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Abstract Political Development in Jordan: 1974-1999 
ABSTRACT 
Jordan is an ancient land wliich happens to be the home to some of the earliest human settlerrients and farming villages. It stands at the juncture of Asia, Africa and/Europe and as such forms the hub of near east; the 
cross worlds of the ancjent^orld, where human beings first organised themselves 
into communities, citij^s and eventually civilization. The Hashemite of Jordan (a/ 
Mamlakah al UrduniyatTaTRashimiyah), is the official name which was adopted after 
1950 annexation of Arab Palestine, west of the Jordan River to the Kingdom of 
Transjordan. The term 'Jordan' is derived from the Arabic world Ardan, Urduun or Al 
Urdun which means descender. The State of Transjordan was created in 1921 which 
was also addressed, as Outer Jordan, Urdon or Sharq al Urdun. This area was never 
an independent and separate entity historically, therefore a variety of names exist as 
a matter of political and diplomatic convenience. 
The principal official language is Arabic. English is the most popular foreign 
language. A sizeable minority speaks Armaic, Cherkess and Armenian. Arabic is both 
popular and cementing languages of Jordan, for a country with domestic policy goals 
of social integration and development of a national consciousness. This unifying 
factor of common language has a far reaching significance. 
Islam is the official religion of the state. It is based on the monotheistic dogma 
as per the teachings of Mohammad (PBUH) who lived in Hejaz in western Arabia. 
Islam has worked as the thread that binds all parts of Jordan together. 
Transjordan's creation reflected in large measure a compromise settlement by 
the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted to reconcile Zionist and Arab 
aspirations in the area. Britain assumed a mandate over Palestine and Iraq, while 
France became the mandatory power for Syria and Lebanon. In a British government 
memorandum of 1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, Jewish settlement 
in Transjordan was specifically excluded. 
As Transjordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually relinquished 
control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign policy matters. In March 1946, 
under the Treaty of London, Transjordan became a kingdom and a new consti'tution 
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replaced the 1928 Organic Law. Britain continued to subsidize the Arab Legion, a 
military force established in 1923. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Arab Legion 
gained control for Transjordan of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The war 
added about 450,000 Palestinian Arab refugees as well as approximately 450,000 
West Bank Arabs to the roughly 340,000 East Bank. Arabs in Jordan. In December 
1948, Abdullah took the title King of Jordan, and he officially changed the country's 
name to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949. The following year he 
annexed the West Bank. 
Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951. Abdullah's son, Talal, 
who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne before being obliged to abdicate 
in favor of his son, Hussein, in 1952. Hussein, who had been studying in Britain, could 
not legally be crowned until he was eighteen; in the interim he attended the British 
Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and returned to Jordan in 1953 to become king. 
The survival of Hussein as King of Jordan represents one of the longest rules 
in the Arab world, thirty-seven years. King Hussein's survival has entailed a keen 
sense of what is politically possible; moving cautiously and seeking to build 
consensus, he has exercised skillful diplomacy, both domestically and regionally. For 
King Hussein survival has involved achieving a balance between more liberal 
Palestinians and more traditionally oriented Transjordanians, particularly the loyal 
beduin tribes of the East Bank, 
The creation of Israel has affected Jordan most because Jordan shares 
longest borders with it. Like other Arab countries, Jordan rated the emergence of 
Israel a dominant power determental to its peace and security and as a loss of its 
prestige and glory. This has been the single core factor to plunge the Arab politics 
into disarray and quandary. During the cold war phenomena, Jordan remained a 
pushpin game in the hands of the East and the West, who did not fight direct war in 
the West Asian region but maintained status quo. The interests remained confined to 
the supply of arms, military training and economic aid so that the countries of the 
region remained dependent upon them to a greater or lesser extent. Jordan was a 
beneficiary of western aid, overtly or covertly and since 1967, offers of active military 
support got accelerated. One aspect of containment policy was also to maintain a 
chain of pro-western governments including that of Jordan also. King Hussein 
deliberately perpetuated Jordan's alignment with the United States due to imperative 
factors of its internal instability as well as harsh acrimony and criticisms led by the 
anti-Western Arab countries. The advantage that Jordan gained out of this tilt was 
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marginal because US policy grew increasingly weighted in favour of Israel. Jordan 
more or less kept on adjusting to new developments and US policies in response to 
meet new challenges and development. 
There is a close association between Palestine and Jordan. They are linked 
with historical, cultural and economic bonds. The partnership with the Palestinians 
desired by King Hussein fell apart in September, 1970. The pervasive and chaotic 
presence of armed Palestinian Fedayeen groups who expected immunity from 
Jordan's laws was leading to a state of virtual anarchy throughout the Kingdom. 
Moderate Palestinian leaders were unable to reign in extremist elements, who 
ambushed the King's motorcade twice and perpetrated a series of spectacular 
hijackings. The situation prompted different reactions throughout the Arab world. 
While most leaders privately expressed sympathy with the position of King Hussein 
many took a public stance in favor of the Fedayeen in order to embellish their 
credentials as "Arab Nationalists". 
Following the events of 1970-71, domestic policy aimed principally at 
promoting national unity among the Jordanian population. This desired unity was 
considered the ultimate guarantee for the survival and security of Jordan. Once 
achieved, Jordan could be trans formed into a model Arab State by opening the way 
for a full return to democracy. For the moment, however, matter of security and order 
remained the immediate concern of the regime. 
Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at an Arab Summit conference 
held in Rabat, Morocco in 1974, King Hussein agreed, along with all the other Arab 
leaders to a summit declaration recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
as the sole. Legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, 
responsibility for negotiating the return of the occupied Palestinian lands was 
transferred from Jordan to the PLO. 
After the Rabat Summit, King Hussein stressed the need for Jordanian political 
self-sufficiency. He told his subjects that a new reality exists and Jordan must adjust 
to it. The West Bank in no longer Jordanian. "But having surrendered title to half his 
kingdom at the behest of the Arab states, Hussein confessed that the East bank might 
become a substitute Palestine swallowed up as the balance of Palestinians in the 
East Bank changed markedly following the Rabat Summit. He advised that the 
resident Palestinians must choose between Jordanian citizenship or Palestine 
identity. No attempt would be made to oust those who chose the latter, he said the 
they would be permitted to remain in Jordan as " guests." He also insisted that any 
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Palestinian choosing to Keep his Jordanian citizenship must be allowed to do so 
without endangering his rights in the West Bank; he further promised that any 
Palestinian living in the East Bank who chose to identify his interests with those of the 
Palestinian people could do so without jeopardizing his rights as a Jordanian citizen. 
In response to the new political situation following the Rabat summit Hussein 
reorganized Jordan's political and administrative institutions. On November 9, he 
amended the Constitution to give the king authority to dissolve the House of 
Representatives (also called the Chamber of Deputies) and to delay elections as he 
saw fit. Using this constitutional prerogative, Hussein dissolved the lower house of the 
National Assembly- the elected House of Representatives when it had completed its 
work on November 23. The House of Representatives, half of whose sixty members 
represented West Bank constituencies could no longer function without undermining 
the newly recognized representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was 
amended to provide for the indefinite postponement of election s for new House of 
Representatives so as to avoid elections on the East Bank alone, which if held would 
have symbolized the final separation of the West Bank from Jordan. In addition to 
dissolving the House of Representatives, Hussein directed Prime Minister Zaid ar 
Rifai to form a new government that did not include Palestinians from the West Bank. 
No Move was made however, to relieve Palestinians in the Jordanian army, where 
they composed one- third of the officer corps, albeit mostly in noncombatant functions 
the government also continued to pay the salaries of 6,000 civil servants and teachers 
in the west Bank, which amounted to about US $40 million a year. 
The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct participant brought 
Jordan and the United States much closer in the peace process that began after the 
conflict. Jordan Joined with the United States in support of UN Security Council 
Resolution 338. This resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973 War to 
cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 
providing for a peace based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. His 
expectations were buoyed by Washington's success in negotiating disengagement and 
limited withdrawal offerees agreement between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. 
The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel to pull back its 
forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step towards a peace agreement with 
Jordan disillusioned King Hussein with respect to the ability of the Americans to 
pressure Israel on the issue of withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. 
Although he continued to value Washington reaffirmations of support for Jordan 
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security and economic progress, King Hussein became increasingly skeptical of 
American assurances that the West Bank would return to Arab hands. Consequently, 
he refrained from participation in the Camp David process, which he was convinced 
would used by Israel to Perpetuate its control of the West Bank. 
Jordan's commitment to the realization of Palestinian aspirations was further 
exemplified in its reaction to the Camp David Accords of 1978. The Treaty between 
Egypt and Israel shattered the chances for a just and comprehensive settlement of 
the conflict, as it neighter required the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories 
(excluding the Sinai) nor asserted Arab sovereignty over them. Along with most Arab 
leaders, King Hussein rejected the treaty as destabilizing to the region. 
Through out the 1980's the Jordanian monarch worked tireless to end the 
Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip. King Hussein accepted that political 
developments since 1974 made it impossible to ignore the PLO in any peace 
negotiation. Thus, one of his policy aims vis-a-vis the United States became to 
convince Washington to deal-at least unofficially-with the PLO. From the end of 1982 
until the end of 1988, King Hussein served as an intermediary between the United 
States and the PLO, attempting to get both parties to make the kind of political 
concessions that were necessary before a dialogue could be initiated. 
In July 1988, King Hussein announced the cessation of a $1.3 billion development 
program for the West Bank, explaining that the measure was designed to allow the PLO 
more responsibility for the area. Following this decision, the King formally dissolved 
Parliament, ending West Bank representation in the legislature. And severed all 
administrative and legal ties with the occupied West Bank. Accordingly, electoral districts 
were redrawn to represent East Bank constituencies only. This disengagement decision 
marks the turning point that launched the current democratic process, and began a new 
stage in Jordan's relationship with West Bank Palestinians. 
Following Jordan's complete disengagement from the West Bank, the country 
could now fully concentrate on the need to develop viable and democratic political 
institutions in line with the aspirations of the Jordanian populace. Thus from the late 
eighties Jordan withnessed an effervescence of democratic political activity, the likes 
of which has not been seen in the past three decades. 
In 1989, political reform began with parliamentary elections that were hailed 
internationally as among the freest ever held in the Middle East. Jordanian went to the 
polls on November 8, 1989, in the first general elections in twenty-two years. The 
fairness of the elections was acknowledged internationally and domestically by both 
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winners and losers alike, and King Hussein was given credit for the measures he had 
taken to secure the return of democracy to Jordan. The electoral guidelines allowed all 
citizens over age nineteen the right to vote. Jordanian women were allowed to vote, 
having first gained the franchise in 1974, and were also entitled to seek office. Although 
the ban on political parties effected in 1957, remained on the books, candidates ranged 
ideologically from the extreme left to the extreme right. Most of these independent 
candidates formed loosely organized blocs according to political inclinations. 
In order to place Jordan's progress to democracy on a stable foundation, a 60-
member royal commission was appointed by King Hussein in April 1990 with the aim 
of drafting guidelines for the conduct of party activity in Jordan. The commission 
comprised members representing all the political groups in the country, and it 
produced a written consensus in the form of the National Charter. The Charter was 
adopted in June 1991 at a national conference of two thousands leading Jordanians. 
The National Charter outlines general guidelines for constructive dialogue 
between the executive and legislative organs, as well as between decision-makers 
and political and intellectual elites concerning questions of authority, rights and 
responsibility. It enunciates the terms under which political parties can operate 
namely, within the framework of the Constitution and free of foreign funding and also 
emphasizes broad agreement on the need for political reflection on Jordan's cultural 
pluralism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has given Jordanian leaders a sense 
of direction, an insurance policy against outbidding by unrestrained groups, and a 
degree of predictability in political affairs. It has also eased concerns about the 
consequences of unbridled freedom of expression. The National Charter, along with 
the Jordanian Constitution, provides a compass for the national debate on 
fundamental issues. 
It also guarantee the protection of human rights and offered an indigenous 
model of democratic pluralism based on the only true guarantors of stability: public 
participation and collective responsibility. Freedom of the press, one of the 
cornerstones of democracy, was enhanced with the enactment of new legislation on 
press and publications. In the area of human rights, the government repealed martial 
law, which had been enforced in the aftermath of the 1967 war. The government also 
encouraged the stationing of several international and regional human rights 
organizations in Jordan, and ratified a number of treaties on human rights 
In June 1992 an extraordinary session of the House of Representatives was 
convened in order to debate new laws regarding political parties and the press. In 
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early July the House adopted new legislation whereby, subject to certain conditions, 
political parties were formally legalized, in preparation for the country's first multi-
party election since 1956, which were to be held before November 1993. The new 
legislation was approved by royal decree at the end of August and by March 1993 
nine political parties had received the Government's formal approval of their activities. 
At the beginning of August 1993 King Hussein unexpectedly dissolved the 
House of Representatives, provoking criticism from some politicians who had expected 
the House to debate proposed changes to the country's electoral law and changes in 
voting procedures at the general election, which was subsequently announced by the 
King in mid-August. Voters were to be allowed to cast one vote only, rather than a 
number equal to that of the number of candidates contesting a given constituency, as 
before. After the announcement of the Israeli-PLO accord in September 1993 King 
Hussein appeared to be unsure whether or not to proceed with the elections, fearing 
that they might be dominated by the debate about the peace process. Eventually the 
King decided to hold the elections as planned in November 1993. 
The political parties, which had been legal for less than a year, had little time 
to organize mass public support. Domestic issues, such as unemployment, were the 
main issues in the electoral campaign, with traditionalist candidates focusing on local 
issues and promising to improve the provision of public services in their 
constituencies. Of the 80 deputies returned, 45 were independents. With the traditions 
of tribalism deeply rooted in the customs of the country, they won largely because of 
their tribal affiliations and personal influence. 
In another move towards democratization, in March 1994 the National Assembly 
approved legislation to allow municipal elections in Greater Amman, where some two-
fifths of the country's population were living. The Government, no doubt concerned 
about the strength of Palestinian and Islamist opposition in the capital, had originally 
proposed that only one-half of the municipal council should be elected, but this was 
increased to two-thirds by the National Assembly. The remaining third of he council, 
together with the mayor, were to continue to be appointed by the Government. 
in May 1997, following increasing media criticism of a number of government 
policies, a number of amendments were made to legislation governing the press 
prompting strong protests from editors, journalists, professional associations and 
opposition groups. The amendments include a considerable increase in the minimum 
capital that weekly journals were required to raise as a precondition for publishing, an 
extension of the range of prohibited subjects to include the armed forces and the 
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security services, and a substantial rise in the fines that could be levied for 
contravening the press legislation. Opposition activists feared that these measure 
represented the return of closer state control over the press. Also in May 1997 nine 
centrist parties, announced that they had united to form the National Constitutional 
Party (NCP), which became the country's largest political grouping. The formation of 
the NCP together with the establishment in 1996 of the Unionist Arab Democratic 
Party (a coalition of three leftist parties), reduced the total number of political parties 
from 24 to 14. 
The elections on 4 November 1997, which were boycotted by many parties, 
professional associations and respected political figures, attracted little popular 
enthusiasm. It was estimated that a mere 55% of the registered electorate participated, 
with a voter turn-out of only 26% in parts of Amman. There were widespread allegations 
of electoral malpractice, and in a number of regions the security forces were obliged to 
intervene to suppress clashes between rival candidates and their supporters Deputies 
with tribal affiliations dominated the new parliament. 
In January 1998 the High Court ruled that the amendments to the press 
regulations introduced in May 1997 were unconstitutional and that actions taken by 
the Government under the amendments consequently had no validity. The authorities 
reluctantly agreed to accept the ruling, and a number of newspapers that had been 
banned resumed publishing in March. 
Jordan's democratic renaissance has had a deep impact in so far as 
empowerment of women is concerned. 
According to the Jordanian Constitution, all Jordanians are equal before the 
law, have the right to assume public office and the right to work. Women were also 
given the right to vote and the right to run for general elections since 1974. In 
addition, the government of Jordan signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in December 1980, which was ratified by 
parliament in 1992. 
The economy of Jordan since past three decades has been dominated by 
dislocations and uncertainties stemming from the Arab conflict with Israel. It created 
demographic problems as the new settlers were from totally different backgrounds 
and there was different outlook from the traditional semi nomadic East Bankers. On 
account of the 1967 Arab Israel war, the society was strained by a further 3.5 percent 
increase in population, rapid urbanization, scarce water resources and the frustration 
of the unemployed. Agriculture production is insufficient to feed the population and 
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large quantities of food stuffs have to be imported. Between 1968 and 1970, 
Palestinian guerilla forays against Israel and the latter's military action caused the 
developing agriculture of Jordan valley to decrease for a while. The 1970-71 civil war 
added to the economic woes. 
The state has played an important role in industrial financing since the mid 50's 
though the economy is essentially based on free enterprise. The state is a partner of a 
private enterprise in the operation of a number of the country's leading industries. Its 
role is regulatory and promotional. It provides institutional structure and financial 
support necessary to stimulate economic and social development. The Government 
adopted a Five Year Plan for Economic Development, 1962-67. Industrial development 
is limited by a lack of commercial deposits of metallic minerals, insufficient skilled 
labour, a restricted labour market and a deficient hydro electric power and fuels such as 
coal and petroleum. The Government did encourage industry with tax exemption and 
financial aid. It also instituted programmes favoring industrialization and showed its 
concern for the promotion of private industrial investment. 
Jordan's relatively small population of fewer than 3 million persons in 1987 
resulted in a limited domestic market unable to achieve economies of scale; thus, 
Jordan needed to develop export markets. Apart from its labor force, which the 
government actively encouraged to seek work abroad in view of scanty domestic 
employment opportunities, Jordan's principal natural resource consisted of 
phosphates-it was the world's third largest phosphates producer~and potash. It also 
was actively engaged in a search for oil and gas; small amounts of both had been 
discovered. These extractive industries, however, required large capital investments 
beyond the capability of Jordan's private sector. In consequence, the government not 
only played the key role in development planning but also became a major economic 
participant, ultimately sharing in forty semipublic companies, contrary to its avowed 
advocacy of free enterprise. In addition, Jordan benefited from the Civil War in 
Lebanon that began in 1975 and the war's troubled aftermath, which heightened 
Jordan's role as a provider of banking, insurance, and professional services formerly 
supplied by Lebanon. 
Jordan's long-term plans called for economic self-sufficiency, and the king's 
brother. Crown Prince Hasan, and the Jordan Technology Group that he founded in 
1988 were key elements in Jordan's economic endeavors. The surface prosperity of the 
early 1980s, however, was ended by the downturn of oil prices in the late 1980s, the 
resulting return home from the Persian Gulf of thousands of Jordanian workers, the 
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decrease in Arab subsidies to Jordan (from more than US$1 billion in 1981 to about 
US$400 million in 1990), and Jordan's increasing debt (estimated in early 1990 at 
between US$6 and US$8 billion). Austerity was reflected in the 1988-89 devaluation of 
the dinar, the freezing of the exchange rate, and increased import duties on luxury 
goods. These measures, combined with the reduction of subsidies on many basic 
commodities to comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements led to riots 
by East Bankers and Bedouins in several towns in late 1989. Jordan had been obliged 
to reduce subsidies as part of an economic stabilization program so as to qualify for a 
US$79.3 million IMF credit. IMF loan endorsement was a precondition for Jordan's 
rescheduling payment on many of Its outstanding loans and obtaining new loans of 
more than US$300 million from the World Bank, Japan, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany). Furthermore, Jordan was sharply affected by the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War in 1988; during the war, because of its good transportation facilities, 
especially between the port of Al Aqabah and Amman, Jordan served as the primary 
transshipment point for goods destined for Iraq. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 found Jordan itself in a difficult 
situation, hard pressed both economically and politically. The enforcement of austerity 
measures in accordance with IMF loan requirements had improved Jordan's balance 
of payments position, but because of the decrease in the transit trade across Jordan 
to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War ended and the return of Jordanian workers from the 
Persian Gulf states resulting from the downturn of oil prices, Jordanian unemployment 
had increased to between 15 and 20 percent. Economic austerity measures had 
widened the gap between the "haves" and the "have no" and had caused discontent 
among elements of the population traditionally loyal to the monarchy: the Bedouins 
and the East Bankers. 
Regionally, Jordan found itself between Scylla and Charybdis. Iraq's invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United States response in sending forces to Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf and encouraging UN economic sanctions against Iraq put 
Jordan in a quandary. In accordance with the UN resolution, it closed the port of Al 
Aqaba to Iraq, and Hussein announced that Jordan refused to recognize Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait. But Jordan expressed reservations concerning the Arab League 
resolution to endorse the sending of an Arab force to Saudi Arabia. 
King Hussein saw his role as that of an active mediator between Saddam 
Husayn and both the other Arab states and the West. Between August 1990 and late 
January 1991, the king held countless meetings with Western and Arab world leaders. 
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including President Busli in mid-August. Initially, Hussein sought to promote an "Arab 
solution" to the Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of this effort, he pursued an 
"Islamic solution" involving Islamic states outside the Arab world, and after the war 
began on January 16 he strove to end the conflict. This policy resulted from a number 
of factors. The king shared the view of the majority Palestinian element of Jordan's 
population that the West, led by the United States, was using a double standard in 
denouncing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, while 
ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies in the West Bank. 
This stance made the king popular with Palestinians, as did permission for the 
September holding of a pro-Iraqi conference by Jordanians and representatives of 
several major PLO groups, Yasser Arafat's August endorsement of Saddam Husayn 
had, however, created a rift in the PLO as well as cut off Saudi financial assistance to 
the PLO. Hussein also had a longstanding fear that Israel planned to make Jordan the 
substitute Palestinian state-this aim had been stated on numerous occasions by 
prominent members of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Bloc- -thus leading to 
the downfall of the Hashimite monarchy. The Guif crisis was seen as a focus that 
would divert attention from the Israeli-Palestinian question and allow Israel greater 
latitude to pursue such a course of action. Both of these elements were reflected in 
the king's request to Jordanian parliamentarians in August to refer to him as "Sharif" 
Hussein, demonstrating the king's view that the Gulf crisis represented a conflict 
between the Arab sovereignty and foreign domination similar to the situation that his 
great grandfather, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, faced at British hands in 1925. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the king's seeking to reconcile the 
conflict was the economic consequence to Jordan of the crisis and the subsequent 
war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created a stream of refugees, primarily Arab and 
Asian expatriate workers and their dependents, who had been living in Iraq and 
Kuwait. These persons entered Jordan at the rate of more than 10,000 per day, a 
total of more than 500,000 as of late September 1990. They required food and shelter 
before most could be repatriated. This influx further strained Jordan's economy, in 
part because promised Western financial contributions to help defer costs of the 
humanitarian enterprise were slow in arriving. For example, Jordan was obliged to 
ration subsidized foods such as rice, sugar, and powdered milk at the beginning of 
September. Meanwhile, the boycott of Iraq had a major impact on Jordan because 
Iraq had been Jordan's principal export market and its major source of cheap oil 
(providing almost 90 percent of Jordan's oil), whereas Kuwait had been Jordan's 
second largest market. 
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Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which had provided substantial economic support to 
Jordan in the past, was so angered over Jordan's failure to back it in its dispute with 
Iraq that it cut off oil exports to Jordan and shortly afterward expelled twenty Jordanian 
diplomats. In turn, in early October Jordan closed its borders to trucks bound for Saudi 
Arabia and instituted fuel austerity conservation measures. The crisis also resulted in a 
dramatic drop in tourism income, a major component of Jordan's GDP. The situation 
caused Minister of Finance Basil Jardanah in the latter half of September to estimate 
that Jordan would lose US$2.1 billion the first year of the boycott and would need 
US$1.5 billion (by January this figure had been revised to US$2 billion) in aid to avoid 
economic collapse. He made a strong plea for financial aid to the UN and the West in 
general; various Western nations and Japan promised loans. 
In early January, reflecting Jordan's concern over being caught between Iraq 
and Israel and the tension prevailing, Jordan mobilized Its armed forces and 
transferred a number of troops from the east to the Jordan Valley, indicating that it 
considered the threat from Israel to be the more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait came on January 15, Jordan announced that it would protect 
its land and air borders against external aggression. 
Following the liberation of Kuwait by us forces, Middle East alignments have 
changed appreciably, and the fiction of Arab unity was destroyed. Jordan's position in 
the midst of this regional dilemma was rendered more precarious than it had been for 
many years. 
Sensing a "window of opportunity" following the liberation of Kuwait, the 
United States and the Russian Federation co-sponsored the Madrid Peace 
Conference in October, 1991. During the Madrid negotiations, Jordan extended an 
"umbrella to the Palestinian delegation, allowing them to negotiate with the Israelis 
directly for the first time. 
Almost two years later, on September 13, 1993, the PLO and Israel signed their 
Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), outlining a negotiating framework to be followed leading 
to a final status treaty between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. This opened the road 
for Jordan to proceed on its own negotiating track with Israel, and the Jordan-Israel 
Common Agenda of negotiations was initialed one day after the PLO-lsrael Declaration of 
Principles. On July 25, 1994, King Hussein met with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in the 
Rose Garden of the White House, where they signed the Washington Declaration, 
formally ending the 46-year state of war between Jordan and Israel. 
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The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed on October 26, 1994, at the 
southern border crossing of Wadi 'Araba. The treaty guaranteed Jordan the restoration 
of its occupied land (approximately 380 square kilometers), and guaranteed the 
Kingdom an equitable share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Moreover, 
the treaty defined Jordan's western borders clearly and conclusively for the first time, 
putting an end to the dangerous Zionist suggestion that "Jordan is Palestine." 
Seeking to lay a firm foundation for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace, 
the treaty also outlined a number of areas in which negotiations would continue. To 
this end, Jordanian and Israeli negotiators have signed a series of protocols 
establishing a mutually beneficial framework of relations in fields such as trade, 
transportation, tourism, communications, energy, culture, science, navigation, the 
environment, health and agriculture, as well as cooperatory agreements for the 
Jordan Valley and the Aqaba-Ellat region. 
Jordan has consistently followed a pro-Western foreign policy and traditionally 
has had close relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. These 
relations were damaged by support in Jordan for Iraq during the Gulf war. 
Since the end of the war, Jordan has largely restored its relations with Western 
countries through its participation in the Middle East peace process and enforcement 
of UN sanctions against Iraq. 
No body in Jordan can deny the progress and prosperity that has taken place 
during the late King Hussein's reign. Throughout his long and eventual reign. King 
Hussein worked hard at building his country and raising the living standard of each 
and every Jordanian. Early on, King Hussein concentrated on building an economic 
and industrial infrastructure that would compliment and enhance the advances he 
wanted to achieve in the quality of life of his people. 
King Hussein died on February 7,1999 and was succeeded by King Abdullah. 
After his accession. King Abdullah immediately made efforts to strengthen relations 
with the Arab world as well as relations with the USA and Western countries. King 
Abdullah also assured that he was committed to continue his father's support for the 
Middle East peace process. The death of Hussein Bin Talal, the estimable King of 
Hashemite Jordan, Is a deeply saddening event. He was a rare man in political life in 
that he was both rich In deeds and even richer in decency. King Hussein Is no more, 
but the challenging legacy is an ideal vision for young King Abdullah. 
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PREFACE 
The Hashemite kingdom of Jordan occupies a strategic position due to its geographical location. The political significance of Jordan increased nnanifold after the creation 
of Israel on its Western borders. Jordan's vicinity to Israel's location is 
crucial development with multiple dimensions of interests which has 
converted Jordan into the most vital, vibrating and sensitive point for the 
entire Arab World in general and the United States in particular. 
The present thesis is an effort to analyses the political 
development in Jordan sine 1974 which is a watershed in Jordanian 
Politics. It was in 1974 that Jordan disengaged itself from the Palestine 
question and the Jordanian monarch concentrated his efforts on 
developing a Jordanian Political identity to the East Bank. 
The First Chapter traces the evolution of the modern Jordanian 
State following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20'*" 
century. It then goes on to analyse the political developments in Jordan 
till the on break of the June 1967 Arab-Israel War. 
The Second Chapter deals with political development in Jordan in 
the aftermath of the October 1973 War. Following the October 1973 
Arab-Israeli War, at an Arab Summit conference held in Rabat, Morocco 
in 1974, King Hussein agreed, along with all the other Arab leaders to a 
summit declaration recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
as the sole. Legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 
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Consequently, responsibility for negotiating the return of the occupied 
Palestinian lands was transferred from Jordan to the PLO. 
The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct 
participant brought Jordan and the United States much closer in the 
peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan joined with the 
United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338. This 
resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973 War to 
cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 
242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territories. His expectations were buoyed by Washington's 
success in negotiating disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces 
agreement between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. 
The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel to 
pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step towards 
a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned King Hussein with respect 
to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on the issue of 
withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. Although he 
continued to value Washington reaffirmations of support for Jordan 
security and economic progress, King Hussein became increasingly 
skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank would return to 
Arab hands. Consequently, he refrained from participation in the Camp 
David process, which he was convinced would used by Israel to 
Perpetuate its control of the West Bank. 
The Third Chapter begins with a discussion of the Jordanian 
political system and then proceeds to critically examine the political 
reforms introduced by King Hussein in the late eighties and early 
nineties. The 1989, 1993 & 1996 National Elections have been analyzed 
in depth and the process of democratization discussed in detail. 
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The Forth Chapter narrates briefly the different phases of the 
growth of Jordanian economy with a focus on the agricultural and 
industrial sectors. Besides, an attempt has been made to relate 
economic development in Jordan with regional crises such as the Iran-
Iraq War and the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent US led War on 
Iraq radically changed Middle East alignments and the fiction of Arab 
Unity was destroyed. Jordan's position in the midst of these regional 
crises was rendered more precarious than it had been for many years. 
The impact of these regional developments on Jordanian polity and 
economy form the subject matter of the Fifth Chapter. This Chapter also 
looks into the movement towards achieving a comprehensive peace in 
the region in the aftermath of the War as well as the Jordan - Israel 
Peace Treaty signed in 1994. The Sixth Chapter deals with the conclusion 
drawn from this study. 
It is a sincere of pleasure to acknowledge the assistance extended 
to me by many during the research and writing of this thesis. 
First and foremost, I am grateful to Almighty Allah for his 
blessings, which were with me during the entire course of the study. 
I feel a deep sense of gratitude for my mother (Um-Omar) and 
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really matter in life. I am grateful for my brothers Abu Ammar, Izzat, 
Ziad, Ali, Azml and Hammoudeh, for rendering me the sense and the 
value of brotherhood. I am glad to be one of them. 
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Jawaid Iqbal. I have 
known Dr. Jawaid as a sympathetic and principled person. His 
enthusiasm and integrated views on research and his mission for 
providing 'only high-quality work and not less", has made a deep 
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have been a real motivating factor. Now words can match their efforts, 
affection, and patience in providing active help. They have been a true 
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I shall be failing in duty if 1 do not thank me dear friends. 
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Chapter- 1 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
Jordan is an ancient land, which happens to be the home to some of the earliest human settlements and farming villages. It stands at the juncture of Asia, Africa and 
Europe and as such forms the hub of near east; the cross 
worlds of the ancient world, where human beings first organised 
themselves into communities, cities and eventually civilization. The 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (al Mamlakah Alurdunlyah al 
Hashimiyah), is the official name which was adopted after 1950 
annexation of Arab Palestine, west of the Jordan river to the Kingdom 
of Transjordan. The term 'Jordan' is derived from the Arabic word 
Urduun, Al Urdun or Ardan; which means descender. The state of 
Transjordan was created in 1921 which was also addressed as outer 
Jordan, Urdon or Sharq al Urdun. 
The area provided safe trade routes and therefore had strategic 
importance for invaders. Its long chequered history bears testimony to 
its being occupied by the Hebrews, Assyrians, Chaiderns, Persians, 
Nabateans, Arabs, Greeks, Romans, Muslim Arabs and Ottoman Turks. 
On the west, Jordan is bordered by Israel and West Bank, the North by 
Syria, the East by Iraq and the South East by Saudi Arabia. It is almost 
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a land locked country, except for a 16-mile coastline on the Red Sea. 
The focus of which is the port of Aqaba. As to size, the East Bank is 
35,000 square miles. The West Bank is bounded on the North West 
South by Israel and separated from the East Bank by Jordan River and 
the Dead Sea. It is located on a largely elevated, rocky plateau that 
slopes downward to the Jordan valley, the Dead Sea and the Gulf of 
Aqaba. Most of the land is desert. Its architectural splendour was at its 
zenith during the Roman occupation and after that it slipped into the 
hands of nomadic tribes and was reduced to destruction and ruin. Most 
of the Transjordan is useable only for pasturing the sheep, goats and 
camels, the Bedouin tribes who in the heat of mid of summer migrate to 
Wadi Sirhan (Saudi Arabia) or to the edge of the cultivated lands, 
where water is available. Thus the area east of the river Jordan which 
forms the present Transjordan had traditionally been part of the 
empires of Ancient Iraq (Summer, Akkad, Babylon, Arsyria, 
Mesopotamia etc), Egypt, Greece, Persia and Rome had been a 
communication and trade route between the Far East and the 
Mediterranean. The major Arab and Islamic dynasties form 640 C.E. 
until present day, which ruled this area include Umayyads (616-750), 
the Abbasids (750-969,) the Fatimids (969-1171), the Ayyabids (1174-
1263,) the Mamluka (1250-1516) and the Ottomans (1516-1918). 
However, now the area is 34,442 sq. miles. Jordan is poor in natural 
resources, soil, rainfall and minerals. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan derives its name from the 
Hashemite clan, bani Hashem. The Quraish tribe ruled this area for a 
very long time. The Hashemites are the descendants of the Arab 
chieftain Quraish who settled in Mecca during second century CE. The 
earliest member of this clan was 'Qusayy'. He was the great 
grandfather of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). The Hashemites are, thus, 
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the direct descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and 
Ali Bin Abi Talib. The Persian Sayyids are the descendants of their 
younger son, Al Hussein, whereas the Sharifian branch of Hashemites 
of Jordan are descendants of their elder son, AL Hassan, King Hussein 
is the forty second generation in direct male descent from Prophet 
Mohammad (PBUH) and as such represents a thousand year of rule in 
the area. Not much of early Arab history is known to us, Between 697 
AD and 1201 AD, various families of Sherifs ruled over Hejaz region of 
Arabia, From 1201 AD, the descendants of Sharif Qatada ruled Mecca 
in unbroken succession until-1925, not with standing their recognition 
of sovereignty of the Ottoman sultan in 1517. 
Since the earliest time, Jordan has been a region of human 
settlement where civilization prospered. It has been home for several 
waves of Semitic Arab migrations. Landmarks of past civilizations built 
by its inhabitants are still in view. Jordan will always take pride in the 
imprints made by Arab tribes that came from the Arabian Peninsula in 
pre-lslamic times and contributed to the establishment and 
maintenance of ties between the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Mediterranean region. The city of Petra, built by the Nabatean Arabs in 
the Southern Jordan, stands as a symbol of Arab staying power, 
determination and contribution to the region as a whole.^^^ 
The rise of Islam in the holly cities of Mecca and Medina bore the 
message of enlightenment and inspiration to mankind, but its spread 
beyond the confines of the Arabian Peninsula was met with opposition 
by existing powers. Muta witnessed the first collision between Muslims 
and Byzantines, leading to the fall of a number of Muslims martyrs. 
Islam then registered a decisive victory along the banks of the 
Yarmouk. As one of the five regions of Syria, Jordan became a 
steadfast base and springboard for conquest and liberation. Since then 
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it has remained part of the Islamic Arab State and a point of contact 
between the Arabian Peninsula and other Muslim countries. 
From the beginning of the twelfth century onwards, during the 
Mamluke and Ottoman periods, the region was regulated by specific 
administration councils with popular participation. However, during the 
latter phase of Ottoman rule, Jordan was the subject of discrimination 
exercised by the Union progress Committee against the Arab National 
identity, which led to a rejection of Turkish nationalist policy and a 
rebellion against the rule of those embracing this policy. The Uprising 
was an inevitable consequence of Turkification, oppression, economic 
malaise, administrative corruption and the inability of the Ottoman 
Empire to provide a modicum of security or stability for the Arab 
countries as a whole. Thus the national and renascent aim of the great 
Arab revolt, which began on the ninth of Sha'ban 1334 A.H (tenth of 
June, 1916 A.D.), was to unite the countries of the Arab East into one 
Arab state embracing Iraq, the Hijaz and great Syria, including Jordan 
and Palestine.^^^ 
The Great Arab Revolt 
Much of the trauma and dislocation suffered by the peoples of 
West Asia during the 2oth century can be traced to the events 
surrounding World War 1. During the conflict, the Ottoman Empire 
sided with the central powers against the Allies. Seeing an opportunity 
to liberate Arab lands from Turkish oppression, and trusting the honor 
of British officials who promised their support for a unified Kingdom for 
the Arab lands, Sharif Hussein bin All, Emir of Mecca and King of the 
Arabs (and grand father of King Hussein Bin Talal), launched the great 
Arab revolt. After the conclusion of war, however, the victors reneged 
on their promises to the Arabs, carving from the dismembered ottoman 
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lands a patch work system of mandates and protectorates. While the 
colonial powers denied the Arabs their promised single unified Arab 
state, it is never the less testimony to the effectiveness of the of the 
great Arab Revolt that the Hashemite family was able to secure Arab 
rule over Transjordan, Iraq and Arabia. In order to discern the motives 
of the Hashemite in undertaking the revolt, one must understand the 
policies undertaken by the Ottoman Empire in the years leading up to 
World War1. Following the young Turk Coup of 1908 the Ottomans 
abandoned their pluralistic and pan-Islamic policies instead pursuing a 
policy of secular Turkish nationalism, The formerly cosmopolitan and 
tolerant Ottoman Empire began overtly discriminating against its non-
Turkish inhabitants, Arabs in particular were faced with political, 
cultural and linguistic persecution. During this time, Arab nationalist 
group in Syria, Iraq and Arabia began to rally behind the Hashemite 
banner of Abdullah and Faisal, sons of Sharif Hussein bin AN, King of 
theArabs.^^' 
When the Ottomans entered World War 1 on the side of the 
central powers in 1914, they upheld the ban on the official use of the 
Arabic language and its teaching in schools, while arresting many Arab 
nationalist figures in Damascus and Beirut. Arabs were further 
threatened by the construction of the Hijaz Railway, connecting 
Damascus and Mecca, which promised to facilitate the mobility of 
Turkish troops into the Arab heartland. Consequently, in June 1916, as 
head of the Arab nationalists and in alliance with Britain and France, 
Sharif Hussein initiated the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule. 
His sons, the emirs Abdullah and Fisal, led the Arab forces, with Emir 
Faisal's forces liberating Damascus from Ottoman rule in 1918. At the 
end of the wars, Arab forces controlled all of modern Jordan, most of 
the Arabian Peninsula and much of Southern Syria. 
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Sharif Hussein's objective in undertaking the Great Arab Revolt 
War to establish a single independent and united Arab State stretching 
from Aleppo (Syria), to Aden (Yemen) based on the ancient traditions 
and culture of the Arab people the upholding of Islamic ideals and full 
protection and inclusion of Ethnic and religious minorities. Arab 
nationalists in the fertile Crescent and the Arabian peninsula found in 
the Hashemite commanders of the great Arab revolt the leadership that 
could realize their aspirations, and thus coalesced around them/" ' 
The political aspirations of the Arabs were not to be realized, due 
to the conflicting promises made by the British to their War times allies. 
The first of these came during 1915 in an exchange of ten letters 
between Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's high commissioner in Egypt, and 
Sharif Hussein. Essentially, Britain pledged, in what became known as 
the Hussein - McMahon correspondence, to support Arab independence 
if Hussein's forces revolted against the Turks. 
But the agreement excluded three areas: the Wilayets (Ottoman 
Provinces) of Basra and Baghdad, the Turkish districts of Alexandretta 
and Mersin, and most importantly, "portions of Syria lying to the West 
of the district of Damascus, Hems, Hama, and Aleppo". The 
interpretation of the last section was to be the source of great 
controversy. The British later claimed that Palestine was meant to be 
excluded from the area of Arab rule, as it is technically located West of 
Damascus: for obvious reasons the Zionists took the same position. 
The Arabs interpreted the letter as it reads: Lebanon, not Palestine, is 
to the West of Damascus and the other area's mentioned. ^^ ' 
In any case, the interests of the colonial powers took precedence 
over promises made to the Arabs. White accepting the principle of Arab 
independence laid down in Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the 
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Sykes- picot Agreement, signed by Britain, France and Russia in 1916, 
divided tlie area into Zones of permanent colonial influence. The 
agreement recognized French interests in Greater Syria and Northern 
Iraq, while acknowledging British designs on a belt of influence from 
the Mediterranean to the Gulf to protect its trade and communications 
links with Indian subcontinent. The Sykes-Picot agreement specified 
that most of Palestine was to be entrusted to an international 
administration. The agreement clearly contradicted the promises made 
to Sharif Hussein of Mecca. 
To further complicate matters, the Balfour declaration in 1917, 
emphasized Britain's commitment and support for a Jewish home in 
Palestine; it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which 
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non Jewish 
communities in Palestine. '^ ^ 
Though the centre of revolt was in the Arabian peninsula, a part 
of it spread towards Syria and Palestine within the framework of Joint 
Anglo- Sharifian adventure under the command of King Faisal who 
established contact with the area after capturing Aqaba on July 6, 1917 
and appealed to the tribal leaders in the area West of the River Jordan 
to join him. Therefore the two Sheikhs Abu Tayah of Huweitat and 
Nuriash Shalan of Rawala tribes came forward with a small force. 
Sharif Husain, his father and the Amir of Mecca reinforced his son's 
appeal by invoking the peoples conscience for what he termed as, "a 
religious and political struggle" ^^^ When Turkey lost its battle, the Arab 
provinces were divided between three victors, Britain, France and the 
Arabs. The territory of Syria, including Transjordan was put under 
Faisal who set-up an Arab government at Damascus. His territory was 
divided into eight provinces out of which three comprised the area east 
of Jordan (included all Karak, al Balga and Hauran). However the 
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arrangements got eclipsed because of the Sykes-Picot (May 16, 1916) 
and the Anglo-French Agreements (September 15, 1919). The French 
government refused to recognize Feisal's little Syria and following futile 
negotiations ousted him (July 25, 1920) and with this the faint flicker of 
hope of establishing an Arab State in Syria. 
The Making of Transjordan 
Although the Sykes-Picot Agreement was modified considerably 
in practice, it established a framework for the mandate system, which 
was imposed in the years following the war. Near the end of 1918, the 
Hashemite Emir Faisal set up an independent government in 
Damascus. However, his demand at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference 
for independence throughout the Arab world was met with rejection 
from the colonial power. In 1920 and for a brief duration, Faisal 
assumed the throne of Syria and his elder brother Abdullah was offered 
the crown of Iraq, however, the British government ignored the will of 
the Iraqi people and shortly afterward, the newly founded league of 
Nations awarded Britain the mandates over Transjordan Palestine and 
Iraq. France was given the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, but had 
to take Damascus by force, removing King Faisal from the throne to 
which he had been elected by the General Syrian congress in 1920. 
In November 1920, Emir (Later King) Abdullah led forces from 
the Hijaz to restore his brother's throne in the Kingdom of Syria. 
However, the French mandate over Syria was already well planted and 
emir Abdullah was obliged to delay his Pan-Arab goals and focus on 
forming a government in Amman. Since the end of the war, the British 
had divided the land of Transjordan into three local districts, with a 
British "advisor" appointed to each. The Northern region of Ajloun had 
its administrative centre in Irbid, the central region of Balga was based 
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in Salt, and the Moabite Arab government, based in Karak, ran the 
Southern region. 
The regions of Ma'an and Tabuk were incorporated into the 
Kingdom of the Hijaz, ancestral home of the Hashemite. Faced with the 
determination of Emir Abdullah to unify Arab lands under the 
Hashemite banner, the British proclaimed Abdullah ruler of the three 
districts, known collectively as Transjordan. Confident that his plans for 
the unity of the Arab nation would eventually come of fruition, the Emir 
established the first centralized government system in what is known 
modern Jordan on April 11, 1921/^^ 
King Faisal 1, meanwhile, assumed the throne of the Kingdom of 
Iraq in the same year. The Hashemite family ruled Iraq until King 
Faisal's grandson King Faisal II and his immediate family were all 
murdered in a bloody coup by Nasserite sympathizers led by colonel 
Abdul Karim Qassem on July 14, 1958. The Hashemites suffered 
another major blow in 1925 when King Ali bin Al-Hussein eldest brother 
of Abdullah and Faisal lost the throne of the Kingdom of the Hijaz to 
Abdul Aziz bin Saud of Najid. The loss, which was the result of a 
partnership between Ibn Saud and followers of the Wahhabi movement, 
led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and brought to 
an end over one thousand years of Hashemite rule in Mecca. 
Emir Abdullah soon succeeded in loosening the British mandate 
over Transjordan with an Anglo-Transjordan treaty. On May 15, 1923, 
Britain formally recognized the Emirate of Transjordan as a state under 
the leadership of Emir Abdullah. This angered the Zionists, as it 
effectively severed Transjordan from Palestine and so reduced the area 
of any future Jewish national home in the region. The treaty stipulated 
that Transjordan would be prepared for independence under the 
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general supervision of the British high commissioner in Jerusalem, and 
recognized Emir Abdullah as head of state. In May 1925, the Aqaba 
and Ma'an districts of the Hijaz became part of Transjordan/^^ 
Despite recognition by Britain of the independence of the Emirate 
of Transjordan on 25 May 1923, and despite a promise to strengthen 
relations between the two countries and to define the constitutional 
position of Transjordan the first Anglo-Jordanian treaty, concluded on 
20 February 1928, failed to respond to Jordanian demands for a fully 
sovereign and independent sate. This failure led to widespread 
disaffection with the treaty among Jordanians, prompting them to seek 
a national conference, the first of its kind, to examine the articles of the 
treaty and adopt a plan for political action. The conference was held on 
25 July 1928, with the participation of large number of leaders, 
notables and thinkers. Regarding itself as legitimate representatives of 
the Jordanian people, the conference set up an executive committee to 
lead the national Jordanian movement. It also issued a Jordanian 
National Charter. This was the first political document at the national 
level with a defined platform and as such was a watershed in the 
history of the Jordanian political and national struggle. It defined the 
basic political constants for that phase and underlined several 
important concepts, including: 
• The Emirate of Transjordan is an independent and sovereign Arab 
State within its recognized geographic borders. It is administrated 
by an independent government headed by his Royal Highness 
Prince Abdullah bin Al-Hussein and his successors. 
• No recognition is accorded to the Mandatory principle except in so 
far it constitutes an impartial form of assistance for the country's 
benefit, provided that such assistance be defined through an 
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agreement or treaty to be concluded between Transjordan and 
Britain on the basis of reciprocal rights and mutual benefits without 
prejudice to national sovereignty. ^^ °^  
• The Balfour Declaration calling for the establishment of a national 
home land for the Jews in Palestine is contrary to Britain's official 
undertakings and commitments to the Arabs and runs counter to 
religious and civil laws known to the world. 
• All parliamentary elections held in Transjordan on a basis contrary 
to that of true representations or on the basis of the government not 
being answerable to parliament shall not be regarded as 
representative of the will or sovereignty of the nation under 
constitutional rules, but rather as an artificial election with no true 
representational value. Decisions taken by such elected members 
on any political, financial or legislative rights shall not have any 
force of law that the people will recognize. They shall rather be 
regarded as symptomatic of behaviour exercised by the Mandatory 
Authority on its own responsibility. 
• All military conscription not authorized by a responsible 
constitutional government will be rejected, since conscription is an 
indivisible component of national sovereignty. No costs will be borne 
on behalf of any foreign occupying force, and any levy imposed 
shall be regarded as money usurped from country's needy workers 
and peasants. Any extra ordinary legislation not based on justice, 
the common goods or the true needs of the people shall be 
regarded null and void. No financial loan concluded before the 
establishment of parliament shall be recognized. No disposition of 
public's lands shall be effected before approval by parliament. Any 
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sale concluded before parliament has been assennbled shall be 
regarded as lacking validity. 
These important principles governed the political struggle of the 
Jordanian people until the conclusion of the second Anglo-Jordanian 
treaty on 17 June 1946, on the basis of which Britain recognized the 
independence of Transjordan under the name of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. 
The period between the two World Wars was thus one of 
consolidation and institutionalization in Transjordan. Abdullah sought to 
build political unity by moulding the disparate Bedouin tribes into a 
cohesive group capable of maintaining Arab rule in the face of 
increasing Western encroachment. Abdullah realized the need for a 
capable security force to establish and ensure the integrity of the state 
in defense, law, taxation, and other matters. Accordingly, he set up the 
fabled. Arab Legion. The Arab Legion was set up with assistance from 
British officers, the most well known of whom was Major J.B. Gubb.^^ 
Although the Arab Legion provided Emir Abdullah with the means 
of enforcing the authority of the state throughout Transjordan, he 
realized that true stability could only be realized by establishing 
legitimacy through representative institutions. Hence, as early as April 
1928 he promulgated a constitution, which provided for a parliament 
known as the Legislative Council. Elections were held in February 
1929, bringing to power the first legislative Council of 21 members. The 
legislative council was guaranteed advisory powers, and of its 21 
members were appointed.^^^' 
Between 1928 and 1946, a series of Anglo-Transjordan treaties 
led to almost full independence for Transjordan. While Britain retained 
a degree of control over foreign affairs, armed forces, communications 
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and state finance, Emir Abdullah commanded the administrative and 
military machinery of the regular government. On March 22, 1946, 
Abdullah negotiated a new Anglo-Transjordan treaty, ending the British 
mandate and gaining full independence for Transjordan. In exchange 
for providing military facilities within Transjordan, Britain continued to 
pay a financial subsidy and supported the Arab Legion. Two months 
later, on May 25, 19,46, the Transjordanian parliament proclaimed 
Abdullah King, while officially changing the name of the country from 
the Emirate of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.^^ '^ 
As a result of the Balfour Declaration and Britain's determination 
to implement the establishment of a national homeland for the Jews in 
Palestine conditions in Palestine rapidly deteriorated. The Palestinian 
Arabs were placed under emergency rule. Their successive uprisings 
and armed rebellions were brutally suppressed, thus preventing any 
form of independence for Palestinian or the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Palestine was opened up for Jewish 
immigration civilian military and political. A Jewish force was trained to 
fight along side British forces in the Second World War. 
Thus, when the United Nations General Assembly adopted 
resolution, 181 on 29 Novembers 1947, calling for the partition of 
Palestine and when the British Mandate came to an end on 15 may 1948, 
the Jewish Agency had acquired all the requisites of a state, whereas the 
Palestinian people were left defenseless in the face of terrorism and 
oppression. Arab regimes, which were then under imperialist influence, 
stemmed the supply of arms to the Palestinian. Large numbers of 
Palestinians were forcibly evacuated from their homes.^ "^^  
The Jordanian Arab legion, fighting along side other Arab armies, 
performed well in the first Arab-Israeli war. It succeeded in holding onto 
Chapter -1 14 Historical Background 
these Palestinian territories, which later became known as the West 
Bank of the Kingdom. Its glorious and honorable defence of Jerusalem, 
together with other battles in defence of Palestine, led to the fall of 37 
martyrs and about a thousand wounded. The total strength of the Arab 
Legion at the time did not exceed five thousand men, armed with small 
weapons and limited munitions under direct British command. In 
addition, Jordanian volunteers took part in the fighting, side by side 
with Palestine commands and their Arab brethren who had flocked to 
the defense of Palestine. 
Solidarity between Jordanians and Palestinians again proved to 
be a most important development in the wake of the 1948 War, when 
the two banks of the Jordan entered into a union within the framework 
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Representing both banks, the 
Jordanian parliament, on 24 April 1950, took the historic decision of 
ratifying the Union. 
The population of Transjordan before the war (1948 war) was 
about 340,000. As a result of the war, about 500,000 Palestinian Arabs 
took refuge in Transjordan or in the West Bank. Most of these people 
had be accommodated in refuge camps, which were administered 
under the auspices of United National Relief and works Agency 
(UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees in the Near East, set up in 1949. 
In addition, there were about 500,000 indigenous residents of the 
West Bank. 
In December 1948, Abdullah took the title of Jordan and in April 
1949 he directed that the official name of the country East Bank and 
West Bank be changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a name 
found in the 1946 constitution but not until then in common use. In April 
1950, elections were held in both the East Bank and the West Bank. 
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Abdullah considered the results favorable and he formally annexed the 
West Bank to Jordan, an important step that was recognized by only 
two governments Britain and Pakistan. Within the Arab league, the 
annexation was not generally approved, and traditionalists and 
modernists alike condemned the move as a furtherance of Hashemite 
dynastic ambitions/^^' On July 20, 1951 King Abdullah was 
assassinated as he entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem for 
Friday prayers. His grandson, fifteen-year-old prince Hussein, was at 
his side. Before the assassin was killed by the King's guard, he also 
fired at prince Hussein. The assassin was a Palestinian reportedly 
hired by relatives of Hajj Amin al Husayni, a former Mufti of Jerusalem 
and a bitter enemy of King Abdullah, who had spent World War II in 
Germany as a Pro Nazi Arab spokes man. 
King Abdullah's second son, prince Naif, acted temporarily as 
regent. Naif's older brother, Prince Talal, was in Switzerland receiving 
treatment for illness. The government invited Talal to return and 
assume the duties, of King. During his short reign, King Talal 
Promulgated a new constitution in January 1952, King Talal was 
popular among the people of the East Bank. But the King's condition 
steadily worsened and he was asked to abdicate in favor up of 
Hussein^^^^- King Talal acceded to the abdication with dignity and retired 
to a villa near Istanbul, where he lived quietly until his death in 1972. 
Prince Hussein, who was a student at Harrow in Britain, returned 
immediately to Jordan. Under the constitution he could not be crowned 
because he was under eighteen years of age, and aregency council 
was formed to act on his behalf. In May 1953 when he attained the age 
of eighteen he formally took the constitutional Oath as King.^^''^ 
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King Hussein's Early Reign 
The chief influences that guided the young King Hussein were 
the example and teachings of his grand father and his own education in 
conservative English Schools. Although Jordan was a constitutional 
monarchy. King Hussein had extensive Legal powers. For Example, the 
constitution allowed him to dismiss the National Assembly and to 
appoint the Prime Minister and other ministers. In addition, he enjoyed 
the traditional support of the East Bank Beduin tribes. 
As border incidents with Israel escalated into a succession of 
reprisals and counterreprisals between Palestinian, infliltrators and 
Israeli security forces, King Hussein's problems grew. The Arab Legion 
tried to secure the armistice line and prevent infiltration, but its 
numbers were inadequate to provide complete and continuous 
coverage of the border. In response to the terrorist attacks Israel 
adopted the technique of massive retaliation that often went deep into 
Jordanian territory. 
In 1953 and 1954, Israel tentatively accepted a United States 
plan (the Eric Johnston Plan) for distribution of the water taken from 
the Jordan River. Although the plan was recognized as technically 
sound from an engineering standpoint, ultimately it was rejected by 
other Arab States concerned because it involved cooperation with and 
the implied recognition of Israel. Given the stress of inter-Arab political 
relationships, it was impracticable for Jordan to initiate a settlement 
with Israel, even though there were strong incentives to do so.^ ^^^ 
Britain agreed to a new financial and political arrangement with 
Jordan in 1954 in which London evinced an interest in coordinating 
military and economic aid to Amman with Jordanian participation, in the 
context of an overall Middle Eastern defense system. In February 1955, 
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Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan joined Britain in signing the Baghdad 
pact, which ultimately became the central Treaty organization 
(CENTO). A high-ranking British military delegation visited Amman to 
discuss conditions under which Jordan might also become a 
participant. The purpose of the visit was generally known, and Arab 
nationalist propaganda especially from Palestinians and Radio Cairo, 
raised a storm of protest denouncing the pact as tool of Western 
imperialism. In December King Hussein asked Hazza-ul-Majali to form a 
government. Majali came from a distinguished family of tribal Shaykhs 
and was known to be Pro-Western. Shortly after forming his cabinet; he 
stated that he intended to take Jordan into the Baghdad pact. Three 
days of demonstrations and rioting in Amman began after the 
announcement and the Arab Legion was called into restore order.^ ^^^ The 
Majali government resigned after only a week in power, and it was 
decided that Jordan would not became a signatory of the Baghdad pact. 
In March 1956, King Hussein, responding to the public reaction 
against joining the British sponsored Baghdad pact, dismissed Glubb 
as commander of the Arab Legion. Glubb's dismissal precipitated a 
diplomatic crisis that threatened King Hussein. Britain relations were 
stained for many years although the British subsidy was not withdrawn. 
King Hussein designated All Abu Nawar, an officer known for his 
nationalist sympathies as Glubb's successor in the Arab Legion. The 
name of the force was officially changed to the Jordan Arab Army, and 
British officers were phased out of the service. 
Border incidents with Israel were a continuing source of anxiety 
in 1956. In October an Israeli task force, supported by aircraft and 
artillery, attacked the West Bank village of Qalgilyah, killing forty-eight 
persons in reprisal for a guerrilla attack in Israel. Palestinians clamored 
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for war, and in this crisis atmosphere Jordanian politics ventured into 
anti-Western nationalism. 
In the parliamentary elections of October 21, 1956, the national 
socialist party received a plurality votes, and King Hussein designated 
its leaders, Sulayman Nabuisi, as Prime Minister. Several National 
Front party (communist Party of Jordan) members and members of the 
Baath Party (Arab Socialist Resurrection Party) also gained seats in 
the National Assembly, although independents and the older 
conservative parties were represented about equally with the leftists 
and nationalists. Nabuisi was an ardent admirer of Nasser and shaped 
the policies of his government accordingly. Nonetheless, when Israel 
attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula on October 29 and 
after British and French forces landed at port said on November 5, 
Nabuisi suddenly proved indecisive.^^°^ King Hussein proposed that 
Jordan attack Israel at once but Nasser discouraged him from wasting 
Jordan's forces in a war that by then was already lost. British 
participation in the attack on Egypt made it politically imperative that 
Jordan end its special relationship with Britain. 
Under the Arab solidarity agreement that resulted from the Arab 
summit meeting in Cairo in January 1957, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and 
Syria undertook to pay Jordan the equivalent of U$ 35.8 million 
annually for ten years, with Saudi Arabia paying an amount equivalent 
to that paid by Egypt and Syria together. The money would effectively 
free Jordan from the British subsidy. Saudi Arabia, however, made only 
one quarterly payment; Egypt and Syria made no payment. The Anglo-
Jordanian Agreement of March 1957 abrogated the basic Anglo-
Jordanian, treaty of 1948, terminated the British subsidy, and initiated 
the turnover of British installations and the withdrawal of all British 
troops still in Jordan. 
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In early 1957, Jordan's internal political scene shaped up as a 
power struggle between the monarchy and the Nasserist Nabuisi 
government. King Hussein and the conservatives suspected that 
Nabuisi was maneuvering to abolish the monarchy. Nabuisi began 
negotiations to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and 
obtain Soviet arm aid. As political tension increased, in April King 
Hussein, exercising his constitutional prerogative, demanded the 
resignation of Nabuisi government.^^^' 
The situation was further confused when commander of the 
Jordan Arab army (then still popularly known in English as the Arab 
Legion), AN Abu Nuwar made a statement to Said al Multi, who was 
then attempting to form a caretaker government. Said al multi 
misinterpreted the statement to be an ultimatum that any new Cabinet 
be approved by the army. A sequence of dramatic events followed that 
became known a the "Azzarga affair". The public in Amman, sensing 
the explosive political atmosphere, became restive. Rumors that the 
King was dead spread at the main army base at Azzarga. TaKing Abu 
Nuwar with him, to demonstrate that he, the King, was much alive and 
that he was in control, not Abu Nuwar, King Hussein set off for 
Az-zarga. Enroute he met several truckloads of troops, who were 
overjoyed at seeing the King alive but who demanded the execution of 
Abu Nuwar.^ ^^^ At Abu Nuwar's request. King Hussein allowed him to 
retreat to the safety of the Royal Palace. Continuing to Az zarga, King 
Hussein spent several hours amid widely enthusiastic troops anxious to 
demonstrate their loyalty to him and to the throne, the King returned to 
Amman after reassuring and quieting the troops. On the next day, Abu 
Nuwar fled the country during the balance of April, several cabinet 
crises occurred, as the remnants of the Nabuisi Faction fought a 
rearguard action against the King. Ibrahim Hashim, a King Hussein 
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loyalist, eventually succeeded in forming a government and outlawed 
all political party activity. 
King Hussein had won a remarkable political victory. What had 
mattered most was the loyalty of the combat units of the army, and that 
loyalty clearly belonged to the King. 
But Jordan was beleaguered. Nasserites were arrayed against 
the King, the British subsidy was gone, the Arab solidarity agreement 
had evaporated, and the rift was wider than ever between the East 
Bank and the West Bank. To counteract these disabilities^"^; King 
Hussein unequivocally placed his country in the Western Camp and 
sought a new source of aid, the United States. 
The 1950s were a period of tumultuous upheaval throughout the 
Arab World. Much of this turbulence was attributed to popular 
dissatisfaction caused by the creation of the state of Israel and the loss 
of Palestine in 1948-49. Colonial powers also continued to exert their 
influences over the Arab nation, a condition that prompted seething 
resentment among the masses. Popular discontent led to a sharp 
growth In support for several radical Pan-Arab ideologies. 
The Ba'th (Renaissance) party, originated in Syria in the late 
1940s under the leadership of two Damascus school teachers, Michel 
Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar. It championed the immediate political unity of 
all Arab states under the slogan of Unity, freedom, and socialism. 
While gaining a degree of popular support throughout the Mashriq 
(Eastern) region, it eventually gained power in Syria and Iraq through 
military coups. 
One of the key players in the Arab political arena during the 
1950s and 1960s was Egyptian President Gamal Addel Nasser. Coming 
to power in 1954 after participation in the 1952 free officers coup, 
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which overthrew King Farouk, Nasser possessed charisma and oratory 
skills, which enabled him to rally the Arab masses^^'*'. Nasser's brand 
of pan-Arabism, broadcast via radio throughout the Arab world, 
especially appealed to the displaced Palestinians. With his popularity 
boosted enormously after the Syez Crisis of 1956, when he 
successfully stood up against the combined front of Britain's, France 
and Israel, Nasser appeared to be the new Salah Eddin who would 
unify the Arabs and reconquer Palestine. 
The vocabulary Pan-Arabism was always more appealing than 
the actions it lead to. Nasser, the Ba'th and others continually tried to 
outbid each other for leadership of the Pan-Arab movement. Instead of 
fostering unity among Arabs, the rivalry fostered by the radicals led to 
deep divisions between Arab States. Eventually in 1967 it led to 
another crippling setback in the struggle against Zionism. While 
Nasser, the Ba'th and radical Pan-Arabists frequently proposed unity 
agreements only to see them dissolve in mutual recrimination. King 
Hussein steadfastly pursued his own ideal of Arab Nationalism. As he 
saw it, Pan Arabism could only succeed in promoting unity among the 
Arabs if it respected the special character of the different Arab 
countries and regimes without trespassing on their individual national 
sovereignties^"^ In the words of King Hussein: 
Essentially, the "Unity" proposals of Nasser and the Ba'thists 
consisted of one state seeking to impose its domination over another. 
The short-lived United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and Syria, 
lasted from 1958-61 and demonstrated the shortcomings of the radical 
unity plans, while popular in the 'street, this risky approach maximized 
rivalry among Arab States at a time when unity of purpose was needed 
more than ever before. On the contrary. King Hussein's visionary Pan-
Arab statesmanship became evident, when the Jordanian Prime 
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Minister Fowzi al-Mulqi introduced a series of liberal reforms, including 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. However, a sense of civic 
responsibility had not yet permeated the Jordanian^^^^ Populace as a 
whole. Radical groups exploited the reforms and relentlessly attacked 
the regime, thus undermining the stability and integrity of Jordan. 
Sometimes they even cynically initiated riots in order to provoke 
reprisals. Nasser's propaganda broadcasts, in particulars incited 
massive riots, which undermined domestic order. Throughout the 
course of his long fruitful reign, King Hussein tried to govern according 
to the precepts and ideals of democratic liberalism, white at the same 
time maintaining the necessary prerequisite of public order. This 
balancing act was not always easy. For example, in 1956, completely 
free parliamentary elections were held, and radical groups including 
Communists and Ba'thists dominated the new cabinet. 
In another important development, King Hussein dismissed the 
British commanders of the Arab Legion in 1956 and terminated the 
Anglo-Jordanian treaty in March of 1957. However, he though that his 
government's leftward drift would eventually lead to a communist 
infiltration of the Arab World, and consequently he resisted the 
trend^^'''. A number of riots, and an externally inspired coup attempt 
which was personally thwarted by King Hussein, forced him to impose 
martial law in the spring of 1957. 
These disruptions to Jordan's stability were followed by a 
succession of internal upheavals, which culminated in perhaps the 
most serious threat to King Hussein's early reign, the crisis of July 
1958 five months after the formation of the Arab Federation, a federal 
union between Jordan and Iraq, a bloody military coup in Iraq by Pro-
Nasserist officers led by colonel Abdul Karim Qassem shattered the 
Arab Federation and left Jordan isolated. 
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With a deft hand characteristic of his leadership, King Hussein 
was able to haul Jordan out of this state of siege. While maintaining a 
firm grip on Jordan's internal security, he reluctantly accepted British 
military help and an American oil airlift in order to preserve the state 
against its external enemies^^^\ 
Jordan And The Baghdad Pact 
The government of Abul Huda, failed to withstand the force of 
public opinion, particularly among the Palestinians, which favored the 
readjustment of Anglo-Hashemite relations. In this ministerial 
statement, delivered on November 7, 1954, Abdul-Huda said: 
"The international situation, the change of situation 
in Egypt and the expected change of situation in Iraq has 
made my government think of a mending our treaty with 
Britain, and negotiations in this regard will start shortly".^ ^^^ 
The change, which Abdul-Huda hoped to bring about, was merely 
in the manner in which the British subsidy was appropriated. In London, 
King Hussein and Abul-Huda demanded the British government to 
consider the Arab Legion subsidy as a payment for the use by British 
military personnel of Jordanian bases. They demanded that the 
payment be made to and disbursed by the Jordan government, instead 
of the British commander of the Arab legion. Such change was deemed 
more consistent with national dignity because direct payment would 
give Jordan more control over the finances of its armed forces, thereby 
reducing Glubb's influence significantly. Britain, however, refused 
Jordan's application^^°\ Instead, it agreed to offer additional funds for 
the Jordan National Guard^^ ^V 
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The British government, which had just come under heavy 
criticism for agreeing to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone without 
securing Egyptian approval of a new defensive organization, was afraid 
of similar criticism if it revised its treaty with Jordan before expiration in 
1963^^^'. It was also considering the revision of its treaty with Iraq, due to 
expire in 1957. Agreement was reached between Britain and Iraq, 
stipulating the replacement of their Pact of Mutual Cooperation on February 
24, 1955^^^^ Britain adhered to the pact on March 30, and as such agreed 
to terminate its bilateral treaty with Iraq, eighteen months before its 
expiration^^^\ The Prime Minister of Jordan, who had earlier demanded a 
revision of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, received a similar offer: Revision 
was contingent on Jordan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact^ ^^^ 
Jordan did not promptly join the pact because of adverse public 
opinion and the sharp criticism of Iraq in the Arab League. Jordanians 
were in no mood to accept further involvement in Western military 
pacts. The Palestinians, considered Israel rather than the Soviet Union 
as the aggressor in the Middle East. Egypt, in the meantime, 
denounced the pact, claiming Baghdad's participation was Inconsistent 
with the treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation signed by 
Arab League members between 1951 and 1953^^^^ In an Arab Premiers 
conference convened in Cairo on January 22, 1955, Egypt attempted to 
isolate Iraq. Jordan's Foreign Minister, Walid Salah, upon the advice of 
Premier Abul-Huda, put forward a resolution calling upon Arab League 
States to refrain from joining the Baghdad pact and recommending the 
formation of a joints peace command, which would expand into a 
general command during war^^^'. This resolution put Jordan 
unmistakably on the side of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Iraq threatened to 
withdraw from the League in the event Jordan's resolution was 
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adopted. A milder resolution was approved by a majority of seven 
delegates including Jordan. It stated in part: 
"The foreign policy of the Arab States is based on the Arab 
League charter, the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation 
between the Arab States. This policy does not approve of concluding 
other alliances^^^^ 
The resolution, which amounted to a condemnation of Iraq, 
sharpened the Egyptian- Iraqi rivalry, within nine months from the 
Turkish-Iraqi announcement of intentions to sign the Baghdad Pact, a 
Mutual Defense Pact was concluded between Egypt and Syria^^^'. This 
Pact established a joint command composed of the Commander in 
Chief, the General staff, and units detached from armies of the 
contracting States. They created a war council of chiefs of staff from 
both States and a Supreme Council consisting of the foreign and war 
minister. Bilateral agreements, similar to the Syrian-Egyptian Pact were 
concluded in 1955 between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and between Egypt 
and Yemen. 
While Lebanon remained neutral in inter-Arab affairs, Jordan 
vacillated between the Iraqi and Egyptian position. The conservative 
Parliament of Jordan, which was almost handpicked by Abul-Huda, 
voted unanimously to cable a congratulatory message to President 
Nasser for the arms deal he concluded with Czechoslovakia in 1955*''°^ 
This event coupled with Jordan's condemnation of Iraq's position on 
military pacts motivated Hussein to make his position clear. He left no 
doubt that the path he wished to pursue was that of Iraq and the West. 
He signaled his choice for the West by requesting the resignation of 
Abul-Huda, which failed to adopt a positive stand toward the Baghdad 
Pact. His foreign Minister, Walid Salah, defected to Cairo. Abul-Huda, a 
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veteran politician who served Abdullah and the British loyally in the 
past, appeared to be in close contact with the Saudi government, a foe 
of the Pact. Said al-Mufti was charged by the King to form a cabinet in 
My, 1955, which included Hazza al-Majali, a well known supporter to 
the Baghdad Pact. This was followed by the visits of two foreign 
dignitaries whose mission was to explain the benefits of the pact to the 
Jordan government. Celal Bayar, President of Turkey, arrived in 
Amman accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Fateen Zurlu, on 
November 2, 1955^''^'. They pledged their country's support to Jordan in 
the event the latter's security is endangered. The visitors, while welcomed 
by officialdom, were greeted by violent demonstration against the 
Baghdad pact in the principal cities^'*^^ Early in December, the British 
government sent Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
to persuade the Amman government to join the pact. He told the cabinet 
that Jordan's infantry would be increased by 25% and its army subsidy 
from £ 10 million to £ 16.5 million the first year and £12.5 every 
subsequent year. A jet fighter squadron was also promised *^^\ 
Templer's visit led to a renewal of the demonstrations of the 
previous month. As frequently happened when freedom of speech was 
shutoff in parliament, the people resorted to the streets to express their 
opposition. 
The Cabinet drafted a memorandum outlining the minimum 
conditions as the price for joining the alliance^'*''^ Prior to submitting it 
to the British delegation, four West Bank Ministers proposed 
consultations with the Egyptian government. When their proposal was 
rejected; the four ministers resigned from the cabinet, thus causing its 
resignation as a whole'^^\ It would have been possible for Said al-Mufti 
to make a new appointment and proceed with the negotiations, but 
being the leader of a minority group, the Circassians, he chose to 
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withdraw in the face of an issue, which had all the makings of a 
communal conflict between Palestinian's and Transjordanian. In view of 
the Cabinet's inability to force the pact on reluctant public, the King 
decided to assume entire responsibility for signing the document. He 
saw in the pact an opportunity to strengthen his army, and to move 
closer to Hashemite Iraq as bulwark against revolutionary nationalism. 
Sir Anthony Eden wrote: 
"Early in November 1955, our ambassador, Mr. Duke 
reported a conversation with King Hussein. The Jordan 
government was ready to join the Baghdad Pact, the King 
said, provided it received the necessary backing" from us^^^\ 
King Hussein, himself, wrote: 
"I realized that if Jordan joined, the free world would 
gain an enormous victory. I felt that if we joined, we should 
receive more arms and economic aid, and the Anglo-
Jordanian Treaty should be changed and its duration 
shortened so that Jordanian officers would have more 
opportunities to rise in the Arab Legion^'*^^ According to 
general Glubb, the King was ready to give a unilateral 
approval, but that Tempter advised against such step 
because, " His Majesty is a constitutional monarch he 
would expose himself to intrigue"^^^^ 
Apparently determined to have a show down with the opposition, 
the King selected a staunch advocate of the Baghdad pact to head a 
new Cabinet^'*^\ Hazza al-Majali, a member of one of the largest and 
most influential tribes in South Jordan, formed a cabinet on December 
16^'', announcing that negotiations with Britain to link Jordan to the 
Baghdad pact would be continued "in proper time"^^°^ His declaration 
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touched off major demonstrations in the principal cities of the Kingdom, 
the third time in two months. The demonstrations became more violent, 
when the army appeared on the scene with orders to disperse the 
crowds by opening fire if necessary ^^ \^ But even that failed to weaken 
the will of the masses to resist. The demonstrations, which lasted five 
consecutive days beginning on December 16, presumably caused the 
resignation of six ministers. Hazza al-Majali was forced to submit his 
government's resignation on December 20. He claimed that it was 
within his means to remain in office and impose the pact on the people. 
He candidly stated that he "could have induced village leaders, 
notablest and opportunities to organize counter rallies and to send 
telegrams in support of the pact"^"^ Deployment of troops to suppress 
the demonstrations was another possibility, but the Prime Minister 
claimed that he disliked violence: 
"I preferred resignation to the shooting of a single soul "(53) 
What the Prime Minister did not say, however, was that an 
exacerbation of an already tense situation in Jordan carried the risk of 
an Israeli invasion of the West Bank, an unwelcome development to 
Hussein as well as to the Palestinians. As price of stability, al-Majali, 
who symbolized the Baghdad Pact, was forced to resign. To justify the 
resignation, the King dissolved the fourth parliament ^ "^^  In the 
meantime, the Monarch's choice of cabinet was being narrowed down. 
Tawfig Abul-Huda was not readily available, for less than a year ago, 
his opposition to the Baghdad Pact cost him the premiership. Further 
more, he was reported to have been approached by the Queen mother 
in Beirut, and that he said: "My Policy is well-known it is neutralism. I 
do not intend to deviate from it.^"' 
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Dissolution of the parliament aggravated the King's troubles. In 
the upcoming elections, a hostile group, more difficult to deal with than 
the dissolved parliament, could have been swept into power. The King 
commissioned an interim government to supervise new elections. It was 
headed by Ibrahim Abdullah. Apparently Ibrahim Hashem disagreed with 
the Monarch regarding the terms under which elections were to be held. 
His government resigned after only seventeen days in office. During this 
brief period, the Supreme Council came to the King's rescue^^^^ 
In an unprecedented move, it ruled that the dissolution of the 
fourth parliament was unconstitutional, and therefore it must be 
reinstated. The Supreme Council based its decision on an insignificant 
constitutional provision requiring the order of dissolution to carry the 
signature of the Prime Minister and the "concerned" minister in addition 
to that of the King. It was noted that the royal decree (Iradah) 
dissolving parliament did not bear the signature of the interior minister 
who resigned prior to the resignation of the entire Cabinet. This 
decision, which technically nullified a royal decree on a technicality, did 
not displease the King. In fact he may have desired it in as much as it 
relieved the Hashem government of the unpleasant task of supervising 
election ^"'. Glubb summed up the situation in the following statement: 
"The King and the government had reconsidered the 
question of dissolution. They had begun to doubt whether 
it was advisable to face a general election at a moment 
when feeling was so inflamed"^^^^ 
The Hashem government was replaced by one headed by Samir 
al-Rifai, who had a long record of service to the Hashemite dynasty. 
Rifai's appointment on January 8, 1956 carried a mandate to restore 
the government's prestige and to reestablish law and order. His 
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Ministerial statement to parliament, delivered on January 26, was a 
mixture of threats and appeasement. On the firm side the premier said: 
"In view of the events of the preceding few weeks 
during which, people of twisted conscience and confused 
minds have restored to violence, destruction and violation 
of the law, my government had decided that its first 
responsibility is to proceed firmly in a direction of law and 
order 
He lectured Parliament on the meaning of freedom which he 
pledged to respect white pursuing a policy of firmness: 
"Freedom, gentlemen, is based on responsibility, 
and that of the individual towards society. Other wise 
freedom will lead to anarchy and tyranny"^^°^ 
On the appeasement side, the ministerial statement embodied a 
pledge to steer clear of foreign alliances and to work for the 
consolidation of the Arab League, which constituted demands of the 
opposition: 
There are two currents of opinion in the Arab World 
today: One aims to organize defense on the basis of 
alliances extending beyond the Arab sphere, and the other 
seeks to establish defense arrangement within an 
independent. Arab framework. And whereas the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan is committed to the sister Arab State by 
multilateral agreements within the framework of the Arab 
League and the Mutual Cooperation Pact, I have declared 
in a statement delivered upon the formation of this 
Cabinet, which I am honored to head, that it is not our 
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policy to join or be tied it in any way to any new alliances, 
but to work for the consolidation of Arab solidarity"^^^\ 
This statement indicated a reversal of Al-Majali's policy, which 
aimed to make Jordan a member of the Baghdad Pact. It, however, 
failed to satisfy the nationalists, who knowing where the sympathies of 
the King lay, insisted in parliament and in the street on an explicit 
denunciation of the Baghdad Pact and a commitment to neutralist 
policy. In the ministerial statement, the government denied that its 
rejection of foreign alliances implied a neutralist policy; it assured 
friends and allies, i.e, Britain and Iraq among others, that Jordan 
respected her agreements ^^^\ The government received a vote of 
confidence by a majority thirty-five against three and one abstention. 
For parliament to act otherwise would have meant dissolution and new 
elections. So, the opposition was again expressed in the street. The 
demonstrations, led by the nationalists, called for new honest elections, 
abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty, and replacement of the 
British subsidy by funds from Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia these 
demands were reiterated in parliament by the members of the Ba'ath, 
communist. National Socialist, and Tahrir Parties,^"^ Opposition 
Leaders were rounded up by the army and security forces in villages, 
town, and refuge camps^^^^ But it was physically impossible to imprison 
all opponents of the regime. 
The crisis of the Baghdad Pact revealed the extent to which 
public opinion figured in the making of public policy. In the face of 
opposition from the domestic environment as well as from abroad, the 
regime began to assess its stability within the frame work of a system 
of checks and balance which involved Israel, Arab nationalism and 
Western influence in the region. Acquiescence the demands of the 
opposition involved the alienation of the West from Hussein's regime, 
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and the risk of an Israeli incursion into the West Bank. Suppression of 
public opinion, on the other hand, would have made Jordan a police 
state. At this juncture of political development, the regime was on the 
defensive. Further concessions to the opposition seemed both 
desirable and necessary for the continued survival of the regime in the 
context of a system of checks and balance. Elizabeth Monroe 
expressed it this way: 
"The disastrous Templer mission to Jordan in 
December 1955 exposed the degree to which Arab unity 
and Arab nationalism must now be taken into account in 
any successful Middle Eastern policy, the Templer incident 
was proof that the force of public opinion in the Middle 
East, though it might be volatile, was henceforth powerful 
and that its impulses were all against the policy of a new 
sedate politicians who thought a pact with the west a price 
worth paying for stability"^"\ 
Early in 1956, the prestige of the government was at such a low 
ebb after being overwhelmed by the pressure of public opinion, that it 
felt it must reach an accord with the opposition at home and abroad. 
The opposition demands were fulfilled before the end of the year: 
The King dismissed general Glubb and other British officers in 
the Arab Legion; he then issued a decree to dissolve the unpopular 
parliament. Relations with Hashemite Iraq were weaker than at any 
other time, and the supporters of Hashemite solidarity began to 
withdraw into the background. 
March 1. 1956, was called by King Hussein "one of the most 
important days of my life"^^®^ General Glubb, chief of the General staff 
of the Arab Legion for more than two decades, was dismissed by the 
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twenty one year old King, and expelled from the country within less 
than twenty-four hours of his dismissal. 
Whereas the dismissal was the necessary concession, which 
King Hussein had to make to the oppositions, several specific 
interpretations were advanced/^^^ One asserts that Glubb was the 
scapegoat chosen by nationalist elements in the army, to whom he 
symbolized Jordan's subservience to British interest^ ®^^ 
The General himself agreed that his dismissal was dictated by 
the political realities. Glubb wrote ^ ®^ ': 
"The King who had incurred the hostility of Egypt 
and the nationalists due to his determination to join the 
Baghdad Pact was persuaded that he could regain his 
popularity with these extremely vocal enemies at one 
stroke. To perform some act of defiance towards Britain 
and to dismiss me would immediately re-established his 
popularity with the noisy politicians at home and would 
quiet the active hostility of Egypt." 
Rejecting these explanations, the King writes that his decision 
was the result of along period of contemplation and reflection in which 
the interest of Jordan was the only consideration ^^°K He wrote: "Let it 
not be thought that I dismissed an old and trusted friend in a fit of 
emotional pique."^ ^^^ 
He said that his only motive for dismissing Glubb was their 
disagreement on two issues. ^^ ^^  The role of Arab officers in our Army, 
and strategy in the defense of our country.*^^^ The King demanded 
more promotions to Arab officers and training for the higher echelons 
so that the army would eventually be Arabized. But he disappointingly 
complained. "Time after time my requests were ignored". '^'^ ^ Finally he 
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was informed that the Royal Engineers of the Arab Legion would have 
an Arab commander by 1985/''^' King Hussein accused Glubb of giving 
his first allegiance to the British government and berated Britain for 
lack of response to nationalist aspirations. He wrote: 
"The British government at that time was incapable of realizing 
that one cannot brush aside a nation's aspirations and say, "We will 
talk about it in thirty years".^''^' The Glubb was efficient and energetic 
did not fail to impress the King. However, he said: one thing has 
changed: 
"The times, twenty-six years is more than a third of 
man's allotted span, and in this period general Glubb had 
been largely isolated from the outside world. To be quite 
frank, it was my impression that he smacked too much of 
the Victorian era".^^ '^ 
The King criticized Glubb's strategy for defense of the country. 
According to the King, his strategy was based on withdrawal to the 
East Bank pending reinforcement, in the event of an Israeli attack^^^^ 
Such strategy was hardly appealing to the more than one million 
Palestinians who lost their homes after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. A 
year before Glubb's dismissal. King Hussein held a military conference 
with cabinet members, advisors and army leaders, including Glubb and 
other British officers, in which he indicated the need for change of 
outmoded practices.^ '^ ^^ He expressed astonishment that many qualified 
Arab officers are changed with insignificant duties and affirmed their 
ability to take on important responsibilities henceforth assigned to a 
select few. He scorned the army command for interference in non-
military affairs. He accused the military of not adhering to a division of 
Labor: "Politics is for the politicians and the battle is for the military. 
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Mixing one function with the other leads to anarchy/^"' The 
combination of those factors meant that Glubb must go. The King 
wrote: 
"All these problems came gradually to a head. I was 
determined to build up strong, well-balanced armed forces, 
and since this was not possible with Glubb, our self-
respect demanded that we fight our battles alone".^°^^ 
The King however, does not deny that his decision to dismiss 
Glubb came also as a response to the pressure of public opinion at 
home and in the Arab world. He wrote: 
One thing led to another; with communism filtering 
into the Middle East and Cairo branding Jordan and 
"imperialist power" there was no alternative. Glubb had to 
go.<«2) 
King Hussein's decision to dismiss Glubb who symbolized British 
dominance in Jordan, earned him tremendous popularity not only in 
Jordan, but throughout the Arab world. Equally important was 
Hussein's exoneration by the British. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the 
opposition in the British House of commons stated: 
"I had the pleasure of meeting him (King Hussein) three 
years ago, and I was impressed by his moderation, wisdom 
and calmness. It certainly is no fault of his that he found 
himself in this situation (of having to dismiss Glubb)"-^"^ 
And again : 
"I think the Baghdad pact, in a way which I shall 
explain, has itself contributed very materially to this 
development" . 
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With the departure of Glubb and a group of senior British 
officers, including Colonel Sir Patrick Coghill, Director- General 
of intelligence, the Arab Legion ceased to be an exclusive power 
of the Kingdom. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine 
A new dimension was added to the international situation in the 
region by the launching of the Eisenhower Doctrine in West Asia. Uptill 
now, Jordan had not acceded to the Baghdad Pact and kept aloof from 
involvement in inter-Arab affairs.^ ^^^ The Doctrine, apparently, was to 
contain communism but implied a warning to the neutralists and an 
encouragement to the supporters of the West in the area. Ibn Saud 
had endorsed the doctrine after acceding to the Arab Plan for Union. 
Jordan showed a mixed response to the doctrine after acceding. The 
foreign Minister, Abdullah ar-Rimawi, talked in terms of management of 
defense of Arabs by Arabs themselves and the utter need to void 
foreign influence. After the vacuum created by British and French 
withdrawal, it was with this mindset that he emphasized neutral stance 
in cold war and sought instrumentality of the UN for the preservation of 
peace in the area. However, the King reacted in another manner. He 
informed the US Ambassador that he welcomed US Aid if offered 
without strings attached. The National Front Deputies received a curt 
reply who tired to oppose him.^"^ This occured before Jordan's 
accession to the Arab solidarity Agreement and was sufficient to show 
King's hostility against communism and an implied suggestion to 
accept US aid and not depend on Arab aid. It showed the widening gulf 
between the King and his Cabinet.^ ^^^ Jordan settled ultimately on a 
policy of positive neutrality, On March 25, 1957 a common message 
was dispatched to Nasser, president Shukri al Quwwati and King Ibn 
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Saud stressing the need of Arab unity in the face of cold war. The 
message was replete with apprehensions of Western colonialism as 
well as propaganda that belied Islam implying communism. Soon 
Khalidi resigned and Ibrahim Hashim took over as Prime Minister. The 
ex-Prime Minister, Sulaiman Nablusi's' decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union was revoked. In the wake of widespread 
disturbance, martial law was proclaimed and almost all political parties 
and institutions were dissolved. There were indications that the USA 
played a significant role reversing the tide in Jordan. The United States 
which apparently saw in the developments In Jordan a real test 
between communism and the West was reluctant to take any hasty 
step. Consequently, President Eisenhower stated on April 24, 1957 that 
they considered the independence and integrity of Jordan as vital. The 
perennial financial problem was solved in no time by the US state 
department, in recognition of the steps taken by the King and the 
people of Jordan to maintain the integrity and independence of the 
nation.^ ®^^ It confirmed Jordan's desire to be on the guard against the 
Western communism.^°*^ 
However, within Jordan some new developments occurred which 
further streamlined the US-Jordan relations at this Juncture. The Prime 
Minister Nabulsi had to resign on April 10, 1957 on King's demand. The 
choice of next Prime Minister witnessed widespread disturbances in 
Jordan. Dr. Husain Fakhri Khalidi formed a non party Cabinet. He 
promised to follow the policy of the liberated States based on positive, 
neutrality and combating foreign pacts. The Baath organized a National 
congress, which demanded inter alia, rejection of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and expulsion of US Ambassador and his military. The 
opposition wanted an alliance with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria but 
the King was not interested in this course of action. On the contrary, 
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his interests coalesced with those of the USA who wanted to isolate 
Egypt. It was the desire to forge closeness with Egypt that the King 
was always unhappy with Nabuisi and Hanson Baldwin observed the 
differences of King Hussein and his Cabinet grew due to American 
encouragement. The Eisenhower Doctrine gave veiled assurance to the 
King against the opposition in a situation which the United States 
described as communist inspired/^^^ Tension mounted during 1957 as 
the communist dominated Government of Syria charged the American 
Embassy with plotting against it. The crisis further precipitated and 
King Faisal was killed in Iraq and General Abdul Kareem al Kassim 
declared himself as the ruler. This caused panic in Jordan.^^°^ Both 
King Hussein of Jordan and Camille Chamoun of Lebanon appealed for 
help from USA "for prompt action". 
There after or sometime to come, Jordan identified itself with the 
Western Camp and set its face against Arab modernism, as Hussein 
affected a coup and regained power with US aid.^^^^ 
Jordan And The Six-Day War of 1967 
In early 1963, Israel announced its intention to divert part of the 
Jordan River waters to irrigate the Naqab desert (also known as the 
Negev Desert). In response, Arab leaders decided at a 1964 Cairo 
summit to reduce the flow of water into Lake Tiberias by diverting some 
tributaries in Lebanon and Syria. To prepare for defense in case of an 
Israeli military response to these diversions, a joint Arab force was 
created. The United Arab command was composed of Egyptian, Syrian, 
Jordanian and Lebanese elements, and was headed by lieutenant 
General AM Amer of Egypt. 
Another outcome of the Cairo Summit was the establishment of 
the Palestinian liberation organization. Concurring with other Arab 
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leaders, King Hussein recognized the need for an organization of this 
kind, which could coordinate Palestinian efforts. His only concerns 
were that the PLO should cooperate with Jordan and that its military 
activities should be under the strict control of the United Arab 
command, lest they should inadvertently drag the Arabs into a war with 
Israel for which they were unprepared. 
The mid-1960s also saw the rise of independent Palestinian 
guerrilla groups (known in Arabic as the fedayeen), the most notable of 
which was Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement. In their relentless 
attempts to out bid Nasser, the Ba'thist Syrian government encouraged 
guerrilla raids into Israel-not from Syria, but from Lebanon or Jordan. 
The Israeli reprisals to these military senseless raids were predictably 
harsh, and Jordan was forced to reign in the guerrillas; For this, Jordan 
was attacked again by the propaganda Machines in Cairo, Damascus, 
and Baghdad. 
Responding to a fedayeen raid, on November 13,1966, Israel 
launched a major attack on the West Bank border village of Samu, 
rounding up villagers and destroying their houses. A Jordanian armored 
column hastened to repel the attack, but was overwhelmingly defeated 
by the Israelis superior firepower. Instead of serving as an alarm 
warning of the dangers of un coordinated military raids, the tragedy 
gave further grist to the opponents of the Hashemite Kingdom, who 
argued that the regime was responsible for what had happened at 
samu. Radio broadcasts from Egypt, Syria and Iraq prompted rioting in 
major Jordanian cities. 
By the spring of 1967, the situation had become extremely 
intense. On May 16, Nasser shocked the world by asKing the United 
Nations to withdraw its forces from Sinai. To the surprise of many, his 
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request was honored two days later. Moreover, the Egyptian President 
closed the straits of Tiran on May 22. 
Sensing that the war was now likely, King Hussein aligned 
Jordan firmly with Egypt, suggesting an Egyptian-Jordanian mutual 
Defense Treaty. Nasser immediately accepted the idea, and the treaty 
was signed on May 30. The Treaty stipulated that Jordan's forces were 
to be placed under the command of Egyptian General Abdul Moneim 
Riad. Iraq also signed the pact, while the Syrians denounced it and 
refused to sign. 
Out bidding and rivalry of radical Arab Parties allowed Israel to 
launch a surprise attack on June 5,1967, virtually eliminating the 
Egyptian air forces in a single blow. At that point, the outcome of the 
war was decided. In response to the Israeli attack, Jordanian forces 
launched on offensive into Israel, but were soon driven back as the 
Israeli forces counter attacked into the West Bank and Arab East 
Jerusalem. After destroying the Egyptian air force, Israel had complete 
control of the Skies, raining down deadly napalm bombs on the 
defenseless Arab forces.^^^^ After a spirited defense of Arab East 
Jerusalem, the outnumbered and out gunned Jordanian army was 
forced to retreat to preserve the East Bank heartland against the 
Zionist expansion. When the final UN Cease-Fire was imposed on June 
11, Israel stood in possession of a wide swath of Arab land, including 
the Egyptian Sinai, Syria's Golan Heights, and most significantly, what 
remained of Arab Palestine-the West Bank, including Arab East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza strip. 
The Palestinian people experienced the second major wave of 
mass displacement. During the 1967 Israeli-Arab war more than 
400,000 Palestinians were displaced, half of whom were 1948 refugees 
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displaced for a second time in less than two decades. As in 1948, it is 
estimated that the majority of the refugees were displaced due to 
Israeli military assault and expulsion. And, as in 1948, Israel 
immediately began to take control of Palestinian refugee land under a 
variety of military orders that effectively applied many of the tactics 
used to acquire Palestinian land inside Israel (i.e., "absence property', 
'military and public purpose', and state land.') The total 1967 refugee 
population comprised approximately one-third of the Palestinian 
population in the West Bank, including eastern Jerusalem, and the 
Gaza Strip and slightly more than one-quarter of the indigenous 
Palestinian population still living within the borders of their historic 
homeland. Refugee property expropriated as 'absentee property' under 
Military Order No. 58, alone, amounted to hundreds of sq. km of land. 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war, Israel had displaced more than half of 
the Palestinian people outside the borders of their homeland and 
expropriated around 80 percent of Palestinian owned property.^ ®^^ 
As in 1948, the United Nations adopted resolutions reaffirming 
the right of the refugees to return to their places of origin. On 14 June 
1967 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 237 calling upon 
Israel to facilitate the return of refugees displaced during the war. On 
the 4 July 1967 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2252 
(ES-V) calling upon the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugee (UNRWA) to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to 
refugees displaced for the first time during the 1967 war. Unlike 1948, 
however, the United Nations failed to identify the appropriate 
international mechanism mandated to facilitate a durable solution for 
the refugees. 
Under an agreement concluded between Jordan and Israel in 
August 1967, a process was established to facilitate the orderly return 
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of the 1967 refugees. Arbitrary conditions and restrictive time 
constrains imposed by Israel, however, limited the number of refugees 
able to participate in the repatriation scheme and infringed on the 
voluntary character to return. According to Red Cross (ICRC) figures, 
Israel approved only 13 percent of the repatriation applications allowing 
only 20,000 of 140,000 refugee applicants to return. Refugees 
displaced in 1948 and again in 1967 were not permitted to go back to 
the occupied territories. Israel rejected appeals by the ICRC to extend 
the time limit to enable the return of all those refugees wishing to do 
soS^^^ The refugees of 1948 and 1967 found shelter in surrounding 
countries, such as, Jordan, Syria and Egypt.^^^' 
As a result of the exodus of masses of Palestinians after the 
1948 and 1967 Arab-Israel War, refugee camps were created at the 
fringes of main cities of the Kingdom. To provide shelters for the 
refugees of the first wave, five camps were constructed: Zarqa (1949), 
Irbid (1951), Al-Hussein (1952,) Wihdat (New Amman Camp) (1955), 
Madaba(1956). 
Eight other camps were constructed to provide shelters for those 
displaced as a result of the second wave of immigration. Those camps 
were Talbiyeh, Hitteen (Schneller, Marka), Al-Baqa'a, Jerash (Gaza), 
Azmi Al-mufti (Al-Husun), and Hay el Amir Hassan (Hinikeen). They 
were established in 1967, 1968, and 1969.<^^^ 
To mention, some refugee camps hold several names, one 
official and another local one related to a person or an event, the other 
name for each camp was provided here between parenthesis. 
The coercive and unorganized nature of the two immigration 
waves were reflected on a swift and random choice of camp sites; while 
there was no standard pattern for camp building. Some camps were 
setup in the same location where the refugees of the displaced had first 
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settled upon their arrival to the Kingdom; other camps were constructed 
years after the immigration when the Jordanian government offered the 
land plots to UNRWA which built shelters and handed them over to the 
Palestinian refugees. Jordan government till today rent the land of 
some camps from its owners. In general, the camp services of water, 
electricity, and communications are fully government provided. 
Pathways, paved and asphalted roads are taken care by the 
government of Jordan, represented by the DPA. UNRWA, in turn, 
continues to be in charge of the environmental health care in UNRWA 
recognized camps. 
In Jordan, there are thirteen refugee camps, 10 of which are 
recognized by UNRWA. The rest are taken care by the government. In 
general, the DPA has five offices supervising the camps all over 
Jordan: 
• The Capital and Madaba governorates Office that supervises 
Amman New Camp (Wlhdat), Al-Hussein, al-Nasser (Hay el Amir 
Hassan), Al-Talbiyeh and Madaba camps. 
• Zarqa governorate Office that supervises the camps of HItteen, 
Zarqa and Sukhneh. 
• Balka Governorate Office, which supervises the camp of Baqa'a. 
• Jerash Government Office, which supervises the camps in Jerash 
and Souf. 
• Irbid Governorate Office which supervises the camps of Martyr 
Azmi-AI-Mufti and Irbid. 
The following table gives resumen information about all the Palestinian 
Camps in Jordan. 
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Camp's Name 
Al-Wihdat 
El-Hussein 
Prince Hassan 
Talibieh 
IVIadaba 
Hitteen (Marka) 
Zarqa 
Sukhneh 
Baqa 
Jerash (Gaza) 
Souf 
Azmi Al-mufti camp 
Irbid 
Establishment 
Date 
1955 
1952 
1967 
1968 
1956 
1968 
1949 
1969 
1968 
1968 
1967 
1968 
1950 
Estimated 
Population 
44395 
27891 
9000 
8754 
5500 
45550 
16491 
4750 
83127 
26000 
15000 
18655 
21753 
Area 
(dunum) 
477 
338 
96 
133 
112 
894 
190 
69 
1896 
507 
596 
758 
219 
Distance 
from/Amman Km 
-
-
-
23 
33 
11 
23 
31 
20 
38 
43 
85 
95 
Sourse; UNRWA, JORDAN 
Jordan has been heavily burdened both economically and 
politically. Jordan has withnessed these camps become occasional 
training grounds for paramilitary groups, whose attacks on Israeli 
targets have met with reprisals. Such tensions greatly fuelled the civil 
war in Jordan (1970-71.) 
The Guerrilla Crisis 
In the wake of the June 1967 war, Hussein's government faced 
the critical problems of repairing a shattered economy, providing for the 
welfare of the refugees, obtaining external aid, readjusting foreign 
policy, and rebuilding the armed forces. Internally however, the major 
Chapter -1 45 Historical Baciiground 
problem was the continuing confrontation with the several Palestinian 
guerrilla organizations. 
The Arab League heads of state met in Khartoum at the end of 
August 1967. The conference reached two major decisions generally 
considered to represent the views of Arab moderates: resumption of oil 
production, which some Oil-Producing States had suspended during 
the war; continued non recognition of and non negotiation with Israel, 
individually and collectively; continued closure of the Suez Canal and 
the elimination of all foreign military bases in Arab territory; and 
provision of financial subsidies and aid to Egypt and Jordan by Saudia 
Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. The total annual of subsidy promised for the 
indefinite future amounted to the equivalent of US $ 378 million, of 
which Jordan was to receive about US $ 112 million. Donor States at 
first regularly paid their shares in quarterly installments, but Libya and 
Kuwait withdrew their support to Jordan during the 1970-71 War 
between the Jordanian government and the Fedayeen. 
In addition to the Khartoum subsidies, Jordan also received 
grants from Qatar, and the Shaykhdom of Abu Dhabi, and a special 
grant of US $ 42 million from Saudia Arabia for arms purchases. Aid 
also came from Britain and West Germany, with whom Jordan had 
resumed relations. Although direct United States aid had been 
terminated, substantial long-term government loans were extended to 
Jordan for emergency relief, development, and military assistance. In 
February 1968, the United States resumed arms shipments to Jordan, 
Jordan narrowly averted financed disaster. 
After months of diplomatic wrangling, on November 22,1967, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 as a guideline for a 
Middle East Settlement. The principal provisions of the resolution 
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proclaimed the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by War; 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied in the June 1967 War; 
termination of all states of belligerency, acknowledgment of the 
sovereignty of all states in the area-including Israel-within secure and 
recognized boundaries; freedom of navigation in all international 
waterways in the area; and a just settlement of the refugee problem. 
Jordan, Egypt, and Israel all accepted this resolution in principle but 
each country interpreted it differently. 
King Hussein has been the most consistent advocate of UN 
Resolution 242. He viewed it as the most viable means by which the 
Palestinian problem could be resolved while also preserving and 
important Jordanian role in the West Bank.^^^' 
The intractability of the Palestinian problem has been due in Large 
part to the widely differing perspective that evolved after the June 1967 
War. For the Israelis in the midst of the nationalist euphoria that followed 
the War, talk of exchanging newly captured territories for peace had little 
public appeal. The government of Levi Eshkol followed a two-track policy 
with respect to the territories that would continue under future Labor party 
governments: on one hand, it stated willingness to negotiate, while on the 
other; it laid plans to create Jewish Settlements in the disputed territories. 
Thus, immediately following the War, Eshkol stated that he was willing to 
negotiate "everything" for a full peace, which would include free passage 
through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran and a solution to the 
refugee problem in the context of regional cooperation. This was followed 
in November 1967 with his acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 
242. At the same time, Eshkol's government announced plans for the 
resettlement of the Old City of Jerusalem, of the Etzion Bloc, and for 
Kibbutzim in the northern sector of the Golan Heights. Plans also were 
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unveiled for new neighborhoods around Jerusalem, near the old buildings 
of Hebrew University and near Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopas. 
The 1967 defeat radicalized the Palestinians, who had looked to 
the Arab countries to defeat first the Yishuv (The Jewish Community of 
Palestine before 1948), and after 1948 the state of Israel, so that they 
could reagain their homeland. The PLO had no role in the June 1967 
War. After the succession of Arab failures in Conventional warfare 
against Israel, however, the Palestinians decided to adopt guerrilla 
warfare tactics as the most effective method of attacking and defeating 
Israel. In February 1969, Arafat (who remained the leader of Al Fatah) 
became head of the PLO. By early 1970, at least even guerrilla 
organization was identified in Jordan. One of the most important 
organizations was the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) led by George Habash. Although the PLO sought to integrate 
these various groups and announced from time to time that this 
process had occurred, they were never effectively united. 
At first by conviction and then by political necessity, King 
Hussein Sought accommodation with the fedayeen and provided 
training Sites and assistance. In Jordan's internal politics, however, the 
main issue between 1967 and 1971 was the struggle between the 
government and the guerrilla organizations for political control of the 
country. Based in the refugees camps, the Fedayeen virtually 
developed a state within a state, easily obtaining funds and arms from 
the both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting 
Jordanian law^^ '^ 
As the guerrilla effort mounted, Israel retaliated quickly and with 
increasing effectiveness. In March 1968, an Israeli brigade attacked the 
Jordanian village of Al Karama. Although the brigade inflicted damage, 
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it was driven back and in the process suffered substantial losses. The 
incidents boosted Palestinian morale and gave the PLO instant prestige 
within the Arab community. In reprisal, Israel launched heavy attacks 
on Irbid in June 1968 and on As Salt in August. It soon became obvious 
to the PLO that the generally open terrain of the West Bank did not 
provide the kind of cover needed for Classic guerrilla operations. 
Moreover, the Palestinian population residing in the territories had not 
formed any significant armed resistance against the Israeli occupation. 
By late 1968, the main Fedayeen activities in Jordan seemed to shift 
from fighting Israel to attempts to threat the Royal throne. 
A major guerrilla-government confrontation occurred in November 
1968 when the government sought to disarm the refugee Camps, but Civil 
war was averted by a compromise that favored the Palestinians. 
The threat to King Hussein authority and the heavy Israeli 
reprisals that followed each guerrilla attack became a matter of grave 
concern to the King. The King's loyal army attempted to suppress 
guerrilla activity, which led to sporadic out bursts of fighting between 
the fedayeen and the army during the first half of 1970. In June 1970, 
an Arab mediation committee intervened to half two weeks of serious 
fighting between the two sides. 
In June King Hussein designated Abd al Munim Rifai to head a 
"reconciliation" cabinet that included more opposition elements tham 
any other government since of that of Nabuisi in 1957. Although the 
composition of the cabinet maintained a traditional balance between 
the East Bank and the West Bank, it included a majority of guerrilla 
sympathizers. Particularly in the key portfolios of defense, foreign 
affairs, and interior. But the King's action did not reflect a new domestic 
policy; rather, it indicated the King Hussein's hope that a nationalist 
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cabinet would support peace negotiations generated by a proposed UN 
peace mission to be conducted by Gunnar Jarring. On June 9,1970, 
Rifai and Arafat signed an agreement conciliatory to the Fedayeen. 
According to its provisions, the government allowed the commandos 
freedom of movement within Jordan, agreed to refrain from antiguerrilla 
action, and expressed its support for the Fedayeen in the battle against 
Israel. In return, the commandos pledged to remove their bases from 
Amman and other major cities, to withdraw armed personnel from the 
Jordanian capital, and to show respect for law and order. 
Small-Scale clashes continued throughout the summer of 1970, 
however, and by early September, the guerrilla grouped controlled 
several strategic positions in Jordan, including the oil refinery near Az 
Zarga. Meanwhile, the fedayeen were also calling for a general strike of 
the Jordanian population and were organizing a civil disobedience 
campain. The situation became explosive when, as part of a guerrilla 
campain to undermine the Jarring peace talks to which Egypt, Israel, and 
Jordan had agreed; the PFLP launched an airplane hijacking campain. 
Within the space of two hours on September 6, 1970 PFLP 
groups hijacked a TWA jet, a Swissair jet, and made an unsuccessful 
attempt to seize control of an EL-AL airplane. About two hours later, 
another PFLP group hijacked a pan Am Jet and forced the crew to fly to 
Beirut airport, where the airplane landed almost out of fuel. The next 
day the airliner was flown to the Cairo airport, where it was blown up 
only seconds after 176 passengers and crew had completed three-
minute forced evacuation.^^^^ 
King Hussein viewed the hijacking as a direct threat to his 
authority in Jordan. In response, on September 16 the King reaffirmed 
Martial law and named Muhammad Daud to head a cabinet composed 
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of army officers. At the same time, the King appointed Field Marshal 
Habis al Majali, commander in chief of the armed forces and military 
governor of Jordan. King Hussein gave Majali full powers to implement 
the martial lav\/ regulations and to quell the Fedayeen. The new 
government immediately ordered the Fedayeen to lay down their arms 
and to evacuate the cities. On the same day, Arafat became supreme 
commander of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), the regular 
military force of the PLO. 
During a bitterly fought ten-day civil war, primarily between the 
PLA and Jordan Arab Army, Syria sent a bout 200 tanks to aid the 
Fedayeen, on September 17, however, Iraq began a rapid withdrawal 
of its 12,000-man force stationed near Az Zarqa. The United States 
Navy dispatched the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and 
Israel undertook precautionary military deployment to attack if 
necessary the guerilla forces. Under attack from the Jordanian army 
and in response to outside pressures, the Syrian forces began to 
withdraw from Jordan on September 24, having lost more than half 
their armor in fighting with the Jordanians. The Fedayeen found 
themselves on the defensive throughout Jordan and agreed on 
September 25 to a cease-fire. At the urging of the Arab heads of state, 
King Hussein and Arafat signed the cease-fire agreement in Cairo on 
September 27. The agreement called for rapid withdrawal of the 
guerilla forces from Jordanian cities and towns to positions 
"appropriate" for continuing the battle with Israel and for the release of 
prisoners by both sides. A supreme supervisory committee was to 
implement the provisions of the agreement. On September 26, King 
Hussein appointed a new cabinet; however, army officers continued to 
head the key defense and interior ministries. 
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On October 13,1970 King Hussein and Arafat signed a further 
agreement in Amman, under which the fedayeen were to recognize 
Jordanian sovereignty and the King's authority, to withdraw their armed 
forces from towns and villages, and to refrain from carrying arms 
outside their camps. In return the government agreed to grant amnesty 
to the fedayeen for incidents that had during the civil war. 
The civil war caused great material destruction in Jordan, and the 
number of fighters Killed on all sides was estimated as high as 3,500. In 
spite of the September and October agreement, fighting continued. 
Particularly in Amman, Irbid, and Jarash, where guerrilla forces had their 
main bases. King Hussein appointed Wasfi at Tal as his new Prime 
Minister and Minister of defense to head a cabinet of fifteen civilian and 
two military members. The Cabinet also included Seven Palestinians 
known to be astaunch opponent of the Guerilla movement. 
Tal was directed by King Hussein to comply with the cease-fire 
agreements; furthermore, according to King Hussein's written directive, 
the government's policy was to be based on "the restoration of 
confidence between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian 
resistance movement, cooperation with the Arab states, the 
strengthening of national unity, striking with an Iron hand at all person 
spreading destructive rumors, paying special attention to the armed 
forces and the freeing of the Arab land's occupied by Israel in the war 
of June 1967. 
The closing months of 1970 and the first Six months of 1971 
were marked by a series of broken agreements and by continued 
battles between the guerilla forces and the Jordanian army, which 
continued its drive to oust the fedayeen from the populated areas. 
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Persistent pressure by the army compelled the fedayeen to 
withdraw from Amman in April 1971. Feeling its existence threatened, 
Al Fatah abandoned its earlier posture of noninvolvement in the 
internal affairs of an Arab State. 
In response to rumors that the PLO was planning to from a 
government-in-exile King Hussein in early June directed Tal to deal 
conclusively and without hesitation with the plotters who want to 
establish a separate Palestinian state and destroy the Unity of the 
Palestinian people. On July 13, the Jordanian army undertook an 
offensive against the still simmering threat of the guerrilla forces and 
their bases about fifty kilometers northwest of Amman in the Ajlun area, 
The fedayeen's last stronghold. Tal announced that Cairo and Amman 
agreements, which had regulated relations between the Fedayeen and 
the Jordanian governments, were no longer operative. On July 19, the 
government announced that the remainder of the bases in northern 
Jordan had been destroyed and that 2,300 of the 2,500 Fedayeen had 
been arrested. A few days later, many of the captured Palestinians 
were released either to leave for other Arab countries or to return to a 
peaceful life in Jordan, and in response to outside Arab pressures; 
King Hussein in September 1973, released the fedayeen prisoners, 
including their leader Muhammad Daud Auda (also Known as Abu 
Daud) under a general amnesty.^ ^^^ 
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Regional Fallout of the 1973 War 
The Six-Day war instead of resolving the Arab Israeli conflict precipitated it. Israel after the war constructed a chain of defended posts a long the East Bank of Suez 
Canal, known as the Bar-Lev line and established 
defensive positions in the Golan Heights as well. The period between 
1968 and 1970 is known as the war of Attrition. During the period Egypt 
reacted with commando raids, artillery bombardment and the 
installation of a multiplayer Russian equipped are defence system. 
Nasser after his death in 1970 was succeeded by Anwar Sadat who 
after planning out a war plan in Russia with Syria and Jordan decided 
on a war with Israel on Sixth October 1973. The attack was launched 
on the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews. The 
advances on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts were initially 
successful but when a ceasefire was enforced on 24 October; Israel 
had not only repulsed the Egyptians and the Syrians but also annexed 
further territories.^^^ 
Jordan was not directly involved in the war although it did 
contribute by sending troops to assist Syria. The Arab armies initial 
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military successes, especially the amphibious crossing of the Suez 
Canal and the storming of the Bar-lev line, reversed much of the 
psychological setback caused by the 1967 defeat, disproving the myth 
of Israel military invincibility. However, lack of coordination between 
Egypt and Syria, combined with American re-supply of Israeli stocks, 
eventually allowed Israel to gain the upper hand. In retaliation for 
assisting Israel, Arab Gulf states announced the suspension of oil 
exports to the United States.^^^ Cease-fires ending the war lead to a 
series of disengagement agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria. 
This process culminated for Egypt and Israel in the Camp David 
Accords of 1978. However, Israel annexed Syria's Golan Heights in 
1981, and Israel and Syria remain in a state of war.^ ^^ 
in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, negotiations 
commenced between Israel and the Arab neighbors. These talks were 
mostly focused on a cease-fire, but there were serious attempts to 
progress further. 
Even the Soviet Union co-sponsored the first Geneva Conference 
in 1973 to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was concerned that Arab regimes might make 
peace with Israel over its head. The PLO also worried about the 
possibility of having the West Bank returned to Jordanian rule, a 
development, which would eliminate any hope of Palestinian control 
over that territory. A proposal fielded by the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by the Jordanian-born Nayif 
Hawatmeh, suggested the solution for the PLO. 
The DFLP proposal was to establish a secular, democratic state 
where Arabs and Jews would both have an equal role as individuals. 
This aspect was rejected by the PLO. But the DFLP plan had asecond 
W >:*>»•-* IS 
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part, which became the cornerstone of the PLCs whole approach from 
then on. 
This plan suggested that the PLO announce its readiness to take 
any part of Mandatory Palestine that was up for negotiating. In short, if 
Israel was to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, that territory 
should go to the PLO and not to Jordan and Egypt. This avoided the 
unthinkable (to the PLO) question of making peace with Israel, it was 
merely acclaim to any available Land. 
In the same period, Arafat sought contacts with the United 
States. He sent two messages to the Nixon administration requesting 
clarification of the US position on key diplomatic issues. The US 
agreed to a meeting, and on November 3, 1973, Vernon Walters, then 
deputy director of the CIA, met secretly in Rabat, Morocco with a top 
Arafat aid. Henry Kissinger described that Rabat meeting in the second 
volume of his memories, Years of Upheaval. Walters was instructed to 
say that the question of who represented the Palestinians-Jordan or the 
PLO-was an inter-Arab Concern. The PLO took this as an American 
invitation to seek Arab backing as the sole representative of the 
Palestinians, and they obtained this status at the Arab summit Meeting 
in Rabat in 1974. Arafat expected, wrongly, that this would also lead to 
prompt American recognition of the PLO. 
In 1974, the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council 
followed Arafat's script when it called for the establishment of a 
"national authority" on any portion of Palestinian land liberated. 
The Rabat Summit Conference in October 1974 brought together 
the leaders of twenty Arab States and representatives of the PLO, 
whose leaders threatened a walkout if their demands for unconditional 
recognition were not met. The PLO required a statement from the 
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conference that any Palestinian territory liberated by Arab forces would 
be turned over to the "Palestinian people" as represented by the PLO. 
Jordan protested, pointing out that recognition of PLO on these terms 
would give the PLO sovereignty over half of the population in the East 
Bank and that in fact the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan had 
been approved by popular vote. 
A compromise solution was adopted that nonetheless favored 
PLO interests. The Conference formally acknowledged the right of the 
Palestinian people to a separate homeland;^^' but without specifying to 
the West Bank. Most important, the PLO was for the first time officially 
recognized by all the Arab States as the "Sole legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian People". The Arab heads of state also called for 
close co-operation between the front-line states and the PLO but 
prohibited interference by other Arab States in Palestinian affairs. 
The Rabat Summit declaration conferred a mantle of legitimacy 
on the PLO that was previously absent. It gave official Arab recognition 
to PLO territorial claims to the West Bank and unambiguously put the 
fate of the Palestinian people solely in the hands of the PLO. 
Jordanian King Hussein opposed the declaration, although he 
eventually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab Oil-
Producing states as frontline state promised to provide Jordan with an 
annual subsidy of $ US 300 million. 
The Rabat Summit allowed Arafat to proceed against Israel 
without worrying about other Arab countries. At the same time, the 
message to Israel was clear: The resolution clearly stated that the 
conflict would continue until Israel's destruction. Indeed, it explicitly 
stated that any land the PLO took over would be used primarily as 
abase for attacking Israel. 
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The PLO, following the Rabat Summit, scored an impressive 
political victory in the International arena. In Late November 1974, the 
UN recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian People, and PLO 
Chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the General Assembly in Arabic, his 
pistol at his side. In addition, in a joint communique issued the same 
month. President Gerald R. Ford of the United States and General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev 
acknowledged the "Legitimate interests" of the Palestinian in 
accordance with the UN resolutions. 
Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution in 1976 proposing to reaffirm 
the right of the Palestinians to self-determination-and including the 
right to establish an independent state-was vetoed in the Security 
Council by the United States, which called instead for a "reasonable 
and acceptable definition of Palestinian interest". After the Rabat 
Summit, King Hussein stressed the need for Jordanian political self-
sufficiency. He told his subjects, "a new reality exists and Jordan must 
adjust to it. The West Bank is no longer Jordanian". But having 
surrendered little to half his Kingdom at the behest of the Arab states. 
King Hussein confessed concern that the East Bank might become "a 
substitute Palestine," swallowed up as the balance of political power 
there shifted to its Palestinian majority. 
The tone of King Hussein's approach to the Palestinians in the 
East Bank changed markedly following the Rabat Summit. He advised 
that the resident Palestinians-estimated at 900,000 or more-must 
choose between Jordanian Citizenship or Palestinian identity. No 
attempt would be made to oust those who chose the latter, he said, and 
they would be permitted to remain in Jordan as "guests". He also 
insisted that any Palestinian choosing to keep his Jordanian citizenship 
must be allowed to do so without endangering his rights in the West 
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Bank; he further promised that any Palestinian living in the East Bank who 
chose to identify his interests with those of the "Palestinian People" could 
do so without jeopardizing in rights as a Jordanian citizen. 
In response to the new political situation following the Rabat 
Summit, King Hussein reorganized Jordan's political and administrative 
institutions. On November 9,he amended the Constitution to give the 
King authority to dissolve the House of Representatives (also called the 
Chamber of Deputies) and to delay elections as he saw fit. Using these 
constitutional prerogatives, King Hussein dissolved the lower House of 
Representatives when it had completed its work on November 23. The 
House of Representatives, half of whose sixty members represented West 
Bank constituencies, could no longer function without underminirig the 
newly recognized representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was 
amended to provide for the indefinite postponement of elections for a 
new House of Representatives so as to avoid elections on the East 
Bank, which if held would have symbolized the final separation of the 
West Bank from Jordan. In addition to dissolving the House of 
Representatives, King Hussein directed Prime Minister Zaid ar Rifai to 
form a new government that did not include Palestinians from the West 
Bank. No move was made, however, to relieve Palestinians in the 
Jordanian army, where they composed one-third of the officer corps, 
albeit mostly in non- combatant functions. The government also continued 
to pay the salaries of 6,000, civil servants and teachers in the West Bank, 
which amounted to about US $ 40 million a year. ^^^ 
As a result of King Hussein's partial reversal from the commitments 
made at Rabat, Jordanian-PLO relations deteriorated throughout much of 
1975. At the year's end, however, the Palestinian National Council, 
meeting in Damascus, backed an effort to reconcile its differences with 
King Hussein. The broadcast of antiregime propaganda was temporarily 
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suspended, and; although PLA units remained stationed in Jordan in 
Military camps, the PLO accepted restrictions on its political and 
military presence there. At the Arab Summit conference held at Cairo in 
January 1976, Jordan and the PLO once again were embroiled in a 
dispute over Jordan's role in negotiating an Israeli withdrawal from the 
West Bank. Jordan declared that it had no responsibility for negotiating 
such a withdrawal. In response, the PLO resumed its hostile 
Propaganda shortly after the meeting. 
in February 1976, King Hussein summoned an extraordinary 
session of the National Assembly attended by about half of the 
representatives elected from the West Bank to enact legislation 
enabling the King to postpone indefinitely the general elections 
scheduled for later in the month. The King's spokespersons explained 
that the action was necessary of "Compelling circumstances" that 
prevailed in the country. That same month, King Hussein abolished the 
Jordanian National Union. 
In July Zaid ar Rifai, who had led the government since 1973, 
stepped down as prime minister. King Hussein replaced him with Mudar 
Badran, chief of the Royal Court. The Badran government set up the 
Bureau of Occupied Homeland affairs, headed by Former Members of 
Parliament from West Bank constituencies, ostensibly to coordinate 
and advise on relations with Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territory. 
The government also conducted discussions on the renewed Possibility 
of some form of Federation between the West Bank and the East Bank. 
The PLO charged that the newly created Bureau of Occupied 
Homeland Affairs had been formed to channel support to pro-Jordanian 
candidates in municipal elections to be held in the West Bank in April 
1977. Badran denied these allegations and reaffirmed Jordan's 
commitment to the concept that the Palestinians themselves must 
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decide the future of the West Bank. PLO-backed candidates won an 
over whelming victory in the April elections.^^^ 
The Camp David Accord and Jordan 
Jimmy Carter had very little experience of international 
negotiating. But it was Carter's diplomatic success that at Camp David, 
the discussions reached a successful completion.^''^ In the light of the 
conciliatory mood of Egypt and Israel, Carter played the role of a 
mediator and arranged for a Summit Conference. As a result of it, on 
September 17,1978, President Saddat and Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin reached an Accord at the Camp David. The Document was 
signed by the two Leaders with Carter as witness. It provided for 
Israel's complete withdrawal from the Sinai and a Peace Treaty with 
Egypt to be signed within three months and normal relations (including 
diplomatic) between Egypt and Israel to be established. It also 
emphasised the establishment of peace elsewhere on the basis of 
resolution 242 of the Security Council. Under it Jordan was to join the 
peace process and work out a transitional five year period for the West 
Bank and Gaza strip during which the local inhabitants would have full 
autonomy and Self government and Israeli troops Confined to a few 
areas. After five years the future of the area would be determined in 
consultation with among others, the Palestinians. 
Jordan disapproved of the Accords of 1978 chiefly because it 
overshadowed the pertinent question of Palestine by pushing it aside 
and aimed at a partial peace between Egypt and Israel. Jordan did not 
proceed with any grudge or malice against Egypt. It was realised that 
the accords gave non-functional and impractical type of settlement 
framework for resolution of Palestinian problem.^^^ 
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Jordan, like the rest of the Arab states, was taken by surprise by 
president Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem in November 1977. 
King Hussein, however, muted his criticism of the Egyptian president's 
historic trip and called on the Arab States to reserve judgment. The 
King feared that an outright rejection of the Egyptian initiative might 
provoke an alienated Sadat to seek a separate agreement with Israel. 
He also saw many positive elements, in Sadat's opening statement to 
the Knesset, such as his rejection of a separate settlement to the 
Palestinian problem, his emphasis on the need to find a solution to the 
Palestinian problem, the recognition of Jordan's special relationship 
with the West Bank, and the proposal to incorporate Jordan, rather 
than the PLO, into the peace process.^^' 
Despite his enthusiasm for Sadat's speech, King Hussein was 
reluctant to join the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. He feared that by 
joining the negotiations he would isolate Jordan in the Arab world, incur 
Syria's wrath, and potentially destabilize Palestinians on the East Bank 
with little possibility for Jordanian gains. Moreover, King Hussein did 
not want to represent Palestinian interests at such negotiations unless 
he had a clear Arab and Palestinian mandate to do so. 
The Final version of the Camp David Accords signed by Egyptian 
president Sadat, Israeli Prime minister Menacchem Begin, and United 
States president Carter separated the issues of the future of the West 
Bank and the return of Sinai, whereas the sections dealing with the 
return of Sinai were very explicit, the sections on the West Bank were 
vague and open to various interpretations. They called for Egypt;^^°^ 
Israel, and "the representatives of the Palestinian people to negotiate 
about the future of the West Bank and Gaza". A five-year period of 
"transitional autonomy" was called for "to ensure a peaceful and orderly 
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transfer of authority". The agreement also called for peace talks 
between Israel and its other Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. 
The Camp David Accords fell far short of meeting even Jordan's 
minimal demands. King Hussein expressed anger that Jordan was 
included in the Camp David framework without his prior Knowledge or 
approval. He viewed the division of the Accords into two agreements 
with no linkage between Israel's withdrawals from Sinai and progress 
on the Palestinian issue as a sign that Sadat was more interested in 
regaining Sinai than in broking a viable peace settlement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. King Hussein was further alienated form the 
Camp David peace process because Israel refused to negotiate over 
East Jerusalem, insisted on its rights to establish settlements in the 
occupied territories, and reserved the right to demand sovereignty over 
those areas at the end of the transition period.^^^^ 
Following the signing of the Camp David Accords; Jordan 
accepted an Iraqi invitation-accompanied by a US $ 30 million Iraqi 
grant to attend the Baghdad Conference. The Summit conference's 
decision to allot to Jordan the relatively large sum of US $ 1.25 billion 
per year helped Keep Jordan in the Arab fold. At the Baghdad 
Conference held in November 1978, the Arab States unequivocally 
rejected the Camp David Accords and officially ostracized Egypt from 
the Arab League.^^^^ 
Jordanian-Egyptian relations deteriorated even further after the 
Signing of the Treaty of peace between Egypt and Israel in March 
1979. The Israeli governments limited view of Palestinian autonomy 
became apparent shortly after the peace treaty was signed. In April the 
Begin government approved two new settlements between Ram Allah 
and Nablus and prepared autonomy plans in which Israel would keep 
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exclusive control over the West Bank's water, communications, 
roads/^^^ public order, and immigration into the territories. The 
acceleration of settlements, the growth of an increasingly militaristic 
Jewish settler is movement, and Israel's stated desire to retain 
complete control over resources in the territories precluded the 
participation in the peace process of either moderate Palestinians; 
such as the newly formed National Guidance Committee composed of 
West Bank mayors, or of King Hussein. The PLO refused from the 
beginning to participate in the peace process. 
The Jordanian government recalled Its ambassador from Cairo 
on March 28 and on April 1 it served diplomatic relations with Egypt. 
Not all ties were broken, however, the Jordanian and Egyptian airlines 
still flew about ten flights a week between their respective cities and, 
most important, Egyptian workers in Jordan continued to enjoy the 
same status as before. The Jordanian media and public officials 
intensified anti Israel rhetoric, showing particular hostility toward the 
United States for supporting the accords. King Hussein's greatest fear 
was that, with Egypt removed from the Arab-Israeli military balance, 
Israel might be tempted to transform the East Bank into an "alternative 
homeland" for the Palestinians: Jordanian fears were fueled when, at 
the end of March 1979, Israeli minister of agriculture Ariel Sharon 
issued a statement to the effect that Palestinians ought to take over 
Jordan and establish a government there. 
King Hussein, although fully backing the Baghdad accords, 
sought a very different objective than the more hard-line, Arab States 
such as Syria and Iraq. His goal was not to punish Egypt or overthrow 
Sadat, but rather to set up an alternative strategy to the Camp David 
framework supported by an Arab consensus. The Jordanian alternative 
was to return the Palestinian problem either to the UN Security Council 
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or to the Geneva Conference where all the relevant parties including 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the European Economic 
Community could v\/ork together in reaching a comprehensive Middle 
East peace plan. 
King Hussein's attempt to develop a united Arab stand did not 
succeed. At the Tunis Summit of November 1979, in face of strong 
Syrian objections, King Hussein was unable to mobilize an Arab 
consensus behind an alternative to the Camp David Accords. Syrian 
president Assad's strong objections to King Hussein's proposal marked 
the beginning of rabid deteriorations in Syrian-Jordanian relations. 
Since 1975 Jordan and Syria had coordinated their defense, foreign 
policy, economic, information, education, and cultural activities. They 
had established a joint military command to provide a single defensive 
line against Israel. Syria had halted anti-Hussein propaganda and 
imposed restrictions on Syrian-based Palestinian activities that might 
be considered prejudicial to Jordan's sovereignty. 
The marked improvement in relations between Hussein and 
Syrian president Hafiz al Assad primarily reflected a shared desire to 
minimize the role of the PLO in any future Middle East peace 
negotiations. Despite the commitments made at Rabat, neither Jordan 
nor Syria wanted the PLO to emerge from Middle East peace talks as 
leader of a proposed Palestinian national entity in the occupied 
territories. Their opposition to the PLO, however, stemmed from very 
different sources. Jordan opposed the PLO because of conflicting 
territorial objectives; Hussein wanted to reintegrate the West Bank as a 
part of a pre-1967 Jordan. Assad opposed a PLO led ministate 
because he feared that such an entity would reduce Syria's regional 
role and would significantly lessen the chances of Syria regaining the 
Golan Heights. At the same time, Damascus rejected Hussein's claims 
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to the West Bank and vehemently opposed any Jordanian attempts to 
reach a separate peace agreement with Israel. This position severely 
limited the flexibility of Jordanian diplomacy and ultimately divided 
Jordan and Syria. 
King Hussein was further rebuffed when Assad revived the 
steadfastness and Confrontation Front consisting of Syria, Libya, 
Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), 
and the PLO. The Syrian Leader accused Jordan of supporting Syrian 
elements of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been involved in a 
series of attacks against his regime.^^^^ 
By the end of 1980, relations between Jordan and Syria had 
deteriorated to such an extent that Military Clashes appeared possible 
along the common border where both countries had massed troops. 
The escalating tension eventually was defused by Saudi Arabian 
diplomatic intervention, although relations remained Strained. 
Jordan broke diplomatic relations with Syria in 1981, charging 
Damascus with plotting to assassinate its prime minister and 
Kidnapping its ambassador to Lebanon. For the next five years, the two 
neighbors were estranged. Amman accused Syria of assisting radical 
Palestinian groups who carried out several political killings of Jordanian 
diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. 
Jordan and the Regan Plan 
The simmering tension between Jordan and the PLO was 
symptomatic of their differing visions of an Arab-Israeli settlement. 
Jordan accepted UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the 
basis for any settlement, including the question of Palestinian national 
rights. Within this framework, Jordan demanded total Israeli withdrawal 
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from all territories occupied in 1967; a solution to the refugee problem 
either by repatriation or compensation; the right of Palestinian to self-
determination; and mutual guarantees for peace. The PLO consistently 
rejected both 242 and 338 on the ground that the Palestinian people 
are only mentioned in the resolutions as refugees and not as a people 
deserving a national homeland/^^^ 
On the issue of self-determination, Hussein agreed with the PLO 
that the Palestinians had the right to establish "a national and political 
entity," but he refrained from giving his support to a fully independent 
Palestinian state, which he saw as a direct threat, particularly if headed 
by the PLO. Moreover, he believed that if he could neutralize the PLO, 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip populations would accept an 
arrangement based on his own federation plan. 
Despite his desire to be the primary Arab negotiator over the 
territories, Hussein also realized that his role in any future negotiations 
required a clear mandate from the Arab states. He could not deviate 
too far from the Arab consensus concerning the occupied territories for 
fear of losing badly needed economic aid or instigating military attacks 
from Iraq and Syria. As a result, Hussein chose to participate in the 
proposed October 1, 1977, Geneva Conference on the Middle East as a 
"confrontation state" but not as the representative of the Palestinians.^^^^ 
The June 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon significantly 
alerted Jordan's geostrategic position. Israel's willingness to remove 
PLO bases from Lebanon by force, despite widespread international 
criticism, raised apprehensions that Israel might launch an offensive 
against Jordan. The Arab States, weakened by internal rivalries, the 
Iran-Iraq war, and Egypt's isolation, did not respond forcefully to the 
Israeli actions. King Hussein viewed the Lebanon invasion as part of a 
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pattern of more aggressive Israeli policies that included the 1981 
bombing of the Iraqi nuclear. The 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear 
reactor, confrontations with Syria, and an ambitious settlement policy in 
the occupied territories. The government of Menachem Begin, unlike its 
predecessors, was willing to use force to attain its territorial objectives. 
This led to concerns that Israel might have designs on Jordan, or that 
of the PLO, after its defeat in Lebanon, might attempt to reestablish 
itself in Jordan. King Hussein also feared that Israeli settlement activity 
in the West Bank was rapidly reducing the chances of an acceptable 
settlement there. The troubles of Lebanon are closely linked with Arab 
Israeli crisis and Problem of Palestine. In order to crush Palestinian 
national sentiments, Israel callously challenged Lebanon's suzerainty 
and undermined its territorial integrity. The Lebanon crisis further 
retarded the peace process in West Asia. When in November 1983, 
some US and French marine Personnel were killed; President Reagan 
reaffirmed US commitment to a sovereign independent Lebanon. The 
military intervention by the multinational peace keeping forces in 
Lebanon and the offshore bombardment by US naval ships was 
dangerous diversion which threatened to put the military strength of the 
super powers one against the other. The US forces with drew suddenly 
which made its credibility suspect because this preceded the total 
withdrawal of all other forces from Lebanon.^^^^ 
On September 1, 1982, President Reagan launched the Reagan 
plan. King Hussein applauded the new American proposal, seeing in it 
a clear break from the Camp David framework. In announcing the new 
plan, Reagan stated that "it was the firm view of the United States that 
Self-Government by the Palestinian of the West Bank and Gaza in 
association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable and lasting 
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peace," specifying tinat the United States would not support the 
establishment of a Palestinian state. 
The Reagan Plan also stressed UN Resolution 242, stating that 
the resolution applied to all Fronts, including the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, and that the final status of Jerusalem should be decided 
through negotiation. The war in Lebanon and the publication of the 
Reagan Plan ushered in a new symbiosis in Jordan-PLO relations.^^^^ 
King Hussein needed PLO acceptance of Jordan's participation in the 
peace process in the framework of the Reagan Plan; PLO Chairman 
Yasir Arafat, considerably weakened by the PLO's devastating defeat in 
the War in Lebanon, needed Jordanian support to gain access to the 
political process. In October 1982, King Hussein and Arafat began a 
series of meetings designed to formulate a joint response to the Reagan 
Plan. These negotiations centered around the formation of a Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation to future peace talks, and because neither Israel 
nor the United States recognized the PLO on the extent to which the 
PLO would be directly associated with this delegation. Jordan proposed 
that the PLO appoint West Bank residents who were not member of the 
PLO to represent the Palestinians. In November 1982, agreement was 
reached on the formation of a higher Jordanian-Palestinian Committee 
headed by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and Arafat.^^^^ 
Because of conflicting objectives sought by Arafat and King 
Hussein, the joint Palestinian Jordanian Committee never materialized. 
Whereas King Hussein saw the proposed confederation as a means to 
reestablish Jordanian control over the West Bank, Arafat viewed the 
negotiations as a means to gain PLO sovereignty over the occupied 
territories. In addition. King Hussein and Arafat required evidence that 
Washington was willing to pressure Israel to make significant territorial 
concessions. Meanwhile, Israel troops still occupied part of southern 
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Lebanon, and the Israeli government had not made any commitments 
on the settlement issue. Moreover, given Iran's recent victories in its 
war with Iraq, tensions with Syria, and a depressed world Oil market, 
King Hussein could not isolate Jordan by unilaterally participating in the 
Reagan Plan without some show of Israeli flexibility. Following King 
Hussein's decision in April 1983 not to join the Reagan Plan, Jordan 
increasingly criticized Washington's inability to apply pressure on Israel 
to halt settlements In the West Bank. United States-Jordanian relations 
were further strained in May 1983 when the Reagan administration 
lifted a ban on the sale of F-16 aircraft to Israel. 
The ban had been imposed to pressure Israel to withdraw its 
forces from Lebanon. The United States opposed a Jordanian draft 
resolution submitted to the UN Security Council in July 1983 asserting 
the illegality of Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank, and 
relations between the two countries were further soured by the signing 
in November 1983 of a new agreement on strategic cooperation 
between Israel and the United States. Syria emerged from the war in 
Lebanon as a pivotal regional power, able and willing to play a role in 
the affairs of neighboring Arab States. Whereas Syrian power was on 
the rise, Jordan's most powerful Arab ally, Iraq, seemed to be losing its 
costly war with Iran. King Hussein tried to counterbalance the Syrian 
threat by making overtures to President Husni Mubarak of Egypt, but 
did not yet reestablish diplomatic relation. King Hussein hoped that 
Mubarak, who had replace Sadat after the latters assassination in 
September 1981, would bring Egypt back into the Arab fold after Sinai 
was returned to Egypt in September 1982.^^°^ 
High-level talks, between Egypt and Jordan occurred regularly 
throughout 1983 and 1984. In addition, Egyptian newspapers, banned in 
Jordan after the Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty, were allowed into the 
.r^ 
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country in October 1983. Also, Jordan and Egypt signed a trade Protocol 
in December 1983 and discussed the expansion of scientific and 
agricultural cooperation. Finally, in September 1984, Jordan^^(ij^lly 
announced the resumption of diplomatic relations with Eg^^**^' ' " / ^ 
The Intifada, Shultz Plan and Jordan i [ ? vf .' I 
In December 1987 a violent Palestinian uprisi$;ti| XJntifada),' 
against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, efcrptedlh 
the Occupied Territories. Despite intensive and often brutal security 
measures, Israel was unable to suppress the revolt. Public 
demonstrations in Jordan in support of the Intifada were muted, owing 
mainly to security precautions taken by the authorities to prevent unrest. 
In April the Palestinian extremist group. Black September, claimed 
responsibility for a series of bomb attacks in Amman, which, it said, were 
directed against the client Zionist regime in Jordan. The intensity of the 
Intifada and the worldwide condemnation of Israeli security tactics, and 
revulsion at the degrading conditions in which many Palestinian were 
forced to live in the Occupied Territories, alerted the international 
community to the need for a revival of the efforts to secure an Arab-
Israeli peace agreement. At the end of February 1988 the US secretary 
of State, George Shultz, embarked on a tour of Middle East capitals, in 
an attempt to elicit support for a new peace initiative. The Shultz plan, 
as the initiative came to be known, proposed the convening of an 
international peace conference, involving all parties to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and the five members of the UN Security Council, with the 
Palestinian represented in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, 
excluding the PLO. This conference would have no power to impose a 
settlement and would act only as a consultative forum prior to and 
during subsequent direct talks between Israel and a joint Jordanian-
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Palestinian delegation. The latter talks would determine the details of a 
three-year transitional period of autonomy for the 1.5 million 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, leading (before the start of the 
transitional period) to negotiation to determine the final status 
government in the Territories. 
The plan's refusal to contemplate the participation of the PLO, 
the Palestinian's right to self-determination, and the establishment of 
an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank (i.e. the principles of 
the plan formulated at the Arab Summit in February in 1982), made it 
impossible for the Arab nations to accept. Jordan, which had initially 
welcomed a renewal of the USA's commitment to peace in the Middle 
East, became disillusioned by its failure to apply persuasive pressure 
on Israel's Prime Minister; Itzhak Shamir; ^^ ^^  to modify his opposition to 
the Shultz plan. King Hussein pronounced himself skeptical that Israel 
would withdraw militarily from the West Bank prior to the transitional 
autonomy period, as the plan would require it to do, and reiterated his 
opposition, in accordance with Arab Summit resolutions, to 'Partial or 
interim solutions'. He welcomed the USA's acceptance, on 1 March 
1988, of the concept of the Palestinians' "Legitimate rights' although he 
asked the USA to clarify its definition of those 'rights'. However, given 
the resumption of Jordanian political co-operation with the PLO, the 
enhanced status conferred on the organization by the intifada, and the 
potentially threatening reaction of Palestinians in Jordan, King Hussein 
was effectively constrained from supporting the Shultz plan. 
An extraordinary Summit meeting of the Arab League was held in 
Algiers in June 1988 to discuss the continuing Intifada and the Arab-
Israeli conflict in general. Addressing the Summit, King Hussein gave 
his unconditional support to the Intifada and disclaimed any ambition to 
restore Jordanian rule in the West Bank. He insisted that the PLO must 
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represent the Palestinians at any future peace conference, and 
repeatedly stressed the PLCs status as 'the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people; The Shultz plan, he claimed, 
had been launched only because the Intifada had taken on the 
appearance of a Palestinian war against Israel. 
The Summit hailed the 'heroic' Palestinian Uprising, and its final 
communique effectively rejected the Shultz plan by endorsing the 
Palestinians right to self-determination and the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian State in the West Bank, and insisting on the 
participation of the PLO in future peace talks/^^^ 
Disengagement from the West Bank 
Prior to 1989, Jordan's last parliamentary elections were held in 
April of 1967, two months prior to Israel's occupation of the West Bank. 
Since their union in 1950, the East Bank had been allocated equal 
representation within Parliament: each had thirty representatives in the 
House of Deputies. The 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and 
the 1974 Arab Summit resolution at Rabat, which designated the PLO 
as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, posed 
constitutional and practical obstacles to the holding of general 
elections. On July 28, 1988, King Hussein announced the cessation of 
a $ 1.3 billion development program for the West Bank, explaining that 
the measure was designed to allow the PLO more responsibility for the 
area. Two days later, he formally dissolved Parliament, ending West 
Bank representation in the legislature. Finally, on July 31 King Hussein 
announced the severance of all administration and legal ties with the 
occupied West Bank. Accordingly, electoral districts were redrawn to 
represent East Bank constituencies only. This disengagement decision 
marks the turning point that launched the current democratic process. 
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and began a new stage in Jordan's relationship with West Bank 
Palestinians. The decision to sever legal and administrative ties with 
the West Bank allowed Jordan's electoral law to be changed, redrawing 
the map to include only East Bank districts. During the same period, 
mounting economic difficulties led to a spate of rioting in certain parts 
of the Kingdom.*^^^ 
The decision of disengagement from the West Bank came after 38 
years of the unity of the two Banks, and fourteen years after the Rabat 
summit resolution designating the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It 
also came six years after the Fez Summit resolution that agreed 
unanimously on the establishment of an Independent Palestinian State 
in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip as one of the bases and 
results of the peaceful settlement. The decision of disengagement had 
been a topic of discussion and consideration for everyone since the 
Rabat Summit. 
Some may wonder why the decision was not taken after the 
Rabat Summit or Fez Summit. We need to recall certain facts that 
preceded the Rabat resolution. It may be important to recall that one of 
the main facts was the text of the unity resolution of the two banks of 
April 1950. This resolution affirmed the preservation of all Arab rights in 
Palestine and the defense of such rights by all Legitimate means with 
out prejudicing the final settlement of the just cause of the Palestinian 
people within the scope of the people's aspirations and of Arab 
cooperation and international justice. Then there was King Hussein's 
1972 proposal regarding his concept of alternatives, on which the 
relationship between Jordan on the one hand and the West Bank and 
Gaza on the other, was to be based after their liberation. Among these 
alternatives was the establishment of a relationship of brotherhood and 
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cooperation between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the 
independent Palestinian State in case the Palestinian people opted for 
that. Simply, this meant that King Hussein declared his clear-cut 
position regarding his adherence to the Palestinian people's right to 
self-determination on their national soil, including their right to establish 
their own independent state, more than two years before the Rabat 
Summit resolution. This was to be the King's position until the 
Palestinian people achieved their complete national goals.^ ^^^ The 
relationship of the West Bank with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 
light of the PLO's call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state, can be confined to two consideration: First, the principal 
consideration pertaining to the issue of Arab unity as a pan-Arab aim, 
which Arab peoples aspire to and want to achieve. Arab unity between 
any two or more countries is an option of any Arab people. This was 
what King Hussein believed. Accordingly, he responded to the wish of 
the Palestinian people's representatives for unity with Jordan in 1950. 
From this premise, the King respected the wish of the PLO, the sole 
and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to secede from 
Jordan as an independent Palestinian State. The King said that "while 
we fully understand the situation, nevertheless, Jordan will remain the 
proud bearer of the message of the Great Arab Revolt, adhering to its 
principal, believing in one Arab destiny, and committed to joint Arab 
action". Regarding the second consideration, since the June 1967 
aggression, King Hussein had believed that his actions and efforts 
should be directed at liberating the land and the Sanctities from Israeli 
occupation. Therefore, the King had concentrated all his efforts over 
the years of occupation on that goal. He did not imagine that 
maintaining the legal and administrative relationship between the two 
banks could constitute an obstacle to liberating the occupied 
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Palestinian land. Hence, in the past and before the King took 
measures, he did not find anything requiring such measures, especially 
since his support for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination 
was clear. Lately, it had transpired that there was a general Palestinian 
and Arab orientation, which believes in the need to highlight the 
Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities that are related to 
the Palestine question and its development. It has also became clear 
that there was a general conviction that maintaining the legal and 
administrative links with the West Bank, and the ensuing Jordanian 
interaction with the Palestinian brothers under occupation through 
Jordanian institution in the occupied territories, contradicted this 
orientation. It was also viewed that these links hampered the 
Palestinian struggle to gain international support for the Palestinian 
cause of a people struggling against foreign occupation. In view of this 
line of thought, inspired by genuine Palestinian will, and Arab 
determination to support the Palestinian cause, it became the King's 
duty to be part of this direction, and to respond to its requirements. 
King Hussein said, "we are all a part of our nation, supportive of its 
causes, foremost among which is the Palestinian cause". Since there is 
a general conviction that the struggle to liberate the occupied 
Palestinian land could be enhanced by dismantling the legal and 
administrative links between the two banks, the King said, "we have to 
fulfill our duty, and do what is required of us". At the Rabat Summit of 
1974 the King responded to the Arab leader's appeal to him to continue 
his interaction with the occupied West Bank through Jordanian 
institutions, to support the steadfastness of the Palestinian brothers 
there, and in 1988 the King responded to the wish of the PLO, the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and to the Arab 
orientation to affirm the Palestinian identity in all its aspects. This step 
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was a substantive addition to the intensifying Palestinian struggle for 
freedom and independence. King Hussein said, "It has to be 
understood in all clarity, and without any ambiguity or equivocation, 
that our measures regarding the West Bank concern only the occupied 
Palestinian land and its people. They naturally do not relate in any way 
to the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its 
obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin. 
They are an integral part of the Jordanian state to which they belong, 
on whose soil they live, and in whose life and various activities they 
participate. Jordan is not Palestine and the independent Palestine 
State will be established on the occupied Palestine territory after its 
liberation, God willing".^ ^®^ 
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Chapter-3 
POLITICAL REFORMS 
IN JORDAN 
Political Structure 
Following Jordan's complete disengagement from the West Bank, the country could now fully concentrate on the need to develop viable and democratic political 
institutions in line with the aspirations of the Jordanian 
populate. Thus from the late eighties Jordan withnessed an 
effervescence of democratic political activity, the likes of which has not 
been seen in the past three decades. 
Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. The King is the chief 
executive. The succession is based on primogeniture and thus the 
throne of Kingdom passed to succeeding generations within the 
dynasty of King Abdullah bin al Hussein in the direct male line. 
The constitution originally promulgated during the reign of King 
Talal, amended in 1974, stipulated that Jordan is a hereditary 
Monarchy with a Parliamentary system. The functions of state are 
clearly stated and the principle of separation of powers is maintained. 
The Islamic law with Hanafi interpretation is observed. Jordan is 
divided into twelve Governorates; each headed by a Governor and 
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subdivided into different administrative regions containing towns and 
countryside alike. The Ministry of Interiors supervises the 
Governorates, which are an extension of the Central Government. 
Governors enjoy vast powers and in specific cases they exercise the 
powers of Minister in the region. The executive power rests with the 
Monarch who is also the supreme commander of armed forces. The 
Army In Jordan is Potentially the strongest political instrument in the 
society. It alone embodies the discipline and military wherewithal to 
prevail in an extraordinary situation facing the authority, which controls 
it. During the years under General Glubb, the Arab Legion was the 
mainstay of the Hashemite throne. Now the King relies on a complex 
ethnic, regional and political balance within the country to maintain 
control of the army. Since its formation, the army has been a volunteer 
and elitist force in which conscripts receive training but to whose 
permanent rungs access has been deliberately limited. Since Army is a 
factor of great importance in Jordan, the overall budget allocation to 
defense has been on the increase.^^^ 
Local Governments and Administration is now based on the 
Twelve East Bank provinces, [Liwas,] of Amman, Irbid, Balqa, Karak 
Maan, Mafraq, Ajloun, Jarash, Zarqa, Madaba, Aqaba and Shobak, 
each headed by a commissioner. The [Liwas] are further subdivided 
into districts, [aqdiyas] and subdistricts, [Nawahins], Small villages are 
governed by headmen, [Mukhtars]. ^^^ 
Political Parties 
Political Parties have been officially banned since 1957. Prior to 
that time. King Hussein had allowed parties to function freely, with the 
hope that Jordan's government could develop into a constitutional 
monarchy. The Baath, Nationalist, Liberal, Communist, Muslim 
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Brotherhood, and other parties were all active in the mid-1950s. The 
majority of these were ideological or sectarian, without a wide popular 
base. Many were antimonarchy. 
As tensions rose in Jordan with the increasing influence of the 
Arab nationalists, the political parties criticized Jordan's pro-Western 
policies and, sometimes, the King. In 1956, the Arab nationalists won 
the parliamentary election. Their leader, Sulayman Nabuisi, a West 
Bank Palestinian, became prime minister. Nabuisi, who was closely 
associated with Abu Nuwar, pushed for greater ties with Nasser and 
other Arab nationalist states. When the nationalists overstepped the 
bounds of loyal opposition in 1957, conspiring with Abu Nuwar against 
the monarchy, the King exercised his power. He not only removed 
Nabuisi from power but banned all political parties. The King has 
attempted to maintain popular representation despite the ban on 
political parties. Elections have been held periodically. Candidates are 
chosen by the government; therefore, popular representation is limited. 
Several other mechanisms have been created to make the government 
more responsive to the people. In 1971, the Jordanian National Union 
was established as the nation's sole authorized political organization. It 
failed to win widespread support. Democracy has not taken root and 
Jordan remains a monarchy with only the thinnest veneer of a 
representational government. Influence on the political process in 
Jordan, therefore, remains with those who can influence the King. 
Members of the ruling family, close advisors, traditional leaders, and, of 
course, the military continue to fill this role. However, in Transjordan 
between 1927 and 1947, there were six parties and it was not 
uncommon to find personalities with claims to membership in several 
parties.^^^ For instance, Hashem Khays who served In the Legislative 
and Executive Council was either president or vice-president of one or 
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other party during his lifetime. He was President of the People's 
(Sha'ab) Party from March 1927 until the beginning of 1930 when the 
party ceased to exist. He was vice-president of the Executive 
Committee of the National Congress party (which opposed the 1928 
agreement) from April 1929 until June 1930, when he joined the newly 
formed pro-government Moderate Liberal Party as vice-president. In 
March 1933, he joined al-Tadamun Party, which claimed to represent 
authentic Jordanians, i.e., settlers in Transjordan prior to 1922. 
Likewise, Mithqal al-Fayez, leader of the Bani Sakhr tribe, was a 
member of Sha'ab, al Tadamun and al-Nahda Parties. Several other 
leaders managed to maintain multiple memberships.^'*^ The Parties 
were short-lived; the longest one lasted five years.^^^ 
With the exception of the National Congress party, the political 
parties of Transjordan possessed no programs or platforms and failed 
to develop organization. Published statements released by the parties 
outlined their objectives in such vague manner that any meaningful 
distinctions were blurred. The Constitution of Sha'ab party outlined the 
party's objectives as follow: 
"Seeking through peaceful means the realization of 
true independence, improvement of the economic 
conditions, protection of individual liberties, religious 
expression, and assurance of equality and brotherhood 
among the citizens".^^^ 
The strong emphasis on parochial loyalties and personal 
relationships impeded the growth of formalized relationships. 
Accordingly, individuals were associated with cliques clustered around 
Sheikhs and notables. Politicians who occupied themselves with 
personal rivalries and leadership moved freely between parties, which 
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were largely a reflection of these personalized relationships. This 
pettiness discouraged a mass following, and tribal conflicts often 
caused the division of parties along tribal lines. 
Politicians were able not only to move from one party to another, 
but also to maintain simultaneous association with several parties and 
all that due to the lack of ideological distinctions between parties. 
The first Parliament elected in independent Transjordan was 
reminiscent of the Legislative Councils of the mandate period. The 
campaign was conducted peacefully in 1947, with only one party, al-
Nahda (Revival) participating. This party was created by the 
government on May 7,1947 for the purpose of supporting King 
Abdullah's drive for a Greater Syria. Its candidates won four seats, and 
the rest of the seats were occupied by independents, who were drawn 
largely from the ranks of tribal leaders, land owners, and wealthy 
businessmen, who traditionally supported the government. With the 
unification of the two Banks the Legislative structure underwent a 
radical change. Membership in the lower house was increased from 
twenty to forty giving the two regions equal representation, and the 
number of electors rose from 100,000 to 304,000 of who 157.000 were 
Palestinians. ^ ^^  
The first election after the merger held in April 1950 was much 
livelier affair than previous campaigns. Five political parties lacking 
official recognition were represented in the contest for legislative seats. 
Three of those parties, deriving their main support from the West Bank, 
were generally opposed to the government. The other two parties 
based in the East Bank owed their allegiance to the palace and were 
identified with either Abul-Huda or al-Rifai. They were the Arab 
Constitutional Party (al-Hizb-al-Arabi al-Dusturi) and the Community 
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Party (Hizb al-Umma). The three opposition parties were the 
Communist, the Ba'ath, and the National Front (later renamed National 
Socialist Party). Together, the opposition secured fourteen seats out of 
forty thus making the government's position somewhat difficult. The 
Palace parties won ten seats, and the remaining sixteen seats were 
occupied by independents. 
The Jordanian Ba'ath party is a branch of an international 
movement which had began in Syria in 1940 under the leadership of 
Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, It extended to Jordan after the Arab 
Israeli war. A group of young intellectuals petitioned the government of 
Jordan of February 5,1952 for a permit to legalize the party, but their 
request was denied.^^^ Two subsequent petitions were also rejected on 
the pretext that the aims of the party were inconsistent with the 
constitution.^®' Finally, the Supreme Council, on an appeal, reversed 
the Cabinet's decisions. The Ba'ath party was legally recognized from 
August 28,1955 and until the dissolution of all parties on April 25,1957. 
The Ba'ath party had a mass following, and it drew its support 
mainly from intellectuals, students, and liberal professionals. It 
advocated a moderate democratic socialist program with emphasis on 
redistribution of wealth to assure social and economic justice and with 
adequate guarantees for the protection of private property.^^°' After 
recognition the Ba'ath was invited to participate in the coalition 
government of Suleiman Nabuisi in 1956. The Ba'ath General 
Secretary, Representative Abdullah Rimawi, assumed the post of 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. 
In October 1950, Suleiman Nabuisi and a group of associates 
petitioned the Cabinet for a license to organize a party called National 
Front. The petition was ignored and no action was taken until July, 
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1954 when party was permitted to operate freely under the name of the 
National Socialist. 
Like the Ba'ath, this party aimed at the establishment of a unified 
Arab State. Its conception of nationalism was based on the citizen's 
feeling of belonging to one nation. The party's Secretary General wrote: 
"This nationalism is not based on radical, material, or ideological 
basis".^^^^ Its socialism is non-Marxian evolutionary with emphasis on 
social reform and integration of the classes. The leadership of the 
National Socialist Party was drawn largely from prosperous but 
progressive businessmen and landowners, and Liberal professionals.^^^^ 
Despite its lack of organization, this party had won a sizeable 
percentage of the vote in free elections. Its popularity in the 1950's may 
be attributed largely to its identification with the "liberal Arab States", 
and its anti-imperialist stand. 
The Jordan Communist Party was established in June 1951, but its 
existence in Jordan dates to 1949 when it was known as the League for 
National Liberation (Osbat al-Taharrur al-watani).^^^^ In the summer of 
1949, it issued a publication called al-Muqawama al-Sha'biya.^^^^ Because 
the party was subject to various kinds of restrictions, it operated under 
different labels and in cooperation with non-suspect groups. 
The name which it adopted for the purpose of participation in the 
1951 parliamentary elections was the Popular Front (al-Jabha al-
Sha'biya). Three of the candidates who appeared on a Popular Front 
platform were elected in Nablus and Hebron. 
The Party campaigned on a rather moderate platform, which 
emphasized Jordan's socio-economic problems but without the Marxist 
terminologies.^^^^ The platform urged the abrogation of the Anglo-
Jordanian Treaty as a necessary step towards independence and non-
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involvement in world conflicts. It called on the government to legalize 
political parties and labor unions, to distribute feudal estates among 
landless peasant, and to establish new industries in order to provide 
work for the unemployed. A second outlet for the Communist Party was 
the movement of the Partisans for Peace (Jama'at Ansar al-Salam), 
which attracted a fairly large following in 1951-1952. The Communist 
Party continued to grow in the early 1950's despite restrictions and 
press censorship. In addition to the regular publication, al-Muqawama 
al-Sha'biya, and two other, al-Jabha, and al-Raye, began to appear in 
1952. At that time with a sizeable number of its leaders and followers in 
prison the party published regularly two periodicals al-Taqaddum 
(Progress) and al-Haqiqa (Truth).^^^^ 
The Communist Party drew its support mainly from lower middle 
class, students and teachers, and professional groups. Occasionally, 
some big Landowners expressed support. On May 9,1954 a group of 
people petitioned the government for a license to establish a political 
party under the name, al- Jabha al-Wataniya (National Bloc). The list 
of petitioners included three scholars and teachers, four attorneys, one 
of whom was a Parliament Member, three physicians, and three 
Landowners. ^'^^^ The request was denied, but the party continued to 
operate underground, and succeeded in electing three members to 
Parliament in 1956. Together with the National socialist and the Ba'ath 
parties, the Communists helped from the first "Popular From" 
government in any Middle Eastern country. 
The association of the Muslim Brethren is an off-shoot of the 
movement in Egypt, founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928. Its formation 
in Jordan dates back to 1946 when branches were opened in several of 
its cities. Apparently, King Abdullah supported the movement in the 
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hope that its only aim was spiritual. But the Association is more than 
spiritual. One of its leaders in Jordan summarized its dimensions: 
1. A movement calling for the return to the Koran and the Sunna, 
path of the prophet. 
2. A welfare organization aiming at the creation of the "good 
society;" i.e., the Muslim society. 
3. An athletic movement to prepare the soldiers of tomorrow. 
4. A political association seeking to apply the Islamic doctrine. 
The Muslim Brethren rejects capitalism and Marxian socialism as 
alien to the Muslim tradition. They consider Islam as capable of 
providing social justice and Islamic law as sufficiently applicable to 
modern life in an its aspects. The Association draws on a reservoir of 
intellectual achievements by medieval Muslims and considers Muslim 
heritage as the basis of a renaissance. In the realm of foreign affairs, 
the Brethren tend to be hostile towards the Western as well as the 
Communist Powers. The Association of Muslim Brethren made its 
appearance on the political scene of Jordan in 1956, when four of its 
members won seats in the Fifth Parliament.'^°^ 
Jordan's Democratic Renaissance 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has made remarkable 
progress toward establishing the basis of a pluralistic, organized 
political structure that can serve as a model for the region. Since 
Jordan resumed, its commitment to parliamentary politics in 1989, a 
number of sweeping reforms have been adopted to ensure that the 
venture is placed on a solid footing. Most notable among these are the 
reintroduction of political parties to parliament, the drafting of the 
National Charter, the expansion of press freedoms and a firm 
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commitment to pluralism and human rights. In the words of King 
Hussein, Jordan's commitment to fostering political culture is an 
"irreversible option" 
In 1989, political reform began with parliamentary elections that 
were hailed internationally as among the freest ever held in the Middle 
East. A caretaker government headed by Sharif (Now his late Highness 
Prince) Zeid bin Shaker was entrusted to supervise democratic 
elections for Jordan's House of Deputies, thereby strengthening the 
process of political reform. Censorship was duly lifted and candidates 
for the lower house began to campaign independently albeit under the 
banners of different ideological persuasions. Jordanian went to the 
polls on November 8, 1989, in the first general elections in twenty-two 
years. The fairness of the elections was acknowledged internationally 
and domestically by both winners and losers alike, and King Hussein 
was given credit for the measures he had taken to secure the return of 
democracy to Jordan. The electoral guidelines allowed all citizens over 
age nineteen the right to vote. Jordanian women were allowed to vote, 
having first gained the franchise in 1974, and were also entitled to seek 
office. Although the ban on political parties effected in 1957, remained 
on the books, candidates ranged ideologically from the extreme left to 
the extreme right. Most of these independent candidates formed 
loosely organized blocs according to political inclinations. 
More than 640 candidates, including 12 women, competed for 
seats in the lower house, which was expanded, form 60 to 80 
members. The size of the appointed upper house, the House of 
Notables, was expanded to 40 members. For the first time in the 
country's history, the entire spectrum of Jordanian society participated 
in the legislative branch of government.^^^^ At the election, in which 
63% of the total electorate (including, for the first time, women) of 
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877.475 voted the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) won 20 seats, while 
independent Islamic candidates who supported the Muslim 
Brotherhood, won a further 14 seats. It was estimated that Palestinian 
or Arab nationalist candidates won seven seats and that candidates 
who were supporters of 'leftist' political groupings won four seats. The 
remaining seats were won by candidates who were broadly considered 
to be supporters of the Government, the strength of support for the 
opposition candidates was regarded as surprising, both In Jordan and 
abroad, especially since a disproportionately large number of seats had 
been assigned to rural areas, from which the Government has 
traditionally drawn most support. At the first session of the new House 
of Representatives on 27 November 1989, Suleiman Arar, a former 
Minister of the Interior, was selected speaker of the house. 
On 4 December 1989 Mudar Badran was appointed Prime 
Minister by King Hussein. Badran had served as Prime Minister twice 
previously, during 1976-79 and 1980-84. Badran's new Cabinet was 
appointed, and approved by royal decree, on 6 December 1989. The 
new Government did not include any member of MB who had been 
elected to the House of Representatives, the MB having declined 
participation after its demand for the education portfolio had been 
rejected. Included in the new Cabinet, however, were three 
independent Muslim deputies and three 'leftist', all of whom were 
regarded as members of the opposition. A further four deputies 
appointed to the Cabinet were described as independent nationalists 
close to the state, while a further Six had held office in the previous 
Cabinet under Field Marshal Sharif Zaid Ibn Shakir. The Government 
received a vote of confidence from the House of Representatives on 
1 January 1990. The Prime Minister affirmed continuing support for 
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prevailing austerity measures, and at the end of January announced 
the abolition of the 1954 anti-communism law.^^°^ 
Soon after the 1989 elections, King Hussein declared: "To continue 
Jordan's liberalization process and to reiterate our deep commitment to 
defending the human rights and dignity of our citizens we decree that the 
martial laws are cancelled". Imposed as a result of the tense security 
situation resulting from the 1967 war and Jordan's loss of the West Bank 
to Israel, martial law had preserved the status quo for more than twenty 
years. With the easing of tensions, the emergency regulations were 
frozen in 1989, and formally erased in April 1992. 
In order to place Jordan's progress to democracy on a stable 
foundation, a 60-member royal commission was appointed by King Hussein 
in April 1990 with the aim of drafting guidelines for the conduct of party 
activity in Jordan. The commission comprised members representing all the 
political groups in the country, and it produced a written consensus in the 
form of the National Charter. The Charter was adopted in June 1991 at a 
national conference of 2000 leading Jordanians. 
The National Charter outlines general guidelines for constructive 
dialogue between the executive and legislative organs, as well as 
between decision-makers and political and intellectual elites concerning 
questions of authority, rights and responsibility. It enunciates the terms 
under which political parties can operate namely, within the framework 
of the Constitution and free of foreign funding and also emphasizes 
broad agreement on the need for political reflection on Jordan's cultural 
pluralism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter has given Jordanian 
leaders a sense of direction, an insurance policy against outbidding by 
unrestrained groups, and a degree of predictability in political affairs. It 
has also eased concerns about the consequences of unbridled freedom of 
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expression. The National Charter, along with the Jordanian Constitution, 
provides a compass for the national debate on fundamental issues. 
It also guarantee the protection of human rights and offered an 
indigenous model of democratic pluralism based on the only true 
guarantors of stability: public participation and collective responsibility. 
Freedom of the press, one of the cornerstones of democracy, was 
enhanced with the enactment of new legislation on press and 
publications. In the area of human rights, the government repealed 
martial law, which had been enforced in the aftermath of the 1967 war. 
The government also encouraged the stationing of several international 
and regional human rights organizations in Jordan, and ratified a 
number of treaties on human rights.^^^^ 
Political Reform and Multi-Party Elections 
On 6 October 1991 an alliance of 49 deputies in the House of 
Representatives, from the Muslim brotherhood (MB), the 'constitutional 
bloc', the 'Democratic Alliance', and some independent Islamic 
deputies, signed a petition in protest at the terms of Jordan's 
participation in the Middle East peace conference initiated in the 
aftermath of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. They urged the resignation of the 
Government, and on 16 November Taher al-Masri resigned as Prime 
Minister, having lost the confidence of the House. The King appointed his 
cousin, Sharif Zaid Ibn Shaker, who had led a transitional government in 
1989, as Prime Minister, and a new, broader-based government received 
a vote of confidence on16 December. Kamel Abu Jaber retained his 
position as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The MB was again excluded from 
the Cabinet and 18 of its members voted against the new Government 
in the confidence motion. 
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In June 1992 an extraordinary session of the House of 
Representatives was convened in order to debate new laws regarding 
political parties and the press. In early July the House adopted new 
legislation whereby, subject to certain conditions, political parties were 
formally legalized, in preparation for the country's first multi-party 
election since 1956, which were to be held before November 1993. The 
new legislation was approved by royal decree at the end of August and 
by March 1993 nine political parties had received the Government's 
formal approval of their activities. 
In May King Hussein appointed a new cabinet, in which Abd as-
Salam al-Majali, the leader of the Jordanian delegation to the Middle 
East conference, replaced Sharif Zaid Ibn Shakir as Prime Minister. 
The new Government was regarded as a transitional administration, 
pending the country's first multi-party election.*"^ 
At the beginning of August 1993 King Hussein unexpectedly 
dissolved the House of Representatives, provoking criticism from some 
politicians who had expected the House to debate proposed changes to 
the country's electoral law and changes in voting procedures at the 
general election, which was subsequently announced by the King in 
Mid-August. Voters were to be allowed to cast one vote only, rather 
than a number equal to that of the number of candidates contesting a 
given constituency, as before. After the announcement of the Israeli-
PLO accord in September 1993 King Hussein appeared to be unsure 
whether or not to proceed with the elections, fearing that they might be 
dominated by the debate about the peace process. Eventually the King 
decided to hold the elections as planned on 8 November 1993. The 
election campaign went smoothly and peacefully. Some 820,000 
Jordanians (52% of eligible voters and 68% of registered voters) cast 
their ballots in the 20 electoral districts. However, the independent New 
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Jordan Research Centre estimated that 70% of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin abstained. This low level of participation was attributed 
to the fact that Jordanians of Palestinian origin did not feel part of the 
Jordanian political system and also that the prevailing system of 
electoral districts favoured areas dominated by East Bankers. 
In all, some 534 candidates contested the election and one-half 
of the 20 registered political parties fielded candidates. The majority of 
candidates, however, stood as independents. The political parties, 
which had been legal for less than a year, had little time to organize 
mass public support. Domestic issues, such as unemployment, were 
the main issues in the electoral campaign, with traditionalist candidates 
focusing on local issues and promising to improve the provision of 
public services in their constituencies. Of the 80 deputies returned, 45 
were independents. With the traditions of tribalism deeply rooted in the 
customs of the country, they won largely because of their tribal 
affiliations and personal influence. 
The Islamic Action Front (lAF), an alliance between the MB and 
other Islamist groups, won 16 seats, the largest number of any political 
party, but six fewer than in the 1989 elections. This reversal was 
largely thought to result from the new electoral law, which embodied 
the one-man one-vote principle. Indeed, the new law was widely 
interpreted as an attempt to weaken the lAF. Others felt that the 
Islamists had misjudged the mood of the country and had not devoted 
enough attention in their campaign to basic issues related to the impact 
of the economic recession on the lives of ordinary Jordanians. Of the 
other political parties, leftists and Arab nationalists won eight seats 
while five conservative and right-of-centre parties claimed a total of 14 
seats. Only 14 of the 80 new deputies were of Palestinian origin. 
Among the new deputies was the first woman to be elected to the 
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Assembly, Toujan al-Faisal, who won one of the seats reserved for the 
Circassian minority.^^^^ 
Soon after the election a number of political groupings were 
formed in addition to the lAF. The Progressive Democratic Coalition, 
consisting of Liberal deputies and leftist and Arab nationalists, claimed 
the support of 22 deputies; the National Action Front (NAF) and the 
Jordan Action Front (JAF), both groupings of conservative parties and 
their allies, claimed 18 and 9 seats respectively. The lAF remained the 
largest single political organization in the country. Some deputies saw 
the emergence of Parliamentary blocs as the first step in a move 
towards the formation of larger political parties. 
Taher al-Masri, widely regarded as the most influential 
Palestinian in Jordanian politics and a former Prime Minister, was 
elected Speaker of the National Assembly on 23 November 1993. Al-
Masri won an overwhelming victory against his rival, an lAF deputy. (An 
lAF deputy had held the post of Speaker in the outgoing National 
Assembly). Dr Abd as-Salam al-Majali remained Prime Minister and 
although he made few significant changes that, for the first time, the 
Cabinet did not include any Parliamentary deputies. His new 
Government won a vote of confidence on 8 December after a prolonged 
debate during which the Prime Minister was criticized for changes to 
the country's electoral law and for not making an independent 
statement of government policy but simply adopting the King's speech 
from the throne at the opening of Parliament. 
In another move towards democratization, in March 1994 the 
National Assembly approved legislation to allow municipal elections in 
Greater Amman, where some two-fifths of the country's population were 
living. The Government, no doubt concerned about the strength of 
Palestinian and Islamist opposition in the capital, had originally 
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proposed that only one-half of the municipal council should be elected, 
but this was increased to two-thirds by the National Assembly. The 
remaining third of he council, together with the mayor, were to continue 
to be appointed by the Government/^''^ 
In early January 1995 there was a further extensive reorganization 
of the Government, following the dismissal of al-Majali as Prime Minister. 
He was replaced by Sharif Zaid Ibn Shaker, who had served as Prime 
Minister in 1989 and 1991-93, and was a close ally and a cousin of the 
King. Only seven ministers from the previous administration retained 
their portfolios in the new Government. Among the new ministers were 
Basel Jardaneh, as Minister of Finance, and Abd al-Karim Kabariti, as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Taher al-Masri resigned 
as Speaker of the House of Representatives, and was replaced by 
Seed Hayel as-Srour, who represented one of the northern Bedouin 
constituencies. The new Government easily won a vote of confidence in 
January 1995, with 54 votes in favour and only 23 against. 
Two new political blocs emerged in the National Assembly in 
early 1995. The Independent National Action Front (INAF), with 17 
deputies, was formed by a merger of the NAF and the bloc of 
independent deputies in the Assembly. The former Speaker of the 
National Assembly, Taher al-Masri, formed a second new grouping of 
some 15 liberal and independent Islamist deputies. In early June the 
authorities arrested six members of an illegal Islamist organization, the 
Islamic Renewal Group, believed to be active among Jordanians who 
had returned from Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion of 1990, and claimed 
to have found weapons and explosives that were to be used in attacks 
against US interests in Jordan. Early in 1996 the Prime Minister 
admitted that there had been 36 attempted terrorist attacks in the 
previous six months aimed at destabilizing the country. In municipal 
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elections held nationwide for the first time in July 1995 Islamic and left-
wing groups failed to gain significant popular support, most elected 
candidates being largely pro-government or independent. The lAF 
alleged that its poor performance was due to a low level of voter 
participation, and to government harassment of its members during the 
campaign. In November King Hussein warned that the country's 
professional organizations, several of which strongly opposed the 
normalization of relations with Israel, were becoming too involved in 
national politics and that this was against the interest of their members. 
In December Leith Shbeilat, the head of the Jordan Engineer's 
Association and an outspoken Islamist, was arrested and later jailed for 
three years, a move regarded by some observers as an attempt to 
intimidate supporters of the movement against the normalization of 
relation with Israel. 
At the beginning of February 1996 King Hussein appointed the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd al-Karim Kabariti as Prime Minister. 
King Hussein was believed to have clashed with his predecessor, 
Sharif Zaid Ibn Shaker, on the pace of normalization with Israel and the 
severing of ties with Iraq. Kabariti's appointment was followed by the 
most radical reshuffle of the Government for many years. He appointed 
a new Cabinet in which the majority of ministers took office for the first 
time. Twenty-two of the 31 members, including the Minister of the 
Interior, were deputies in the House of Representatives, strengthening 
the new administration's democratic credentials. Negotiations between 
the new Prime Minister and the lAF leadership failed to achieve 
agreement, and there was some criticism among Islamist deputies who 
argued that their leaders should have adopted a more positive line 
about entering government. The King hoped that the new Government 
would go with all its energy and capability towards full and 
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comprehensive change. In early March Kabariti's new administration 
easily won a vote of confidence, in the House of Representatives, 
gaining the approval of deputies for its domestic policy. The Prime 
Minister emphasized the need to promote pluralism and democracy, 
safeguard public freedoms, and respect human rights. Kabariti 
announced his commitment to the independence of the judiciary and the 
media, to increasing public access to information and, eventually, to the 
abolition of the Ministry of Information. He also outlined plans to reform 
the Ministry of the Interior and the system of government appointments 
in order to combat nepotism and corruption, which had become an 
important political issue in recent years. Kabariti retained the foreign 
affairs portfolio and was known to be a strong supporter of the King's 
new policy on Iraq and of strengthening ties with Israel, policies that 
were likely to prove more controversial than his domestic programme.^^^^ 
The popularity of Kabariti's Government in the House of 
Representatives and indeed, in the country as a whole was short-lived. 
In mid-August 1996 fierce rioting erupted in the south of country after 
the Government more than doubled the price of bread. The price rise 
was part of an economic plan supervised by the IMF to remove the 
agriculture subsidies that stabilized food prices and thus help reduce 
the budget deficit in order to meet IMF fiscal targets. About one-third of 
Jordan's population were believed to be living below the poverty line, 
and many people feared that the rise in the price of bread, the 
country's staple food, would lead to increases in the prices of all 
foodstuffs. The rioting quickly spread to other parts of the country, 
including the poor suburbs of Amman. The King vowed to employ stern 
measures to suppress the demonstrations and told the Western media 
that he believed that the ringleaders had been educated in Iraq. He 
suspended the legislature and deployed elite units of the army to re-
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establish control in Karak, the scene of the most severe rioting, where 
several banks, the local officers of the Ministry of Education and a 
school were set on fire. The army quickly regained control over the 
town, which was placed under curfew, before any fatalities occurred, 
and it was reported that some 190 people had been arrested. After 
peace was restored, King Hussein visited different parts of the country 
to meet with civil and tribal leaders in a reconciliation attempt. The 
curfews were soon lifted, and by November 1996 all those arrested 
during the demonstrations had been released and charges against 
them dropped. Price increases, however, were not revoked. The lAF 
(which had earlier protested vigorously at the price increases), together 
with a number of smaller opposition parties, urged Kabariti to resign, 
blaming his Government for the rioting. Several observers argued that, 
although the demonstration had been triggered primarily by the 
Government's austerity programme, the deeply unpopular peace treaty 
with Israel and the King's dramatic break with Iraq had also contributed 
to growing discontent in the country. In an attempt to calm political 
tensions, the lAF had cancelled a mass demonstration against the 
economic austerity measures, scheduled for 23 August, and withdrew its 
demand for the Prime Minister's resignation. In response, King Hussein 
emphasized that the rioters were not members of the lAF. In November 
the King ordered the release of Leith Shbeilat, a leading Islamist, who 
had served only six months of his three-year sentence. In January 1997 
the shura council of the MB, the dominant group within the lAF, voted 
against the party's joining a future Government because this would imply 
recognition of Israel. However, moderates in the lAF opposed the 
decision, maintaining that it condemned the party to a relatively 
ineffective role in politics and could lose them electoral support. 
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King Hussein did not hold his Prime Minister responsible for the 
August riots, and Kabariti quickly attempted to restore his reputation. It 
therefore came as a surprise when the King dismissed Kabariti on 19 
March 1997 and appointed Abd as-Salam al-Majali to the premiership. 
There were reports that the King and Kabariti had disagreed over 
issues relating to the peace process and relations with Israel, as well 
as rumours of enmity between Kabariti and Crown Prince Hassan. King 
Hussein's public criticism of the outgoing Prime Minister suggested that 
he was unlikely to appoint Kabariti to head a future government. The 
new Prime Minister, a veteran and trusted politician who had been 
head of government when Jordan signed the peace treaty with Israel in 
October 1994, appointed a 23-member Cabinet consisting mainly of 
technocrats; he retained five ministers from the previous administration, 
including Dr Abdullah an-Nusur, an East Banker, promoted to Deputy 
Prime Minister, and Dr Jawad al-Anani, a Palestinian with experience 
as Minister of Labour and Industry in a previous administration also 
became a Deputy Prime Minister, with special responsibility for 
development matters. In his letter of appointment to al-Majali, King 
Hussein gave priority to internal affairs. The new Government's primary 
task was to be supervision of the forthcoming legislative elections. In 
preparation for the elections, the National Assembly voted to continue 
the 'one man one vote system adopted for the 1993 elections, rather 
than return to the previous multi-vote system.^^^^ The King also urged 
the new Government to eliminate corruption in public office to alleviate 
unemployment and to modify the education system to the needs of 
society. In May 1997, following increasing media criticism of a number 
of government policies, a number of amendments were made to 
legislation governing the press prompting strong protests from editors, 
journalists, professional associations and opposition groups. The 
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amendments include a considerable increase in the minimum capital 
that weekly journals were required to raise as a precondition for 
publishing, an extension of the range of prohibited subjects to include 
the armed forces and the security services, and a substantial rise in the 
fines that could be levied for contravening the press legislation. 
Opposition activists feared that these measure represented the return 
of closer state control over the press. Also in May 1997 nine centrist 
parties, announced that they had united to form the National 
Constitutional Party (NCP), which became the country's largest political 
grouping. The formation of the NCP together with the establishment in 
1996 of the Unionist Arab Democratic Party (a coalition of three leftist 
parties), reduced the total number of political parties from 24 to 14. 
The 1997 Elections And 1998 Government 
in July 1997 the MB declared that it would boycott the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections, which. King Hussein had 
announced, were to proceed In November, as scheduled. This decision, 
which was opposed by some prominent members of the movement, 
appeared to reflect growing disillusionment with the role of the National 
Assembly, which was perceived to have little or no influence over 
important political and economic decisions in the country. After 
intensive discussions, the lAF endorsed the MB's decision by a large 
majority. In the two months prior to the elections, discussions between 
the Government and the opposition parties failed to achieve any 
significant progress. The lAF, together with nine smaller leftist and 
nationalist parties, had in particular, demanded changes in the electoral 
legislation, arguing that the existing one man, one vote system 
favoured candidates with strong tribal affiliations over those 
representing 'ideological' parties; However, King Hussein and al-Majali 
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refused to make any concessions. In September the Government 
suspended some 13 weekly newspapers for three months (effectively 
during the electoral period) for failing to comply with the amendments 
to the press regulations that had been introduced in May. 
The elections on 4 November 1997, which were boycotted by 
many parties, professional associations and respected political figures, 
attracted little popular enthusiasm. It was estimated that a mere 55% of 
the registered electorate participated, with a voter turn-out of only 26% 
in parts of Amman. There were widespread allegations of electoral 
malpractice, and in a number of regions the security forces were 
obliged to intervene to suppress clashes between rival candidates and 
their supporters Deputies with tribal affiliations dominated the new 
parliament. Only 26 deputies who served in the outgoing parliament 
were re-elected, and many leading political figures, such as Taher al-
Masri and Abd al-Karim Kabariti, were absent from the new legislature. 
The NCP, which some sections of the press referred to as the 'party of 
the regime', presented 11 candidates but won only two seats. Although 
some opponents of the Government were represented in the nevy 
Assembly, including Islamist politician Abdullah Akaileh and 
Muhammad Azaydeh (who contested the election in defiance of the lAF 
boycott), government claims of a significant opposition presence 
appeared to be greatly exaggerated. Saed Hayel as-Srour was re-
elected Speaker of the House of Representatives. Among the new 
members appointed by King Hussein to the 40-member Senate was 
Kabariti (a move which was viewed as marking his political 
rehabilitation). Zaid ar-Rifai was retained as Speaker of the Senate. 
Political figures critical of the Government were completely absent from 
the upper house. King Hussein also confirmed the appointment of al-
Majali to the office of Prime Minister.^^^^ 
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Elections to the lAF's ruling body, the 120-member Shura 
Council, took place in December 1997. Despite the victory of the hard-
liners who ensured that the party boycotted the parliamentary elections 
in November, moderates and centrists succeeded in maintaining their 
dominant position on the Council, indicating that the party would avoid 
outright confrontation with the Government. In January 1998 the High 
Court ruled that the amendments to the press regulations introduced in 
May 1997 were unconstitutional and that actions taken by the 
Government under the amendments consequently had no validity. The 
authorities reluctantly agreed to accept the ruling, and a number of 
newspapers that had been banned resumed publishing in March. The 
country's Chief Justice, Farouq al-Kailani, claimed that, owing to his 
role in the High Court ruling on the press legislation, the Government 
had forced him to resign. 
There was widespread support among Jordanians for Iraq and, to 
a certain extent, for the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein. The authorities, 
however, decided to ban all pro-Iraqi demonstrations and put heavy 
pressure on the press to adopt the official government policy on the 
situation. When a grouping of Islamists, leftists and nationalists opposed 
to US policy in the Middle East attempted to hold a large rally in Amman 
in mid-February, the police quickly dispersed the meeting, and a number 
of leading government opponents were assaulted during the 
disturbances. Later in February there were violent clashes in the 
southern town of Ma'an when members of the security forces intervened 
to prevent a pro-Iraqi demonstration; the security forces subsequently 
denied responsibility for the death of one of the demonstrations. The 
Minister of the Interior, Nadhir Rashid, claimed that the riots in Ma'an 
had been instigated by Leith Shbeilat, an outspoken Islamist critic of the 
regime, who had addressed a meeting in the town that day, and stated 
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that he would be put on trial for his involvement in the disturbances. 
Supporters of Shbeilat, however, insisted that he had left Ma'an before 
the violence erupted and was arrested on his return to Amman. Shbeilat 
was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, but King Hussein ordered 
his release later in the year. The situation in Ma'an remained tense for 
some days after the disturbances, although order was quickly restored. 
The authorities imposed a curfew on the town for almost a week, during 
which schools were closed, telephone links suspended and food supplies 
disrupted. Many arrests were made and some of those detained were not 
released until the beginning of April. After his release from prison, 
Shbeilat called openly for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy 
that would place limits on the King's powers to dissolve the National 
Assembly and to appoint and dismiss members of the Government. 
In early 1988 al-Majali announced a cabinet reorganization, in 
which five new ministers were appointed, notably Dr Bassam al-Umush, 
a member of the MB who had been suspended from the movement in 
1997. The other new ministers had served with al- Majali when he was 
premier in the early 1990s. Rashid, who had been criticized for the 
suppression of the pro-Iraqi demonstrations by the security forces, 
retained his portfolio, but Samir Mutawi was replaced as Minister of 
State for Information and his responsibilities assigned to one of the two 
Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah an-Nusur. Dr Fayez at-Tarawneh, 
hitherto the Minister of Foreign Affairs, became Chief of the Royal 
Court, traditionally a move towards the premiership, with Jawad al-
Anani assuming the foreign affairs portfolio.^^°^ 
In July 1998 severe water shortages and a deterioration in the 
quality of existing water supplies in Amman caused public discontent, 
prompting the resignation of the Minister of Water and Irrigation, 
Mundhir Haddadin. In August King Hussein (who was undergoing 
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medical treatment in the USA) appointed at-Tarawneh to the office of 
Prime Minister, replacing al-Majali. Al-Majali's removal was largely 
attributed to the criticism that the Government had attracted over the 
continuing water crisis in Amman. Later in August a new Cabinet, which 
included 10 new ministers, was installed; al-Anani replaced at-
Tarawneh as Chief of the Royal Court. 
In the months following his appointment as Prime Minister, at-
Tarawneh made efforts to establish a dialogue with the opposition but 
failed to make any significant progress on key issues relating to foreign 
affairs or greater democratization at home. Meanwhile, the authorities 
moved quickly to control protests organized in opposition to the Wye 
River Memorandum signed between Israel and the Palestinians in 
October 1998. Despite the new Prime Minister's declared commitment to 
eradicate corruption in public office, those cases that were referred to 
court appeared to disappear without trace. In November the Minister of 
Administrative Development, Bassam al-Umush, accused the Government 
of lacking the will to implement urgently needed administrative reforms, 
rendering his ministry powerless to execute the tasks assigned to it. 
Despite such outspoken criticism, al-Umush retained his post, although 
his outburst provoked little evidence of government action regarding 
public sector reforms. The Government also encountered criticism from 
Jordan's business community; whereas the Jordanian authorities 
enthusiastically promoted membership of the World Trade Organization 
and Jordan's association with the EU, the Amman Chamber of Industry 
favoured prioritizing the further development of existing bilateral 
agreement with a number of Arab states. 
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Women In the Political Process 
The inception of modernization and spread by modern education 
have played Key role in modifying women's role and changing their 
status in Jordan. Throughout the nineteenth century and in the early 
decades of twentieth century individual and collective efforts were 
being made to universalize female education and to make women 
conscious of their rights. It is worthy to be noted that in every epoch 
the freedom of women had remained a subject of heated discussion 
between the conservative and liberal circles, thus hampering considerably 
any attempt to achieve the desired goal of equality of status speedily. The 
effect of education and employment gave Jordanian women a wider 
perspective and created desires which traditional seclusion could not 
satisfy. Emancipation has led to the organization of hundreds of women's 
clubs and societies. Some of these seek to expand women's rights and to 
promote their welfare in modern times. Others have charitable, 
philanthropic, and educational functions. Many are affiliated with 
international women's groups. Gradually, women have also acquired 
political rights (i.e. right to vote and be elected). The first women minister 
was appointed in Jordan in 1984.^ ^^^ 
In Jordan, number of women work in government offices, 
schools, medical clinics, hospitals and even in business enterprises. As 
area where women have made strong headway has been in the 
professions. There are substantial number of professional women in 
Jordan, and they are able to achieve top positions remarkably quickly. 
There are women pilots, women Judges, women Deans, women T.V. 
producers, radio announcers, computer scientists, journalists and 
economists throughout the Kingdom. There is no doubt that women's 
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aspirations, demands, and success will transform Jordan profoundly 
and permanently. ^^ °^  
According to the Jordanian Constitution, all Jordanians are equal 
before the law, have the right to assume public office and the right to 
work. Women were also given the right to vote and the right to run for 
general elections since 1974. In addition, the government of Jordan 
signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) in December 1980, which was ratified by parliament 
in 1992. <^ >^ 
Women have also been very active in local administration. 
Therefore women have the right of candidature and election to the 
member ship of municipal councils also in 1980, a woman was 
appointed to the 12-member Amman Mayoral Council and was 
reappointed in 1986 to the 50-member Greater Amman Mayoral Council 
where she is still serving at present. While in the 1995 municipal 
elections, 10 women won seats on municipal councils throughout 
Jordan, Miss, lyman Ftaimat one of whom was elected as Jordan's 
first Mayor.^ ^ )^ 
Women have also been very active in government. In the 1979 
cabinet, one of 23 ministers was a women the Minister of Social 
Development became the first female incumbent of a ministerial post in 
Jordan. In 1984, a woman became Minister of Information in a 25-
member cabinet. But in the period 1985-1992, in Six successive 
governments, no women was appointed to a ministerial post, until a 
women became Minister of Trade and Industry in the 29-member 
Cabinet of 1993. While in 1994 two women were appointed to the 
cabinet assuming the posts of Minister of Trade and Industry and 
Minister of Social Development. In 1996,1997 and 1998, one woman 
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retained the post of Minister of planning. Jordan's first woman judge 
was appointed in IVIay 1996. The government formed a National 
Committee for women in September 1996 to draw up general policies 
related to women in all fields and to define the priorities, chart plans 
and programs for women in the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors and to follow and work towards the modernization and 
development of the implementation of the national strategy on woman. 
In 1999, the first woman Deputy Prime Minister was appointed and who 
also has the important portfolio of Minister of Planning.^^^^ 
Women in the Kingdom of Jordan were granted the right to vote 
in 1974. Since Parliament stopped working from 1968 to 1984, the first 
parliamentary elections in which women voted were held in 1989. ^^^^ 
During the second Legislative elections in 1993, only two women 
ran for parliament, and one, Tujan al-Faysal, won a seat. Despite the 
fact that Faysal had no previous involvement in politics (though she 
was active in the media), she ran on an integrated political platform not 
presented by any of her male competitors. Her platform was based on 
the concept of human rights, and it was therefore logical that she stood 
as an independent candidate. Despite the active participation of women 
in the political process, there are still plenty of hurdles in the political 
empowerment of women. This is due to the following reasons: 
• The male political culture which militates against women's equal 
participation in the political sphere; 
• Lack of party support and backing; 
• Lack of media support; 
• Lack of confidence among voters that women can actually deliver 
on their election promises; 
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' Stunted democracy which allows for manipulation of electoral 
process; 
• Lack of networking and co-operation between women's 
organizations and women PMs. 
Tujan al-Faysal's standpoint for arguing in favour of women's 
rights on the basis of human rights was repeatedly demonstrated in 
her parliamentary debates. She asserts that she did not gain her 
popularity by presenting issues related to services in parliament, but 
through her political discourse, which was understood and supported 
by her constituents. They have also supported the bills that she has 
presented to parliament, which mainly revolve around the promotion 
of democracy. She described the nature of her performance within the 
Jordanian parliament by saying; "I am trying to present a new form of 
parliamentary work, a type that offers radical solutions to political 
issues". 
Faysal's independent political discourse provoked the religious 
and conservative trends within parliament, but her passionate belief in 
democracy and human rights and her knowledge of Islam earned her 
respect among some sections of the public and enmity from the ruling 
establishment. As an MP, she played a key role in revealing corruption 
and irregularities.^^^' 
National Women Organization 
> The Women NGO Movement in Jordan 
The first women society was established in Jordan in 1944 under 
the tittle of the " Women Solidarity society". The society, which had no 
headquarters and held its meeting in members house, played a 
prominent role in relief work for Palestinian refugees. In 1945, "the 
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women Federation Society" was founded as part of the Arab Women 
Federation. It aimed at improving the status of women in society 
culturally and socially, in addition to focusing on healthcare, chlldcare 
and programs for impoverished people. In 1949, the two women 
societies merged into one, under the name of the "Jordanian 
Hashemite women society". In 1950 the Young Women's Christian 
Association (YWCA) whose motto is "with love, serve one another", 
was founded to serve women and the community without social 
religious or racial discrimination, to promote the standard of women 
culturally economically and socially and to implement leadership 
training programs for women. The YWCA was followed two decades 
later by the Young Muslim Women's Association (YMWA), which was 
set up in 1972 under the patronage of HRH Princess Sarvath EL 
Hassan and has founded the YMWA Center for Special Education, a 
community college for women, a hostel and a workshop to provide 
employment for the disabled. In 1952, the "League to Defend Women's 
Rights" was founded to raise Jordanian women's awareness of their 
political role and the need to defend their socio economic rights. This 
laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Jordanian Women's 
Union in 1974 as anon-governmental grassroots organization that 
advocates women's and children's rights, political and awareness and 
poverty alleviation. In 1954, the First Women Federation in the 
Kingdom was announced and became a member of the International 
Women Federation; the main goals of the "Arab Women Federation" 
were the eradication illiteracy, building ties between Arab women and 
women of the world, the advancement of peace and promoting 
women's political rights. The present General Federation of Jordanian 
women, which was under the presidency of Her Majesty Queen Noor, 
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was the largest women's NGO in Jordan encompassing membership of 
women associations, societies and clubs. 
> The General Federation of Jordanian Women (GFJW) 
After His Majesty King Hussein passed away on 7 February 
1999, Queen Noor gave up the presidency of the national 
organizations. The Federation's membership includes over 80 
societies, committees and headquarters in each of 12 governorates, 
mobilizes women's efforts to play an effective role in political decision-
making. It offers educational opportunities and guidance in family 
welfare and health, advocates legislative reform favoring women and 
initiates income-generating activities in collaboration with other non-
governmental organizations, including the Noor Al-Hussein Foundation. 
The GFJW established a National Information Center for Women, which 
is the first of its kind in Jordan and the Arab world, and comprises a 
research unit, a comprehensive interactive library with audio-visual aids 
and access to the Internet, as well as consultation and information 
department. The latter will provide researchers, planners and women 
with information on national, regional and international organization 
concerned with women's affairs.^^^^ 
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Chapter - 4 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN JORDAN 
Introduction 
Despite the tumultuous events facing Jordan since 1974 and before, its economy has shown steady expansion and growth. There is no doubt that the over 
all picture was optimistic although at certain times growth was slow. 
For a short period following the 1967 War and the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank, and the subsequent clash with the commando groups in 
1970, economic growth even halted. The first major wave of Palestinian 
refugees following the 1948 War was a major shock for the Jordanian 
economy, at the time Jordan was very weak and underdeveloped.^^^ 
The second major wave of Palestinian refugees followed the 
occupation of the West Bank in 1967 and the concomitant dislocations had 
a similar effect in the ensuing four years. Jordan enjoyed an 
unprecedented growth in its income (and expenditures) during 1974-1999, 
boosted by foreign aid and loans, worker's remittances, and export to 
different markets. This ended in the mid-eighties as a result of the rapid 
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decline in the price of oil and the subsequent slowdown in regional 
economies. As a consequence, Jordan experienced a drastic slowdown in 
growth, which became more pronounced after 1986, and severe fiscal and 
external account deficits. By 1991, real Per Capita Income (RPCI) had 
declined to about half of its heights during the pre-crisis years. 
Unemployment and poverty increased. The government responded in 1989 
by undertaking policy adjustments to stabilize the economy and to restore 
growth rates towards the optimum growth rates. The stabilization policies, 
notwithstanding the disruptions caused by the Gulf crisis in 1991, have 
been persistent and largely successful. However, even against the 
background of these major shocks, the overall development of Jordan is 
very impressive indeed. The GDP at market prices increased from JD 
560.0 million in 1974 to JD 5767.2 million in 1999, that is the GDP increased 
from 1974 to 1999 by more than ten times. The GDP per capita increased 
from JD 220.950 million in 1974 to JD 1177.020 million in 1999.^^^ 
Economic Growth has a number of indicators. For economic 
growth study the GDP, Investments, Consumption, Savings, revenues, 
expenditures, exports and imports or the external trade are the main 
indicators for economic growth. In the other hand Per Capita income, 
life expectancy, literacy percentages are the main indicators. ^^^ 
Economic Growth in Jordan 
Economic growth is the main concept leading to the development 
of a country. To cover this part we have several economic aspects and 
variables and these must be analyzed correctly and accurately. The 
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following economic sectors and variables constitute the study of 
economic growth for the period 1974 to 1999. '^^  
1. GDP Growth 
2. Agricultural Sector 
3. Industrial Sector 
4. External Trade 
5. Balance Payment 
6. Transportation And Communication 
7. External Debt 
8. Banking And Monetary Development 
GDP Growth (1974-1999) 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a very important concept 
of national income. GDP is the money value of all final goods and 
services produced by normal residents as well as non-residents in the 
domestic territory of a country. The difference between Gross Domestic 
Product and Gross National Product at market prices arises due to the 
existence of 'Net Factor Income From Abroad'. GDP does not include 
net factor income from abroad, whereas GNP includes it. Therefore, 
GDPmp=GNPmp - Net Factor Income from Abroad, where GDPmp 
and GNPmp mean the GDP and GNP at market prices, respectively. 
For the Jordanian GDP growth study, we have tables from 
different sources in which the GDP and the relevant figures are already 
computed in their final formula. 
The Jordan GDP at market prices increased from JD 
385,700,000 in 1974 to JD 5767,200,000 in 1999. The data available 
about GDP were taken at current prices from 1974 to 1984 and at 
Chapter -4 124 Economic Growth and Development in Jordan 
constant prices from 1985 to 1999, and the Price indices are available 
from 1985 only, therefore, we will use the nominal GDP or GDP at 
current and producer's prices. 
The GDP figures are shown in (table 1.1). It is clear from table 
below that the GDP rapidly grew over the period of study. The 
performance of the economy during the entire period of study was 
satisfactory, despite the continued adverse effects of the unfavorable 
regional conditions. National accounts data reveal that GDP grew 
rapidly from 1974 to 1999. The rate of economic growth is adjusted by 
the rate of population growth. For the optimum growth path, economic 
growth rate must not be less than the rate of growth of population. 
From 1974 to 1982, the Jordanian GDP at current prices grew by about 
20.5%, and by about 8%, in average, from 1983 to 1999. This 
phenomenon may be interpreted due to the following reasons: 
1- The First Gulf War in early eighties that resulted in 
unattractive investment environment in the region as a whole. 
2- The second Gulf War in 1991. The main problem due to this 
war was the sanctions imposed against Iraq, the country with 
which Jordan had a considerable external trade, nearly about 
30% of total external trade. 
3- Increasing rate of growth of population in Jordan, especially after 
1991 when about one million of people came from Kuwait. 
4- The financial and managerial corruption that prevailed the 
country by some governmental officials in 1987, 1988. 
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Table 1.1, GDP by thousand JD 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
GDP 
385700 
435900 
547400 
676400 
779300 
981000 
1180300 
1469300 
1701100 
1828700 
1981400 
2020200 
2163600 
2208600 
2264400 
2372100 
2668300 
2868300 
3615700 
3884000 
4358200 
4714700 
4912300 
5137800 
5609900 
5767400 
Source: Department of Statistics, 
The figures In this table modified 
thousand JD 
Jordan 
by researcher from million JD to 
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Figure 1.1, GDP growth at current prices 
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From data in (table 1.1), we have obtained ANOVA table as 
shown above. For the purpose of our study we need the value and the 
sign of Beta. The value of Beta is (0.975) which is very high showing 
that the GDP was growing smoothly over the entire period of study. 
The sign of the coefficient, Beta, is positive which reflects that the rate 
of growth of GDP was positively increasing. In (figure 1.1) and 
(tablel.1) above, we can see that the GDP at current prices increased 
from 385,7 million in 1974 to 1177,02 million in 1999. To see whether 
the Jordan economy was growing in the optimum growth path, we have 
to study and analyze the rate of growth of GDP as well as the rate of 
growth of population. *'^  
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Table 1.2 The Rate of growth of GDP and population 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
GDP 
385700 
435900 
547400 
676400 
779300 
981000 
1180300 
1469300 
1701100 
1828700 
1981400 
2020200 
GDP growth rates 
13% 
26% 
24% 
15% 
26% 
20.30% 
24.50% 
15.80% 
7.50% 
8.40% 
2% 
Population 
(in million) 
175 
181 
189 
197 
206 
213 
223 
232 
241 
250 
260 
270 
Population 
Growth 
Rate 
3.40% 
4.40% 
4.20% 
4.60% 
3.40% 
4.70% 
4% 
3.90% 
3.70% 
4% 
3.90% 
Source : Department of Statics, Jordan 
From 1975 to 1982 the average rate of growth of GDP at current 
prices was 20.5% and the average rate of growth of population for the 
same period was 4 .1%, see (table 1.2). The average rate of growth of 
GDP at current prices for the period 1983-1999 was 8% and the 
average rate of growth of population for the same period was 4%. It is 
clear that there was a negative proportionate change in both the rate of 
growth of GDP and the rate of growth of population, but the decline in 
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the rate of growth of GDP is much bigger than that of the rate of growth 
of population. It means that there was a bigger effect of the Second 
Gulf War, 1991, and the imposed sanctions against Iraq on the 
Jordanian economy than that of the First Gulf War. The huge decline in 
the GDP growth rate was due to decreasing growth rate of foreign 
direct investment in Jordan. ^^^ 
> Sectoral Contribution To GDP : 
Sectoral growth indicators for the period of study, as shown in 
(table 1.3 ), reveal the following: 
> The agricultural sector absolute contribution value to the GDP at 
current prices increased from JD 42.4 million in 1976 to JD 115.9 
million in 1999.The GDP at market prices in 1976 was JD 565 
million, (table 1.3). Therefore the percentage contribution of the 
agricultural sector to the GDP in 1976 was 8%, whereas the GDP 
at market prices in 1999 was JD 5767.2 million. Therefore the 
percentage contribution of the agricultural sector to the GDP in 
1999 was 2%. This indicators show that there is a hazardous fall 
back in the agricultural contribution to the Jordan economy. The 
agricultural sector in Jordan was, indeed, the key sector and it no 
longer becomes the leading sector. There are a lot of factors 
affecting negatively the agriculture in Jordan such as the 
shortage of water resources, the bad agricultural policies during 
eighties and nineties and the general trend of investment toward 
the industries and services sector. 
> The absolute value of the mining sector production in 1976 was 
JD 16.2 million, so the percentage contribution to the GDP was 
3%. The value-added of the mining sector in 1999 was JD 163.8 
million, as is shown in (table 1.3), and the percentage 
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contribution of the mining sector to GDP was 3% also. It is 
obvious that the relative contribution of the mining sector was 
growing steadily over the entire period of study. In comparison 
with the agricultural sector, the mining sector is more stable than 
the agricultural sector for the following reasons: 
i. The agricultural sector is more sensitive than the mining 
sector. Agriculture needs much of strategic water 
resources. It depends also on the weather conditions that 
vary from time to time making some shocks against the 
agricultural investors 
ii. The mining sector was invested and managed by 
government while agriculture was the work of the poor 
and incapable groups of people who missed the 
governmental support. 
> The Manufacturing sectors contribution has increased over the 
period of study. The value-added by manufacturing was JD 
48.6 million in 1976 and the share of manufacturing to the GDP 
was 9%. The value-added of the manufacturing sector 
increased to JD 750.3 million in 1999 and the percentage 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP was 13%. That is, the 
manufacturing sector grew by 30% during the period of study, 
which let itself to be nearly the leading sector of the economy 
(table 1.3). There are a lot of factors behind the increasing 
growth rates of industrial sector that will be explained in details 
under separate headline. 
> The value-added by the "electricity and water" sector in GDP was 
JD 3.6 million in 1976 that increased to JD 129.3 million in 
1999,(table 1.3). Therefore, the percentage contribution of the 
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"electricity and water" sector to the GDP has increased from 
0.6% in 1976 to 2% in 1999. 
> The construction sector income was JD 44.4 million and its 
contribution to GDP was 8% in 1976, whereas the value-added 
by the construction sector was JD 207.1 million and its share to 
GDP was 4% in 1999. 
> "Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels" sector 
income was JD 72.4 million in 1976 and its percentage 
contribution to GDP was 13%. In 1999 the total income from this 
sector was JD 543.2 million and its contribution to GDP was 9%. 
> The income from the "transport, storage and communications" 
sectors was JD 60.9 million in 1976 and the contribution of these 
sectors to the GDP was 11%. In 1999 their incomes were JD 
762.2 million and their contribution to the national income 
increased to 13%. 
> The value-added by the "finance, insurance, real estate 
and business services" sectors increased from JD 100,6 million 
in 1976 to JD 990.5 million in 1999 and the percentage 
contribution of these sectors to GDP decreased from 18% in 
1976 to 17% in 1999. 
> The value-added by the "community, social and personal 
services" sectors increased from JD 8.5 million in 1976 to JD 
224.3 million in 1999, and the percentage contribution of these 
sectors to GDP decreased from 6% in 1976 to 4% in 1999. 
> Income from "producers of the government services" sector 
increased from JD 112.7 million in 1976 to JD 995.7 million in 
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1999. The percentage contribution of this sector to GDP 
decreased from 20% in 1976 to 17% in 1999. 
> "Producers of private non-profit services to households" achieved 
a total income of JD 5.6 million in 1976, which increased to JD 
57.4 million, and the percentage contribution of this sector was 
1% in 1976 and remained the same in 1999. 
> The value-added by the "Domestic services of households" 
sector increased from JD 0.7 Million in 1976 to JD 7.9 million in 
1999, and the percentage contribution of this sector to GDP was 
0 .1% in 1976 and remained the same in 1999 despite some 
fluctuations over the period of study. 
> "Imputed bank services charge" increased from JD 7.6 million in 
1976 to JD 93.5 million in 1999 and its contribution to GDP 
increased from 1% in 1976 to 2% in 1999. 
> The "net tax on products" increased from JD 56 million in 1976 to 
JD 913.2 million in 1999 and the percentage contribution to GDP 
increased from 10% in 1976 to 15% in 1999. 
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Growth of Agriculture Sector 
Jordan is still in need to develop its potential in the agricultural 
sector. The scarcity of dependable resources, the fluctuation in the 
amount of rainfall, ineffective agricultural policies in addition to the limited 
amount of arable land continue to be the main constraints facing the 
development of agriculture sector. Scarcity of water remains the main 
reason behind the fluctuation in agricultural production. It is clear from 
(table 2.1) that there is a remarkable fluctuation in the production of 
agricultural sector. For instance, the agricultural production increased 
from JD 40 million in 1974 to JD 41.5 million in 1975. It decreased from 
JD 247 million in 1992 to JD 199.1 million in 1993 and again decreased 
from JD 144.8 million in 1998 to JD 115.9 million in 1999. ^ ^^  
The value added in agriculture was fluctuating from time to time 
over the entire period of study. The value added in agriculture 
increased from JD 40 million in 1974 to JD 41.5 million in 1975 and 
decreased from JD 77 million in 1978 to JD 61.6 million in 1979. Again 
it increased from JD 61.6 million in 1979 to JD 83.2 million in 1980. 
During nineties the value added in agriculture increased from JD190 
million in 1990 to JD 214.3 million and JD 247 million in 1991 and 1992 
respectively. It declines again from JD 144.8 million in 1998 to JD 
115.9 million in 1999. 
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Table 2.1, Annual Rate of Growth of Agricultural Sector in Jordan 
Serial 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Agricultural Production 
In mil l ion JD 
40 
41.5 
42.4 
52.7 
77 
61.6 
83.2 
79.8 
92.9 
109.9 
97.7 
96.9 
114.3 
134.7 
137.6 
132.7 
190 
214.3 
247 
199.1 
192.9 
173.7 
158.6 
148.3 
144.8 
115.9 
Rate Of Growth Of 
Agricultural Sector 
4% 
20% 
20% 
32% 
-25.00% 
26% 
-4% 
14% 
16% 
-12% 
-0.80% 
15% 
15% 
2% 
-4% 
30% 
11% 
13% 
-24% 
-3% 
-11% 
-9% 
-7% 
-2% 
-25% 
Source : Department of Statics, Jordan 
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Figure 2.1, based on table 211, made by researcher. 
In (figure 21), above, the fluctuations in the growth rate of 
agricultural sector are seen clearly. The blue line in the above figure 
represents the annual growth rate over the period of study. The slope of 
the growth line varies from year to year negatively or positively, which 
reflects the fluctuations of the agricultural sector growth in Jordan. 
In spite of the increase of agricultural production in absolute 
figures, the relative contribution of this sector in the GDP declined 
continuously for the period of study. It declined from 8% in 1976 to 7%, 
5% and 2% for the years 1980, 1986 and 1999 respectively, (table 1.3). 
Table 2.2 indicates the change in production levels for some main 
agricultural commodities during 1976-1980 compared with the period 1973-1975. 
Table 2-2: Levels of Production of Some Agricultural Commodities 
During 1976-1980 and 1973-1975 (Thousand Tons) 
Type of 
Production 
Field Crops 
Vegetables 
Melons 
Fruits 
Olives 
Meat 
Dairy Products 
Poultry 
Eggs 
* Source: Min 
Minimum 
Annual 
Production 
32 
225 
16 
37 
7 
6 
35 
21 
144 
stry of Plann 
lyflaximum 
Annual 
Production 
225 
480 
48 
103 
45 
8 
44 
28 
360 
ing, Five-Yes 
1976-80 
Average 
Production 
109 
346 
30 
76 
24 
7 
39 
25 
280 
ir Plan For E 
1973-75 
Average 
Production 
170 
214 
50 
48 
19 
9 
43 
14 
90 
Economic and 
Change 
-36 
62 
-40 
58 
26 
-23 
-10 
79 
210 
Social 
Development 1981-1985, Amman. 
Chapter -4 137 Economic Growth and Development in Jordan 
By 1975 and due to government efforts especially in increasing 
the irrigated area in the Jordan Valley, structural changes within the 
agricultural sector began to take place/^^ 
During the period 1976-1980, in the Jordan valley a total of 64,000 
dunums were put under permanent irrigation and 20,000 dunums were 
changed from surface to a sprinkler irrigation system. In addition, 8,000 
dunums were put under irrigation in the highland areas. This was 
accompanied by the introduction of new technology in irrigation system 
especially with regard to drip irrigation and agriculture under plastic covers, 
together with the local manufacture of required material.^^^ 
Despite the increasing technology usage, during eighties and nineties 
the agriculture sector showed a decline due to the following reasons: 
1. The corrosion of agricultural land all over the country. The 
agriculture land has been corroded due to the expansion of 
industrial construction and real estate sector that took a large 
number of dunums of agricultural land. 
2. The governmental support was insufficient to face the serious 
challenge of weather fluctuations and scarcity water resources. 
To boost agricultural productivity the government initiated work on 
the construction of Several irrigation projects including King Talal Dam 
during 1976 to 1980.^^°' 
> These projects included the following^^^' 
The North Easterly Ghor Irrigation Project: Flows from Wadi Al-Jirm, 
Wadi Ziglab and Wadi Al-Arab were trapped and utilized in pressure 
network to irrigate 17,600 dunum located above the East Ghor Canal 
level. A total of 10,000 dunums located below the canal level were also 
converted from surface to network irrigation. 
Chapter -4 138 Economic Growth and Development in Jordan 
Zarqa Triangle Project: Waters from King Talal Dam and the East 
Ghor Canal were directed into pressure networks to irrigate 15,500 
dunums in Deir Alia, Abu Obeida, Kraimeh and Wadi Al-Shaqaq. 
Extending the East Ghor Canal by 18 km.: The East Ghor Canal 
was extended by 18 km. In addition, a new canal was constructed in 
the Zarqa Valley. Two diversion dams were constructed to divert the 
water of the King Talal Dam to the Zarqa Triangle project and the 
extension project. A new pressure network was installed to irrigate 
36,600 dunums. 
Kafrain-Husban: A diversion dam on Wadi Husban and a pressure 
network utilizing the Wadi waters and the Kafrain reservoir water were 
constructed to irrigate 15,000 dunums. 
Wadi Arab Irrigation Project: Irrigation network were constructed to 
utilize ground water from thirteen wells to irrigate 2,000 dunums on a 
trial basis: 500 dunums in each of Rahmeh, Wadi Mousa, Kaa' Al-
Saidyeen and Dm Muthla. Dry irrigation networks were installed in 
connection with these projects. 
Subterranean Drainage Project: Studies were conducted on 15,000 
dunums with subterranean drainage. A network of observation and 
piezometric wells were established to observe the ground water level in 
the East Ghor Canal area. Design drawings were prepared for 
subterranean drainage networks over the 15,000 dunums, of which 
4,500 dunums had been covered until 1980. ^ ^^ ^ 
The percentage contribution of agriculture sector to GDP fell 
down continuously during 1993 to 1999. The relative contribution of this 
sector during the entire period of study is shown in (table 2.3). 
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Table 2-3 , The Relative Contribution of Agriculture to GDP 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
GDP(in million JD) 
500 
520 
565 
690.5 
799.7 
979.4 
1139.9 
1429.5 
1635.8 
1772.9 
1881.7 
1949.9 
2226.8 
2275.7 
2337.9 
2436.5 
2718.3 
2913.5 
3615.7 
3884 
4358:2 
4714.6 
4912.2 
5137.8 
5610.1 
5767.2 
Value Added in 
Agriculture 
(in million JD) 
40 
41.5 
42.4 
52.7 
77 
61.6 
83.2 
79.8 
92.9 
109.9 
97.7 
96.9 
114.3 
134.7 
137.6 
132.7 
190 
214.3 
247 
199.1 
192.9 
173.7 
158.6 
148.3 
144.8 
115.9 
Relative 
Contribution 
of Agriculture 
To GDP 
8% 
8% 
8% 
8% 
10% 
6% 
7% 
6% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
5% 
5% 
6% 
6% 
5% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
5% 
4% 
4% 
3% 
3% 
3% 
2% 
Source: Department of Statics, Jordan. 
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Growth Of Industrial Sector 
Industrial development has been the object of interest of 
successive Jordanian governments. The Kingdom has, from time to 
time introduced several facilities and motivations to increase the 
productive efficiency of industrial sector, as well as instituted many of 
industrial projects in the country. This process resulted in an increase 
in the income from industrial sector and the contribution of this sector 
to the GDP has increased as well which led to an increase in the 
Jordanian employment. ^^ ^^  
Industrial Development during the Five Year Plans (1973-1975) 
This plan called to invest JD 26.1 million, of which JD 5.8 million 
for the public sector and JD 20.3 million for private sector. Income from 
industrial sector increased from JD 19.8 million in 1972 to JD 45 million 
in 1975, and its contribution to GDP increased from 11.1% in 1972 to 
14.8% in 1975. The total investments, which savored the exemptions of 
the Investment Promotion Corporation Acts, amounted JD 23 million in 
1972. During this period the Cabinet decided to allocate about 1400 
dunums in the south of Amman city to be the first industrial city. The 
industrial investments was estimated of about JD 26 million, while the 
number of industries increased to 120 industries which its investments 
were estimated of about JD 23 million. There were 720 new licenses for 
manufactories or small industries in which the total investments were 
estimated to be JD 2 million. During this plan the credit facilities by 
banks to industrial activity increased from JD 4.4 million in 1972 to JD 
13.1 million in 1975 ^^ '^ ^ 
The Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) 
Industrial development in Jordan took of in a systematic way in 
the mid-seventies with the infraction of the 1976-1980 Five Year Plan. 
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The goals of this plan were as follows: 
1. Increasing the income from industrial sector from JD 45 
million in 1975 to JD 144 million in 1980, that is with an 
annual increase of 26.2%. 
2. Developing the mining and industry activity through several 
policies which can be outlined as follows: 
> Utilizing the raw materials and converting these materials 
into industrial products and in the same time exporting the 
local raw materials those can't be made locally. 
> Establishing and developing the food industries, and 
manufacturing the local agricultural products. 
> Establishing a new converting industries and to expand the 
existing industries to produce consumption and 
intermediary commodities as substitutes for imports. 
3. Increasing the national exports of industrial and mining 
products from JD 30 million in 1975 to JD 110 million in 1980. 
4. Achieving the best geographical distribution of the location of 
the new industries. 
5. Achieving a higher level of integration of the national 
industries within the industrial and mining sector itself and 
between this sector and other economic sectors such as the 
agricultural sector and construction sector. 
6. Studying the economic benefit of the local raw materials and 
focusing on the efforts for oil excavation. 
The actual income from this sector preceded the planned and the 
estimated figure during this plan. The actual investments in this sector 
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increased to JD 317 million, of which JD 60 million for the private 
sector, JD 16 million for the public sector and JD 241 million for 
concerted investment between private and public sector. The planned 
investment for this plan was JD 229 million while the actual investment 
in this period was JD 317 million '•^^K 
The next Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) also laid considerable 
emphasis on industrialization: 
The main goals of this plan were as follows: 
1. Income from industrial and mining sector should be increased 
from JD 154 million in 1980 to JD 350 million in 1985 at 
1980's prices. 
2. Increasing of the value-added and the manufacturing stages 
locally. 
3. Improving the production of phosphate and potash raw 
materials. 
4. Integration between the industries of phosphate, potash and 
fertilizers in marketing, training, maintenance, transportation 
and manufacturing the derived products. 
5. Optimum economic utilization of equipments and raw 
materials available locally or imported. 
6. Industrial integration between Arab countries. 
7. Stepping up the local capability level in the fields of planning, 
carrying out, installing and managing the mining and 
manufacturing projects. 
8. Attracting the advanced Arabian and Foreign investments into 
the country. 
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9. Settling the industries in the industrial cities and in the 
qualified industrial zones. 
10. Involving the modern production technologies into the 
existing and new firms for the purpose of competition. 
11. Motivating the existing industries toward the exporting 
industries. 
12. Developing and improving the converting industries and 
increasing the value-added in the industries those depending 
on the local raw materials ^^^\ 
The aggregate investment in industrial sector amounted about JD 
599 million against JD 750 million as a targeted figure in the plan. 
During the period of the plan the public sector investment formed JD 
58.4 million against JD 42 million as a targeted figure in the plan, while 
the private and concerted investments formed JD 540 million against 
JD 716.8 million as a targeted figure in the plan. The value-added in 
the industrial sector increased from JD 180.7 million in 1980 to JD 271 
million in 1985 with annual growth rate of 8.3%. About 681 new 
factories were authorized with a total capital of about JD 125.5 million 
and the industrial exports at current prices Increased from JD 96.6 
million in 1980 to JD 213.7 million in 1985 with annual growth rate of 
20.2%. The banks expanded its credit facilities for industrial sector 
from JD 73 million in 1980 to JD 189.2 million in 1985, and the 
Industrial Development Bank increased its credit from JD 18.1 million in 
1980 to JD 41.6 million in 1985. Income from industrial sector 
increased from JD 184.2 million in 1980 to JD 288.1 million in 1985 
with an annual growth rate of 9.4%, and the industrial employment 
increased from 38,600 workers in 1980 to 55,100 workers in 1985 with 
an annual growth rate of 7.1%. 
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The Five-Year Plan of (1986-1990) 
Aimed at consolidating the achievements of the last two plans 
while at the same time providing a more conducive atmosphere for 
accelerated industrial growth. 
It aimed at the following: 
1. Increasing the employment opportunities in the industrial 
sector. 
2. Increasing the reservation of foreign currencies through 
promoting exports and shrinking imports. 
3. Increasing the value-added and the stages of local 
manufacturing to increase the contribution of industrial sector 
to GDP. 
4. Coordination between the existing industries especially in the 
marketing, training, transporting and maintenance fields. 
5. Motivating and promoting to establish exporting industries. 
6. Rationing the import of commodities those similar to the local 
products. 
7. Protection of the local products by all possibilities to enable 
them compete the foreign products. 
8. Strengthening the Arab trade relations, increasing of the 
Arabian and foreign investment in Jordan and promoting the 
establishment of concerted Arabian projects. 
9. Stepping up the level of the local product quality and using all 
possibilities to reduce the industrial costs. 
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Income from industrial sector increased from JD 311.1 million in 
1985 to JD 557.3 million in 1990 with an annual growth rate of 13.2%. 
The value-added in this sector increased from JD 217 million in 1985 to 
JD 504 million in 1990 and the industrial sector contribution to GDP 
grew up from 19.5% in 1985 to 22.5% in 19990, that is, with annual 
growth rate of 2.3%. The labor force in industrial sector stepped up 
from 55,100 labors in 1985 to 60,300 labors in 1990 with an annual 
growth rate of 1.75%. During this plan, industrial exports increased 
from JD 113.3 million in 1985 to JD 317.3 million in 1990 with an 
annual growth rate of 30%. The number of registered factories 
increased from 330 factories in 1985 to 488 factories in1990, which 
resulted in an increase in the registered capital from JD 10.5 million to 
JD 16.7 million with an annual growth rate of 9.9%. ^^ ^^  
• The Five-Year Plan of (1993-1997) 
Aimed at more considerable achievements in the industrial 
sector. This plan included the following objectives: ^^ ^^  
1. Activate the investment role of the private sector in the fields 
of infrastructure and initial services, and increasing its 
contribution in managing and possessing the public sector 
institutions. 
2. Promote the establishment of the small industries with 
intensive employment to contribute in the solution of the 
problem of unemployment. 
3. Increase the level of employment in the industrial sector with 
a percentage of 39.5 % in converting industries and of 3.3% in 
mining sector during the period of the plan. 
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4. Increase the contribution of industrial sector in spending on 
research and development from 8% in 19991 to 12% in 1997. 
5. Exempting the equipments and machineries for any new 
projects from fees and customs. 
6. Credit facilities must be directed to finance the small and 
medium industries and those that depend on technology and 
innovation. 
7. Achieve an annual growth rate in the sector of converting 
industries at 19991 prices of 8.9% and 6.6% for mining sector 
during the plan. 
The aggregate investments for all economic sectors estimated by 
JD 5242 million, from which JD 1874 million for the public sector and 
JD 3368 million for the private sector.^ ^®^ 
Contribution of Industrial Sector to GDP: Income from industrial 
sector has increased from JD 48.6 million in 1976 to JD 104.6 million in 
1980, from JD 167.1 million in 1981 to JD 352.5 million in 1990, and 
from JD 347.4 million in 1991 to JD 750.3 million in 1999. The 
contribution of industrial sector to GDP has increased rapidly during 
the period of study. (Table 3.1) shows the income generated from 
industrial sector, and its contribution to GDP. 
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Table 3.1, percentage contribution of Industrial Sector to GDP. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Industrial 
Production 
(In million JO) 
40 
45 
48.6 
60.8 
67.5 
91.8 
104.6 
167.1 
181.3 
189.3 
205.6 
189.2 
274.4 
293.2 
259.8 
261.2 
352.5 
347.4 
444.6 
443.3 
585.9 
606.8 
570 
621.6 
742 
750.3 
GDP 
(In million JD) 
550 
558 
565 
690.5 
799.7 
979.4 
1139.9 
1429.5 
1635.8 
1772.9 
1881.7 
1949.9 
2226.8 
2275.7 
2337.9 
2436.5 
2718.3 
2913.5 
3615.7 
3884 
4358.2 
4714.6 
4912.2 
5137.8 
5610.1 
5767.2 
Percentage Contribution of 
Industrial Sector to GDP 
7% 
8% 
8.60% 
8.80% 
8.40% 
9% 
9% 
11.70% 
11% 
10.70% 
10.90% 
9.70% 
12% 
12.90% 
11% 
10.70% 
13% 
11.90% 
12.30% 
11% 
13% 
12.90% 
11.60% 
12.10% 
13% 
13.10% 
• This table made by researcher 
• Source : Department of Statistics, Jordan. 
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Annual Growth Rates of Industrial Sector: Annual growth rates of 
industrial sector is shown below in (table 3.2). The annual growth 
rates of industrial sector were fluctuating over the period of study. The 
annual growth rate of industrial sector was 10% in 1975 and declined to 
7% in 1976. It increased again from 7% in 1976 to 20% in 1977. The 
fluctuation in industrial sector growth refers to many factors some of 
them are as follows: 
1. The Persian Gulf War between Iraq and Iran. The impact of 
this war was, up to a certain limit, positive on the Jordanian 
economy because the trade between Iraq and Jordan grew 
and trade between Jordan and other countries all over the 
world was not affected. 
2. The Second Gulf War between Iraq and USA and its allies in 
1991 had a direct impact on the Jordanian economy because 
of the restricted sanctions against Iraq that led to a 
substantial decrease in the trade between Iraq and Jordan, 
between Jordan and Arab Gulf Countries, and between 
Jordan and a large number of countries because the Port of 
Aqaba was nearly closed during that period ^^°\ 
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Table 3.2, Annual Growth rates of Industrial Sector. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Industrial production 
(Million JD) 
40 
45 
48.6 
60.8 
67.5 
91.8 
104.6 
167.1 
181.3 
189.3 
205.6 
189.2 
274.4 
293.2 
259.8 
261.2 
352.5 
347.4 
444.6 
443.3 
585.9 
606.8 
570 
621.6 
742 
750.3 
Annual growth rate 
Of Industrial Sector 
10% 
7% 
20% 
10% 
26% 
12% 
37% 
8% 
4% 
8% 
-9% 
20% 
6% 
-13% 
0.50% 
26% 
- 1 % 
22% 
-0.30% 
24% 
3% 
-6% 
8% 
16% 
1% 
• Source: 
• Growth 
Department of statics, Jordan, 
rates were computed by researcher. 
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External Trade 
Since the 1950's imports and exports have played an important 
role in the economic life of the country and have helped in the creation 
of a comparatively large number of jobs while at the same time 
supplying the necessary goods and services needed in a free economy. 
By continuing its liberal economic policy, the government permitted an 
extremely high level of imports, and, at the same time, in response to 
domestic and regional pressures, attempted to encourage and diversify 
local production and industry through a variety of incentives. This is an 
attempt to narrow the gap between imports and exports. The enormity 
of this continuing effort is manifested in the fact that Jordan 's imports 
in 1982 consisted of about 66.8% of its GNP while its exports 
amounted to a mere 15.4%. 
Both imports and exports have increased rapidly during the last four 
decades. Imports increased from a low of JD 452.5 million in 1976 to JD 
3537.9 million in 1999 with a percentage increase of about 900%. Exports 
both domestic and re-export, increased from JD 183.7 million in 1976 to JD 
2505.4 million in 1999 with a percentage increase of about 1500%. 
On the one hand, compensations of employees from the rest of 
the world increased from JD 13.6 million in 1976 to JD 118 million in 
1999. Property and entrepreneurial income from the rest of the world 
increased from JD 13.9 million in 1976 to 213.5 million in 1999. Other 
current transfers from the rest of the world increased from JD 199.1 
million in 1976 to JD 1527.8 million in 1999. On the other hand, 
compensations of employees to the rest of the world increased from JD 
0.8 million in 1976 to JD 17.1 million in 1999. Property and 
entrepreneurial income to the rest of the world increased from JD 4.7 
million in 1976 to JD 323.1 million in 1999. Other current transfers to 
the rest of the world increased from JD 7.3 million in 1976 to JD 199.5 
million in 1999. The external trade figures for the entire period of study, 
given in (Table 4.1) below: 
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It is clear from the above table that both exports and imports 
grew rapidly during the entire period of study. Imports are more than 
double the exports, which is the case all over the developing countries. 
However, through (table 4.1), we will analyze the growth of Jordan 
External Trade. <^ '^ 
Jordanian Exports: Export is very important economic element 
for every country because every country needs to import some of its 
needs of consumption goods, raw materials, and capital goods; 
therefore it is very necessary to export national products to cover the 
imports and to support the balance of payments. 
For the Jordanian Economy, exports contribute to the process of 
economic development through its returns that result from these 
exports and these returns, in turn; able Jordan to increase imports from 
other countries, contribute to cover the deficit in Trade Balance, 
increase GDP through its role in development of various productive 
sectors. 
Development and Growth of Jordanian Exports: During past 
years, Jordan, exports have witnessed a rapid increase about JD 183.7 
million in 1976 to JD 2505.4 million in 1999, as shown in table 4-1 
above with annual compound rate of growth of about 25% which 
reflects the importance of exports in Jordan economy. Despite this 
marked growth in exports. Yet there was a marked decline in Jordanian 
exports during different periods of our study. There were negative 
growth rates in exports during1983, 1986, 1998, and 1999. The reason 
behind this decline in those years in exports refers to the situations of 
the West Bank occupation, some other events like the events of 1970 
that resulted in an unstable economy, and the economic recession from 
which some traditional markets suffered, specially those around 
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Jordan. During 1990s the decline in exports was due to the Gulf War 
that caused Jordan to lose its traditional markets. 
It nnay nne mentioned here that the period 1976-1982 was marked 
by prosperity for the Jordanian economy as a whole. After the 1973 
War, and the quadrupling of oil prices the Jordanian exports to Gulf 
countries increased rapidly. The 1975-76 Civil War in Lebanon resulted 
in capital fleeing to Jordan, which assisted Jordan to achieve economic 
growth. After that, the Irani-Iraqi War had made Jordan the main 
gateway of Iraq to the World. The percentage of exports to the GDP 
varied between 4% and 26.5% during the period of study. It is observed 
that there were three main skips for this percentage; the first skip was 
In 1974 where the percentage of exports to the GDP was 11.3% due to 
the increase in exports of phosphate due to the increase in its prices. 
The second skip was in 1984 with percentage of 18.8% due to the rise 
in the value of exports of phosphate. Potash, and fertilizers, which rose 
from JD 51.6 million, JD 0.1 million, and JD 20.7 million respectively in 
1983 to JD 69.6 million, JD 14.9 million, and JD 44 million in 1984 
respectively. The third skip occurred in1989 where Jordan witnessed 
economic challenge due to the effect of the rumor that there is 
depletion in foreign reserves, after the political and managerial 
separation between Jordan and West Bank, and the spread of 
expectations about the depreciation of Jordanian currency. 
The percentage of exports to imports was on an average 22.9% 
during the period of study. It has grown from 15% in 1974 to 39% in 
1999 and it declined from 25.2% in 1974 to 14.5% in 1983 and then it 
rose to 43.4% in 1989 and again declined to35% in 1991. The reason 
beyond the increase and then the decrease in the percentage of 
exports to imports is refer to the decline in the exports growth rate in 
comparison with imports growth rate for the period (1975-1983), and 
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the rise in the exports growth rate in comparison with imports growth 
rate for the period (1984-1989), and then its decline for the period 
(1990-1991). In 1999, the national exports amounted to about JD 
1,046,382,000 and the re-exports was JD 231,517,000. In the same 
year, imports amounted to about JD 2,714,374,000. Therefore, the 
deficit in trade balance was about JD 1,436,475,000. ^^ ^^  
Jordanian Imports: Import is considered very important element for 
the process of economic development in the developing countries 
because such countries needs necessary goods to meet the requirements 
of projects of economic development. Jordan depends; to a large extent 
on imports to fulfill the needs of domestic consumption. Domestic 
consumption grew rapidly specially after the Arab-Israeli War in 1948, 
which led to the migration of West Bank population to Jordan. ^ ^^ ^ 
Growth of Jordanian Imports: It is clear from (table 4.1), above, 
that the Jordanian imports witnessed a substantial increase during the 
period 1974-1999, where the value of imports has doubled by more 
than 40 times. Jordan's imports was about of JD 400 million in 1974 
and reached to JD 2505.4 million in 1999. The annual growth rate of 
imports was 49.5% in 1975, 46.4% in 1981, 40.3% in 1990, 9.6% in 
1995, and declined to 8% In 1999. There are several reasons for the 
growth of imports : 
a) The small size of Jordan economy where production cannot meet 
the minimum requirements of capital, intermediate, and 
consumption goods. 
b) There are a large number of Jordanians abroad and thus, their 
remittances to Jordan is very high, which results in substantial 
availability of foreign exchange. 
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Imports percentage to GDP was 6 1 % during the entire period of 
study. This percentage is higher than the percentage of exports to GDP 
by four times. This percentage is considered high according to the 
international measures and it indicates a high degree of economic 
disclosure where the Jordan economy is considered an open economy 
to the world. The high percentage of imports to GDP reflects how 
Jordan economy depends on imported goods to fulfill the consumption 
requirements and capital formation altogether. 
Based on (table 4.1) and on the previous analysis; the 
development of Jordan external trade suffers from many problems. 
These problems are as follows: 
a) There Is a decline in the percentage of national exports to GDP, 
despite the rapid growth of national exports during the period of 
study. 
b) There is a persistent increase in the value of imports in 
comparison with the value of exports, which resulted in the 
problem of trade balance deficit. 
c) There is an increase in the percentage of imports to GDP. 
d) The percentage coverage of exports to imports is considered 
modest.^^''^ 
Balance of Payments 
Jordan witnessed two different stages of economic development: 
> The first stage which lasted upto mid-eighties was marked by 
economic planning and a high degree of governmental 
intervention. This stage has resulted in economic growth 
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accompanied by inflation, huge deficit in the public budget, and 
depreciation of home currency. 
> The second stage from mid-eighties onwards depended on the 
economic reformation program supported by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. ^^ ^^  
Jordan's Balance of Payments has reflected the marked gap 
between exports and imports. Despite the substantial increase in 
Jordan's exports, imports grew more rapidly than exports. Jordan has 
witnessed a continuously rising deficit in its balance of trade, especially 
during 1970s and 1980s. This deficit increased from JD 88.82 million in 
1973 to JD 876.56 million in 1982. That is the deficit in the trade 
balance doubled more than nine times within 10 years. 
Through mulling the Balance of payments up during the period of 
study, we conclude that there is a chronic deficit in the Jordanian trade 
balance; this balance did not witness, at least, a case of surplus, in 
spite of the persistent surplus in the services balance in the case of 
Jordan. However the tremendous of deficit in Jordan trade balance 
prevailed any surplus that might be obtained. 
The Net Current Transfers has made, side by side with Services 
balance, a marked improvement in the position of Current Account. The 
country, since its beginning, depends on assistances and dominations 
as an important factor on which the Jordan economy depends. 
Opposite the Current Account, the Capital Account witnessed surplus 
for a large number of years. During the period of study. Capital Account 
witnessed a deficit during three years only, namely 1989, 1990, 
and1993. (Tables 5.1), and (Table 5.2) below, as a sample for the 
period of study, show the performance of Jordan economy through the 
balance of payments. ^^ ^^  
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Table 5.1, Main Indicators of The Balance Of Payments 
(JD Million), Item 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Current 
Account 
2.94 
21.47 
27.34 
-2.46 
-85.8 
-2.08 
111.62 
-18.69 
-118.3 
Commodity 
Trade 
Balance 
-105.9 
-184.1 
-270 
-371.1 
-368 
-467.4 
-543.3 
-803.7 
-876.6 
Balance of 
Goods And 
Services 
-83.8 
-118.2 
-99.21 
-168.3 
-192.3 
-316.5 
-287.1 
-444.5 
-491.6 
Net Transfer 
Payments 
86.74 
139.8 
126.55 
165.83 
106.51 
314.43 
398.75 
430.8 
373.21 
Capita! 
Account 
4.14 
-6.63 
-12.32 
-8.43 
51.5 
-2.96 
-77.85 
52.8 
171.13 
Source : Central Bank Of Jordan 
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Transportation and Communications 
The Jordanian economy is predominantly service based. The 
contribution of services sector to GDP, on an average, was 66% during 
the period of study. Furthermore, the percentage of workers in services 
sector, on an average, was about 70% during the period. (Table 6.1), 
below, shows the absolute value and the growth rate of transportation 
and communications sector. 
Table 6.1, Growth Rates and absolute values of Transportation 
and Communications Sector. 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Value of Transportation 
And Communications 
59 
60.2 
60.9 
78.3 
91.8 
110.1 
132.2 
177.4 
211.9 
236.1 
238.8 
274.4 
284.1 
287.2 
305.5 
369.9 
369.6 
390.8 
456.8 
495.8 
533.4 
581.9 
642.7 
672.7 
717.1 
762.2 
Rate Of Growth Of Transportation 
And Communications Sector 
1.2% 
1% 
22% 
15% 
17% 
17% 
26% 
16% 
10% 
1% 
13% 
3% 
1% 
6% 
17% 
0% 
5% 
14% 
8% 
7% 
8% 
9% 
4% 
6% 
6% 
Source: Department of Statistics, Jordan. 
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It is clear from (Table 6.1) that the value of transportation and 
communications sector increase from year to year for the entire period 
of study except in 1990 when the value of this sector remained nearly 
the same as in 1989. The value of this sector did not increase in 1990 
due to the negative effects of the Gulf War 1990/1991, and the 
sanctions imposed against Iraq, which had negative effect on the 
Aqaba Port. 
The contribution of transportation sector to GDP has achieved 
positive growth rates, although they were fluctuating. The growth rate 
of this sector, in average, was 9.4% during the period of study. From 
(Table 6.1), the contribution of the transportation and communications 
sector increased from JD 60.9 million in 1974 to JD 762.2 million in 
1999. <2^> 
External Debt 
Jordan's economic expansion accelerated in 1970s in the wake 
of the regional economic boom that opened up opportunities for 
Jordan's exports and for employment of Jordanians in the region; these 
developments resulted in a markedly higher inflow of foreign exchange. 
This process continued through the mid-1980s, even when the regional 
economies started to experience recessions resulting from the collapse 
of petroleum prices. 
In spite of the ensuing substantial reductions in remittances and 
foreign grants, the Jordanian authorities attempted to maintain their 
domestic economic policies unchanged during 1984-1988. Instead of 
adjusting to the lower financing available, Jordan resorted increasingly 
to foreign borrowing on commercial terms; as a result, its external 
outstanding public or publicly guaranteed debt built up steadily during 
the period 1984-1988 to US $8 billion by the end of 1988, while its 
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outstanding short-time debt reached US $400 million. By that time, with 
the slowdown in economic activity and high real interest rates in the 
world market, the debt burden had reached unsustainable proportions. 
In response to these developments, Jordan external scheduled 
debt-service payments rose to nearly US $1.4 billion in 1989; at the 
same time, receipts from remittances declined and exports slowed 
markedly so that the scheduled debt service as a percentage of exports 
of goods and services increased to 46% in 1989. Jordan's external 
vulnerability was exacerbated, and its creditworthiness impaired, by the 
high debt-to-GDP ratio and high dependence on receipts from services; 
about one-half of the external current account receipts in Jordan 
derived from services, mostly remittances and receipts from tourism 
and travel. Arrears on external debt-service payments began to 
accumulate in 1989. 
The Jordan government's strategy to face the challenge of 
external debt and the public debt service comprised the following : 
> Debt Management Strategy: The government initiated an external 
debt-management policy in 1989 aimed at obtaining debt relief 
through rescheduling, lengthening the maturity structure of debt, 
and reducing the debt burden in relation to GDP over the medium 
term. 
> Paris Club Agreement. 1989: About half of Jordan's public and 
publicly guaranteed external debt was owed to Paris Club 
creditors. At the request of the Government of Jordan, Paris Club 
creditors rescheduled Jordan's external debt July 19, 1989. Total 
debt relief from Paris Club creditors was estimated to be US 
$587 million over the 18-month period. 
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> Negotiations With Commercial Bank Creditors: Unlike many other 
heavily indebted developing countries, Jordan debt to 
commercial banks was relatively small, accounting for about 15% 
of the outstanding public and publicly guaranteed external debt. 
An informal agreement was reached with the steering committee 
of commercial banks in October 1990, under which Jordan 
agreed to pay all interest obligations in arrears through the end 
of March 1990. Moreover, the multiyear rescheduling agreement 
was abandoned. 
> Paris Club Rescheduling Agreements. 1992 and 1994: Immediately 
after the approval of a new 18-month stand-by arrangement with 
the IMF, Jordan concluded the second rescheduling agreement 
with the Paris Club in February 1992. Under the agreement, 
Jordan obtained debt relief through rescheduling of all interest 
and amortization on debt incurred before the cut-off date that 
would fall due during an 18-month period beginning on January 
1, 1992, and all amortization arrears and 50% of interest arrears 
accumulated up to the end of 1991. There was another 
agreement with IMF; IMF's executive board approved on May 25, 
1994 a new three-year programme for Jordan under the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF). As a result of this agreement, the 
overall debt relief during the EFF period would amount to about 
US $1.4 billion. 
> Revised Debt Strategy vis-a-vis Commercial Banks: There were 
growing concerns regarding the impact of the external debt 
overhang on Jordan's growth potential. The increasing emphasis 
on operations to reduce debt and debt service was motivated by 
a number of other considerations. First, given the balance sheet 
situation of some commercial banks, the assessment at that time 
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was that it could prove difficult to arrange adequate interest 
refinancing through concerted new money loans. Second, apart 
from the financial implications, the potential absence of such 
concerted new financing raised comparability problems vis-a-vis 
other official creditors. Third, there was growing evidence that 
many commercial banks were willing to dispose of their claims on 
Jordan. This shift in the overall debt strategy also gained 
momentum in Jordan in 1992 when, following the record level of 
repatriation of returnees' savings after August 1990, Jordan's 
official foreign exchange reserves increased markedly. By the 
end of December 1992, the foreign assets of commercial banks 
amounted to US $1.4 billion, of which about US $600 million was 
deposited with the Central Bank Of Jordan. Given the favorable 
circumstances, in early 1993, the Jordanian authorities stepped 
up their efforts to buy back debt. By then, Jordan was able, 
through cash buybacks, to extinguish external debt owed to 
commercial banks for the total amount of about US $600 million 
at a cost of US $115 million. 
> Negotiations With Other Official Creditors: Such negotiations led 
to rescheduling external debt and abated the burden of debt and 
debt service. 
Nevertheless, the debt-to-GDP ratio still remained high- 96% by 
the end of 1998-even under the assumption of continuing rapid growth 
of exports, annual remittances of US $1.1 billion, and substantial 
foreign direct investment. By the end of 1999 the total amount of 
Jordan's external debt was JD 5333.7 million excluding interest on 
loans and debt service.^ ^®^ 
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Banking and Monetary Development 
The banking system in Jordan consists of the Central Bank, 
Commercial Banks, specialized credit institutions, the Amman Financial 
Market, Financial Papers Commission, and various financial 
intermediaries comprised of investment banks, companies in financial 
brokerage, savings and investment, insurance and exchange. 
Before 1974, the Jordan Currency Board and the Currency 
Control Department managed and controlled the currency and 
monetary affairs of the country. The Central Bank of Jordan, 
established in 1964 took over these tasks, and subsequent legislation 
expanded them. After that time, the Central Bank's main functions are 
to issue bank notes, the management of exchange reserves, the 
regulation of credit, and the maintenance of monetary stability as well 
as the regulation and control of commercial banks in the country. 
The number of commercial banks increased from 11 in 1975 to 
16 in 1982 and to 200 in 1999.^"^ 
The development plans in Jordan have not merely aimed at 
satisfying basic needs, but they attempted to find effective and radical 
solutions on the basis of a long-term and integrated approach. The 
present economic system of Jordan has made a basic contribution in 
fostering the co-operation of all segments of the citizens in sustaining and 
strengthening the development process as well as in bringing about a 
partnership between the public and private sectors. Jordan is part of the 
Arab nation. Therefore, Jordanian growth and development are rooted in 
a concept of integration and consistency with the growth and development 
objectives of other Arab countries with view to achieving mutual benefits 
within the framework of Arab Economic Unity. 
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Chapter- 5 
FIRST GULF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH: 
THE JORDAN - ISRAEL PEACE TREATY 
The Iraq - Kuwait Conflict and Jordan 
Iraq had been complaining against the over-production of oil by 
some of the Arab producers (like Kuwait), which hurt some of their 
fellow Arabs like Iraq, due to a sharp fall in oil revenues. One 19 July, 
1990 Kuwait sent a formal letter to the Arab League Secretary General 
expressing "astonishment and surprise" at the Iraqi accusations. For 
some reason, the Arab League did not take any initiative to defuse the 
Iraq-Kuwait war of words. Two days later, the OPEC ministerial 
meeting held in Geneva (26-27 July, 1990) supported in principle the 
Iraqi contention on crude oil prices and production quotas. 
The minimum demands made by Iraq were reported to be that 
Kuwait should promise to abide by the OPEC rules: (i) ceding the 
southern part of Rumailah oilfields; (ii) pay $ 2.4 billion as 
compensation for oil extracted from the Rumailah oil field, and (iii) 
some form of debt write off and additional financial compensation for oil 
market losses and for the war efforts. Kuwait asserted that the loans 
will be written off and financial compensation will be paid, provided Iraq 
agrees to sign a favourable border treaty. 
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Iraq could not repay about $ 80 billion that had been borrowed to 
finance the Iran-Iraq war. It could argue that the war was in Kuwait and 
Saudi interests since the enemy was Iranian messianic Shiite 
fundamentalism, which potentially threatened them. Kuwaiti decision 
not to forgive Iraq's $ 65 billion debt provided to Iraq economic and 
emotional justification for the invasion. Another bone of contention 
between the two countries was Romaila oil field part of which lay in the 
disputed region. Kuwait was drawing oil from it and Iraq was claiming 
that it was the oil of Iraq, which Kuwait illegally drew. 
Another factor in the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was the 
leadership of the Arab World. With its long history and geography, Iraq 
is the pre-eminent power in the Arab world. But this was denied to her 
for a variety of reasons in the 1960 and 1970s; and Saudi Arabia 
usurped this position with its enormous oil wealth. The outbreak of the 
Iraq-Iran War in September 1980 and the subsequent years saw Iraq 
bleeding in its War with Iran. With the sea routes through Shaft al-Arab 
closing down, Syria closing the oil pipeline through its territory, Iraq oil 
revenues came down to a trickle. It was forced to depend on the 
material and monetary support given by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait at the 
end of the war with Iran in August 1988, which Iraq considers it fought 
against Persian invasion of Arab land. Iraq became a client state of its 
two rich neighbours. Clearly Iraq was unwilling to accept this 
humiliation from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. With a million strong battles 
trained army, Iraq wanted to assert its position in the region. 
On 2 August 1990, Iraq launched what was in pure military 
professional terms a brilliant operation. At 0200 hours, three Iraqi 
Republican Guard armoured divisions with nearly 300 tanks (mostly T-
72s) rolled over the Kuwaiti frontier, in a move coordinated with 
heliborne air assault with nearly three commando battalions of the 
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Special Forces. The main force of commandos were landed on Kuwait 
international airport to make it secure for troops flown in by transport 
aircraft immediately afterwards. The second element of the heliborne 
commandos quickly captured most of the key points in the city 
including the command and control centres of the Kuwaiti army. There 
was hardly any resistance except by the guards at the royal palace. 
Complete surprise had been achieved. By 5 August; US satellites 
photos showed that Iraqi troops had dug in along the Kuwaiti-Saudi 
Arabian border. By that time, 130,000 troops and 500 tanks were 
believed to have been deployed in Kuwait. 
Six days later the Iraqi government declared comprehensive 
merger between the two countries. On 10 August, Iraq declared for a 
Jihad or holy war against the Americans and Israelis. Same day it 
ordered closing down of all embassies in Kuwait. On 12 August the 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussain declared that Iraq would withdraw 
from Kuwait, if Israel withdraws from West Bank, the Gaza Strip and 
Golan Heights and Syria from Lebanon, and arrangements are made 
between Iraq and Kuwait. First, however, UN sanctions against Iraq 
must end, allied forces must withdraw from Saudi Arabia and be 
replaced by pan-Arab forces not including Egyptians. The US and 
Israel rejected the Saddam offer of conditional withdrawal. 
In fact the international response to Iraq's invasion was 
remarkable swift. Within hours Iraq's assets were frozen worldwide and 
the first of 11 critical UN Security Council resolutions. Resolution 660, 
calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal had been passed. The speed 
of the response was due, in no small part, to the fact that neither the 
USSR nor China - both permanent members of the Security Council -
attempted to oppose the resolutions. The following day, a majority in 
the Arab League condemned the Iraqi invasion at a vituperative 
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meeting hastily convened in Cairo. Three days later, the UN imposed 
wide-ranging import and export sanctions against Iraq. ^^ * 
Iraqi oil exports were thus virtually blocked, while exports by sea 
through the Gulf were blocked by western naval powers. In a 
nationwide address on 8 August 1990, President George Bush defined 
the basic objectives of the American policy as follows: 
1. Immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of Iraq 
from Kuwait. 
2. Restoration of the legitimate government in Kuwait. 
3. Security and stability of the region. 
4. Protection of lives of Americans abroad. 
US troops began landing at Dehran in Saudi Arabia on 8 August 
and Turkey closed vital Iraqi oil pipelines and terminals on the Red Sea 
and the Mediterranean. Entire Arab World was divided into two groups 
firstly those, which had supported the US - led, and United Nation 
sanctioned coalition, the GCC, Syria (together with its protege, Lebanon), 
Egypt, Morocco and those, which were neutral or opposed to it (North 
Africa, Sudan, Libya, Jordan, Yemen and the PLC). 
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait the Palestinians and the PLO 
supported Saddam Hussain. Officially Jordan in its own interests, 
remained neutral in the conflict. King Hussein 'regretted' but did not 
condemn the action of Saddam Hussain in invading Kuwait, and 
Jordanian public opinion was solidly pro-Iraq for the duration of the 
crisis. Arab League ministers, attending a meeting of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Cairo on 3 August 1990, issued a 
statement, opposed by Jordan, condemning the invasion and 
demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal. At the 
emergency summit meeting of the Arab League, held in Cairo on 10 
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August, Jordan abstained in a vote to denounce the annexation of 
Kuwait and to advocate the deployment of a pan-Arab force to defend 
Saudi Arabia and neighboring states from invasion by the forces of 
Saddam Hussain. King Hussein welcomed Saddam Hussain's 
Proposal, on 12 August, to link Iraq's occupation of Kuwait with the 
continued Israeli occupation, and he held talks with the Iraqi leader in 
Baghdad on the following day. Another Arab League meeting in Cairo 
(30-31 August) was boycotted by Jordan and other Arab nations, which 
supported Iraq. King Hussein persistently argued in favour of an Arab 
solution to the crisis and opposed the deployment of a multinational-
armed force in the Gulf region. 
In the West, which had always regarded King Hussein as one of 
its chief allies in region, there much criticism of the King's Pro-Iraq 
stance, though this was tempered with acknowledgement of the 
extremely difficult position in which he found himself. Talks in the USA 
between the King and President Bush, at Kennebunkport on 16 August, 
resulted in promises of US financial assistance in return for Jordanian 
observance of the economic embargo imposed on Iraq. A report by a 
UN envoy in October 1990 estimated that the crisis would cost Jordan 
some 30% of its GDP in 1990 and as much as 50% in 1991. 
Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Jordan was over whelmed 
by an influx of refugees, who included thousands of migrant workers 
from Egypt and the Indian sub-continent, fleeing the conflict. The 
congestion was such that Jordan was forced temporarily to close its 
border with Iraq in late August 1990, in an attempt to cope with the 
accumulation of refugees who could not immediately be transported to 
the Red Sea port of Aqaba or airlifted to their countries of origin. On 3 
September Jordan issued an urgent appeal for international aid, 
partially to offset the costs of caring for the refugees. By October some 
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800,000 refugees had passed through the country, at a cost of some 
$40million, to the Jordanian authorities. 
In mid-September 1990 two of King Hussein's former Palestinian 
opponents, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and Naif Hawatmeh of the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), who had been expelled during the civil 
war in 1970, were allowed to return to Amman for a pro-Iraqi conference 
of Arab Popular Forces. The two Damascus-based leaders were 
received by the King in a display of unity and reconciliation fostered by 
the Gulf crisis. The conference, which was opened by the Speaker of the 
Jordanian House of Representatives (although not attended by the 
King), heard severe criticisms of governments opposed to Saddam 
Hussain and ended with pledges to wage a jihad against foreign forces 
in the Gulf region if Iraq were attacked. This led to a denunciation of 
King Hussein by the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, and 
Saudi Arabia subsequently expelled Jordanian diplomats and many 
Jordanian immigrant workers. It also halted oil supplies to the Kingdom, 
claiming that Jordan had not paid for earlier deliveries. 
King Hussein invested considerable personal effort in the search 
for a peaceful solution to the crisis, visiting London, Paris and 
Washington. In late August 1990 he arrived in Libya at the start of a 
peace mission among Arab leaders. He continued to advocate an Arab 
solution to the crisis and, in a televised message to the US Congress 
and people on 23 September, he urged the immediate withdrawal of the 
multinational force from the Gulf region. Speaking at the World Climate 
Conference in Geneva on 6 November, the King warned of the 
potentially disastrous environmental consequences of war in the Gulf 
region (a fear which was subsequently realized when Iraq released oil 
into the waters of the Gulf and ignited Kuwait's oil installations).^^^ 
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Following talks in Baghdad with Saddam Hussain on 4 December 
1990, the King proposed a peace plan linking the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute 
and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He urged the convening of a peace 
conference on the Middle East, and that all Arab leaders should take 
part in a dialogue on the crisis, to take place simultaneously with the 
talks between the USA and Iraq, which had been proposed by 
President Bush at the end of November. 
The King's diplomatic efforts continued into 1991, when he 
embarked, in January on a fresh tour of European capitals in a final 
attempt t avert war in the Gulf region. Diplomatic ties with Iran, severed 
in 1981 after the start of the Iran-Iraq war, were resumed in mid 
January 1991, and Jordan was later reported to be supporting Iranian 
proposals to end the crisis. On 10 January Jordan had closed its ar-
Ruweishid border post, on the frontier with Iraq, to all except Jordanian 
refugees. As war became imminent, Jordan feared a further influx of 
refugees from Iraq and Kuwait, and claimed that it had still not received 
UN aid promised for the August 1990 exodus. However, after receiving 
assurances of UN assistance with the cost of caring for the refugees, 
the border was reopened on 18 January 1991. 
Following the outbreak of hostilities on 16 January 1991, the 
Jordanian Government condemned the bombardment of Iraq as a brutal 
onslaught against the Arab and Muslim nation; Large-scale anti-
western and anti-Israeli demonstrations occurred throughout the 
country, and overwhelming popular support for Iraq was expressed in 
all sections of society. Sentiments were further aroused when air 
attacks on goods vehicles (including tanker-trucks carrying oil) on the 
Baghdad-Ruweishid highway in late January killed at least six 
Jordanian civilians. Jordan had been entirely dependant on Iraqi oil 
since Saudi Arabian supplies were suspended in September 1990. Now 
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these consignments were halted, and Jordan, which introduced petrol-
rationing in February, was obliged to obtain more expensive supplies 
from Syria and Yemen. Oil imports from Iraq were eventually resumed 
in April 1991. 
In a televised address in February 1991, King Hussein paid 
tribute to the people and armed forces of Iraq, describing them as 
victims of this 'savage and large-scale war' and claiming that the war 
was directed against all Arabs and Muslim. The speech was 
condemned by the USA Administration, which accused Jordan of 
abandoning its neutrality and threatened to review its economic aid. In 
March the US Congress approved legislation canceling a $ 57 million 
aid programme. President Bush signed the law in April. However, the 
effects were offset, to some extent, by the announcement of a $ 450 
million Japanese concessionary loan. As the multinational force 
launched a ground offensive to liberate Kuwait on 24 February, Prime 
Minister Badran announced that the conflict had at that point cost 
Jordan some $ 8,000 million. 
Fears that Iraq would provoke Israel into entering the conflict, 
thus making Jordan part of the combat zone, were not realized, owing 
to the Israeli decision not to retaliate in response to the scud missile 
attacks launched by Iraq against its territory. At the end of December 
1990, Jordan had deployed 80,000 troops in defensive positions facing 
Israel. King Hussein declared, in Mid-January 1991, that Jordan would 
defend its territory and air space against any incursions. In early 
February a Jordanian air force officer and a truck-driver were executed, 
having been convicted by a military court of spying for Israel.^^^ 
On balance. King Hussein acted calculatingly in 1988 and early 
1989 to prevent upheaval in 1990. Still while the regime had been 
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thrown back on its heels, it was still standing. The Kuwait crisis 
worsened Jordan's economic situation. Aqaba was brought to a near 
stand still, income from tourism plunged to near zero, remittances were 
severely reduced, oil from Saudi Arabia was cut off, and Jordanian 
products were prevented from the Gulf by Saudi diktat. '^^ ^ In addition, 
Jordan's Saudi subsidy was eliminated and special privileges formerly 
enjoyed in Saudi by Palestinians with Jordanian passports, such as being 
able to work without having a specific Saudi sponsor, were rescinded. As 
bad luck had it, the market for Jordanian phosphates was also depressed. 
Unemployment, hovering at around 15 Percent before 1990, reached 
nearly 40 percent by the spring of 1991.^^^ Most ironically, because of the 
crisis, Iraq had a good excuse not to repay what it owed to Jordan, which 
stood at about $ 835 million in the fall of 1989.^ ^^ 
As a result, the International Monetary Fund estimated that 
Jordan's GNP measured at market prices would shrink 16.5 percent 
when 1990 figures were accumulated, and projections for 1991 still 
expected negatives rates. These predictions were too dire; the 1990 
shortfall was 8.5 percent, and the economy did better in 1991 than 
most expected.^^^ But there in no question that the Kuwait crisis hurt, 
and the impact of about 300,000 Palestinians returning to Jordan from 
the Gulf by fall 1991;^°^ and the continued shutoff of Saudi subsidies 
and trade, suggested to most analysts that the worst was yet to 
come.^^' Moreover, the crisis furnished precisely what Jordan's 
Islamists needed in order to take the modest political space opened up 
by the November 1989 election and enlarge it. Until 1990, the 
Jordanian regime had been adept at co-opting and accommodating 
religious forces. This was made easier by the fact that it is not 
noteworthy to be an orthodox Moslem in a tradional monarchy, and the 
general religious atmosphere in Jordan undercut fundamentalist 
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criticisms. Although there was a logic for religious sensibilities to 
translate into political mobilization against the regime in the 1979-85 
period-rampant materialism/^°^ the ostentation of new suburbs around 
Amman, the fact that alcohol and immodestly dressed women coexisted 
in some areas of the capital with mosques and Madrassas-a catalyst 
was lacking. On or about August 2, one arrived. 
Radical scenarios seemed far-fetched before the Kuwait crisis 
because a thorough overturning of the status quo would have required 
four improbable things to happen simultaneously or in near sequence. 
One was a deep economic unraveling, with little help for the country 
from outside when it happened. Second, the regional environment 
would have had to be particularly crisis-prone either because of war, 
sudden regime transitions in nearby countries, or other equally serious 
dislocations. Third, there would have had to be a new cadre of united 
radical leadership. Fourth, the King would have had to die, fall 
seriously ill, or abdicate. The Kuwait crisis furnished the first three 
conditions in total or in part, and, conceivably, biology or a bullet might 
have provided the fourth before the war ended. The question of an 
opposition leadership underwent the most dramatic change. Before 
1989, it was hard to identify an incipient opposition leadership cadre to 
challenge the regime; political activism and violence were at a twenty-
five year low. Nor it was easy to find an East Bank cadre devoted to an 
Islamic revolution. Aside from Laith Shubailat, the maverick Islamic 
legislator, little was known about the new generation of politically 
minded Islamist activists.^ ^^^ But after the election and the Kuwait crisis, 
this new elite became more visible, and the rise of popular support for 
Iraq among the most disenchanted segments of Jordanian society 
propelled this new leadership forward with great speed. A united 
political front, led by Islamists, formed in August 1990, and it effectively 
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operated not as a Jordanian government as such but as a power 
against which the palace could generally not operate effectively.^^^* 
By not applying royal influence in August 1990, the regime 
courted further challenges. In October, Parliament, led by Shubailat, 
demanded that the regime arm the people to confront the expected war 
with Israel.^ ^^^ Neither the King nor the Prime Minister, Mudar Badran, 
wanted to do that. In mid-may 1990 there had been serious riots by 
Palestinians in Jordan's refugee Camps in the after math of the Rishon 
Lezion incident, when a deranged Israeli Killed seven Palestinians on 
their way to work in Israel.^ ^^^ The regime hit upon a compromise: the 
Palestinians would be given people's Army uniforms and trained by the 
regular army-but they would not be allowed to take their weapons out of 
the secured training areas such as Amman's football stadium.^^ '^ Then, on 
November 17, 1990, Jordan's lower house elected a fundamentalist as 
speaker over the opposition of secular leftists and liberals. This spelled 
trouble to come between parliament and the King, but by the end of 1990 
the trouble was still latent. As long as regime and street moved in the 
same general direction, a tense internal peace endured. 
The 1991 Gulf War And Jordan's Economy 
The Gulf war divided the Arab world into two camps, with a small 
group supporting Iraq (Jordan, PLO, Sudan, Yemen), and the rest 
supporting Kuwait. Many countries would feel the consequences of the 
invasion, but few are still as deeply affected as Jordan has been by 
that conflict's economic and political fall-out. Even though Jordan in 
not, of course, itself a Gulf state, its interests are very much influenced by 
events there. Lacking oil and valuable natural resources itself, trade and 
aid involving Gulf States are vital for Jordan's economy. As part of the 
Arab world and Middle East, Jordan also has a special interest in events 
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in that sub-region. Eigiit percent of its area is desert and another portion 
arid mountains that contains no oil. Among its population of 4.9 million 
people almost 40 percent of them under 15 years of age, Jordan requires 
an inflow of capital to provide jobs and services. ^^ '^ 
During the 1980, a very significant part of its income depended 
on billions of dollars in remittances from Jordanian expatriates and 
hundreds of millions of dollars in financial aid granted by some of the 
Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates). Jordan also exported agricultural and industrial 
products to the Gulf States and Iraq. In addition, Jordanian trucks 
transported agricultural and industrial products all over the Middle East 
and beyond. As a result of the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan, Iraq's main 
economic partner, found itself in a crisis that it did not create. In an 
attempt to save Jordan from its precarious position. King Hussein 
proposed the Arab League mediate the dispute between Iraq and 
Kuwait. Although the attempt failed, King Hussein was seen by some 
as the best hope for a peaceful solution.^^^' After the mediation attempt 
failed and the conflict escalated, Jordan became affected by all the 
social, military, political and economical consequences. Jordan's 
position was especially complicated by the trade sanctions imposed on 
Iraq by the UN that resulted in a siege of Aqaba, Jordan's Red sea 
port. The massive inflow of returning Jordanians and, temporarily, by 
the arrival of many foreign refugees on the way back to their home 
countries contributed to the economic crisis. A side from their common 
characteristics as Arab and Muslim neighbors, there was a special 
historical bond between Jordan and Iraq. When they emerged from the 
Ottoman Empire after world war One, both countries were ruled by 
members of the Hashemite family. Abdullah become King of Jordan 
and his brother Faisal became King of Iraq. In Iraq, a 1958 military 
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coup overthrew that regime and created a republic. Still, relations 
eventually recovered. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Jordan and 
its people genuinely supported Iraq both as a fellow Arab state and as 
a protector against Iran's brand of radical Islamism, giving the 
relationship an increasingly inriportant strategic dimension. When 
Jordan faced a deep economic crisis in 1989, it Gulf friends refused to 
help, further increasing Baghdad's relative important for Amman. The 
economic aspect of relations was quite critical in all these years. 
During the war with Iran, Jordan's economy-including transportation, 
trade, agriculture, and industry-all became essential for Iraq. In 
exchange, Iraq supplied Jordan with cheap oil, grants, and low-interest 
loans. Today, Iraq remains the major supplier of discounted oil and 
Iraqi continues to be the largest market for Jordanian products. 
Delivering these goods in both directions has become one of the main 
pillars of Jordan's transportation sector. 
Jordan's economy faced many problems before the Gulf War. 
There was a high unemployment rate of 20 percent. The foreign debt, 
exceeding $ 11 billion, was triple the annual Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). And the level of financial transfers from Jordanians working in 
the Gulf was declining.^ ^^^ As a result, Jordan had to devalue its 
currency by 50 percent in 1989. Another factor was Jordan's sensitivity 
to trade levels and Its dependence on international commerce. For 
instance, exports were worth almost $ 1 billion in 1989, with a further $ 
181 million in goods being re-exported through Jordan. Considering 
that Jordan's GDP was a mere $ 4.3 billion, this is a staggering figure. 
No less important to Jordanian living standards, the country imported $ 
2.16 billion worth of goods in that same year.^ ^^ ^ 
Before the Gulf war, well over half of Jordan's exports were sent to 
Gulf states. Iraq alone was the market for 23 percent of its exports; Saudi 
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Arabia was generally the market for at least 10 percent more. Iraq's 
importance was underlined by the fact that it was the source of between 
10 and 17 percent of total Jordanian imports by the late 1980s. 
Largely as a reaction to the problems of deficit and debts 
described above, the International Monetary fund (IMF) pushed Jordan 
to apply a tough economic reform program to increase production, 
decrease imports, reduce government spending, and stop government 
subsidies. These steps led to massive riots in April 1989 starting in 
Ma'an, Capital of Jordan's transport sector, and swept throughout the 
country, forcing King Hussein to change the government and Keep 
subsidies for most basic products. By 1990, Jordan's economy had 
begun recovering from the 1989 crisis but still needed serious domestic 
efforts, international support, and time to reach better levels of 
performance.^^°^ 
Immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 661which invoked economic trade sanctions 
against Iraq, a decision with which Jordan complied UN sanctions 
deeply affected Jordan's interests and economy since, as stated above, 
Iraq was the largest Jordanian trade partner for the previous ten years. 
Many Jordanian companies lost large amounts because Iraqi 
companies were unable to repay their debts due to the sanctions. 
Moreover, key Jordanian economic sectors such as transportation, 
agriculture, and industry, mainly serving Iraq, were severely affected by 
the UN resolution. The Amman Chamber of Commerce announced in 
November 1990 that the trade sanctions had already cost Jordan $ 2 
billion, and the loss was growing. According to the same source, they 
expected it to reach $ 3.6 billion in 1991.^^^^ In addition, before the 
resolution Iraq was supplying 80 percent of Jordanian oil at reduced 
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prices.^^^^ The sanctions forced Jordan to import oil from the 
international market at the going rates. 
Iraq was highly dependent on Jordan as the route for importing and 
exporting needed products. Each year, million of tons of goods were 
handled for Iraq in the Jordan's part of Aqaba and this aspect of Jordan's 
economy had been growing rapidly before the sanctions took effect. 
Imports via the port went from 6.2 million tons in 1989 to 3.2 million in 
1990 to 7.7 million in 1991.^"^ The trade sanctions also caused the 
cancellation of many shipping visits, and as a direct result, the number of 
ships arriving at Aqaba decreased from 2,583 in 1988 to 2,075 in 1991. 
This, in turn, made it harder and longer for Jordan to receive products it 
needed for local industry and agriculture, in addition to disrupting 
Jordanian exports. Allied warships searched thousands of vessels each 
year and turned back many shipments belonging to Jordanian merchants 
who had business relations with Iraq, even if they were targeted for local 
consumption. Jordanian phosphate and potassium exports were also 
disrupted since they depended on Aqaba's port.^ '^*^ 
The Gulf War affected (in various ways) forty countries around 
the world.^^^^ Some countries lost their exports to the Gulf area. Others 
lost the remittances of their expatriates. A few had to accommodate 
thousands of their citizens who returned from the Gulf area. Most 
countries were affected as a result of the interest rate increase on their 
old debts and difficulty to get new credits. Many were affected by the 
increase in oil prices. Jordan, however, was severely affected by all 
of these issues. 
Crown Prince Hassan announced that the effect of Gulf War on 
Jordan could be summarized in three dimensions: the trade sanctions 
against Iraq, the refugees who fled the Gulf area and passed through 
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Jordan, and the Jordanian expatriates who returned to Jordan.^ ^^^ At 
the time of the crisis, estimates one what losses would occur due to the 
conflict varied, but in Jordan, they were believed to be massive. 
Mudhar Badran, Jordan's Prime Minister at the time, estimated 
Jordan's total loss at $ 8 billion, Badhran added that while Jordan's 
exports to other Arab countries were $ 485.7 million in 1989 and had 
increased by $ 42.8 million in the first half of 1990, they had since 
decreased gradually after August 2,1990 reaching Zero at the end of 
1990 and first three months of 1991.^ ^^^ The Jordanian daily al-Dustur 
reported that Jordan's loss would reach $ 1.4 billion in the last five 
months of 1990, and would reach $ 8.4 billion in 1991, including both 
direct and indirect losses.^ ^°^ According to another Jordanian daily, 
Sawt al-Sha,b, the UN had estimated that Jordan lost $ 1.52 billion in 
1990, and expected it to lose another $ 3.4 billion in 1991.^ ^^^ Sawt al-
Sha,b's Sameh Hanandeh reported in November 1991 that Jordan had 
lost $ 1.68 billion in 1990 and would lose $ 3.97 billion in 1991.^ °^^  
Regardless of how much these figures (especially Badhran's) 
were an attempt to get move foreign aid; the real impact was vast and 
did cause Jordan's leadership to worry enormously about the future of 
its economy. Jordan's GNP declined by more than 8 percent, and 
Jordan's general economic growth dropped especially in the first five 
months after the war.^ ^ '^ Jordanian reserves of foreign currencies and 
government revenues declined leading to an estimated budget deficit of 
$ 308 million in 1991, excluding interest payments. The crisis affected 
almost all production sectors, led to an increase in the unemployment 
rate to nearly, 30 percent, and also resulted in an increase of the 
poverty rate to 33 percent. Moreover, Jordan had to postpone the 
application of the IMF reform program, writing in al-Dustur, Odeh 
Suleiman al-Swais concluded that, after the Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
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economies, Jordan's economy suffered the most due to the Kuwait 
crisis.^^^' Indeed, when compared to other countries, the serious effect 
on Jordan becomes even clearer. During the eight months after the 
Gulf War, Jordan lost an estimated $ 4billion while Turkey, India and 
Yemen combined lost $ 5.5 billion. Turkey estimated its losses to be $ 
3 billion, Yemen announced a loss of $ 830 million, and India estimated 
its loss to about $ 1.6 billion. Even Egypt's actual loss did not exceed $ 
1 billion dollars. In addition, while those countries losses were less 
than Jordan's, they received more and better credits. Jordan obtained 
only US $1 billion from Japan and the European Union.^^^^ 
Furthermore, before the crisis Arab and international financial 
support was vital for Jordan's economy. Before the Gulf War Jordan 
was receiving almost $ 600 million a year from the wealthy Gulf States 
alone. As a result of the Jordanian support of Iraq during the war, those 
countries such as the US and Japan took the same steps (a situation 
not reversed until Jordan become involved in the peace process with 
Israel, most especially after the Wye River Agreement). In addition, 
Iraq and Kuwait themselves had previously been the source of 30 
percent of the total financial aid received by Jordan.^^'^^ 
Jordanian exports to Arab and other countries also declined. 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia prohibited the import of Jordanian products 
because of Jordan's political position during the war. Jordanian 
agriculture, industry and trade sectors were thus shut out of the most 
important Gulf markets. The transportation sector was paralyzed as a 
result of the trade sanctions and .the decline in exports and imports.^^^^ 
Moreover, the tourism sector was harshly affected by the Gulf war, 
Having taken nearly a decade to recover from the loss of the important 
tourist sites of Jerusalem and Bethlehem in 1967, by 1990, the industry 
in Jordan had reached all-time highs, with almost 2.6 million tourists 
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entering in that year alone (most of whom were Arabs). Utilizing its 
sites like Jerash and Petra to their fullest, tourism had even out 
performed phosphates (Jordan's leading export) in net receipts. 
However, by 1991, this number dropped by almost 25 percent to 2 
million visitors.^^^^ 
Return of Jordanians 
There were many groups of people who passed through or 
returned to Jordan due to the Gulf War. These people can be classified 
into five categories: first, Jordanians who carry Jordanian passport and 
have Jordan as their only home and who consequently returned to 
Jordan. Second, Jordan had to host Palestinians who carried 
identification papers issued by other Arab countries that then refused to 
receive them. Third, Palestinians from the West Bank, who had 
Jordanian passports, were forced to stay for a long period in Jordan 
until Israel allowed them to go back to the West Bank. Fourth, over 
300,000 Iraqi refugees who escaped Iraq eventually settled in Jordan. 
Finally, as many as one million refugees during the last five of months 
of 1990, according to Prime Minister Badhran.^^^^ Jordan was one of the 
largest providers of white-collar employees to the Gulf countries. 
Jordanians living in the Gulf countries before the crisis exceeded one 
million (20 percent of Jordan's total population) distributed among 
Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
Emirates. These Jordanians living abroad also became the main 
supplier of foreign currency to Jordan, which official statics estimated 
at over $ 1.2 billion annually in the mid-1980s (an official estimates ran 
as high as $ 3 billion). Jordanians in Kuwait and Iraq alone accounted 
for almost 40 percent of the total Jordanian expatriate transfers, as 
these two countries hosted over half a million Jordanians. However, as 
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a result of the war, these remittances decreased to $ 460 million (the 
official statistic) in 1991. It was estimated that Jordan had lost $ 122 
million in 1990 and $ 318 million in 1991 due to the decrease in the 
employee transfers.^^^^ In addition, it was estimated that Jordanian 
expatriates lost $ 1.4 billion of their deposits in Kuwait and $ 1.5 billion 
of their belongings. Making matter worse, after the Gulf War, former 
Jordanians working outside Jordan, previously a source of national 
income, suddenly became a major burden inside Jordan. 
Jordanians started to migrate to Kuwait in the 1950, and the total 
number of Jordanians working in Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion was 
almost 400,000. Jordanian labor helped in building modern Kuwait, with 
Jordanian employees working in many government departments such 
as education, health care, military, as well as in the private sector. The 
Jordanian media reported that Jordanians were treated as second-
class citizens, even though most of them had lived many years there 
and many were even born and raised in Kuwait. Before the Iraqi 
invasion many articles requesting the government to deport Jordanians 
appeared in Kuwaiti newspapers, and the slogan "Kuwait is for 
Kuwaitis" became widespread. Jordanians were unable to buy private 
houses or operate their own businesses in Kuwait. Following the 
liberation, Kuwait started a comprehensive campaign to deport 
Jordanians out of Kuwait and an estimated 330,000 Jordanians 
returned to Jordan after the Iraqi troops were expelled from Kuwait by 
the US-led UN coalition.^^^^ Many other Jordanians, under indirect 
pressure and changing economic conditions, returned from other Gulf 
countries such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United 
Arab Emirates. 
The return of 330,000 Jordanians from the Gulf area, in addition 
to one million refugees who passed through Jordan, had many serious 
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negative effects on Jordan. Jordanian unemployment rate soared from 
20 percent to 30 percent/'*°^ White-collar employees were the main 
victims since Jordan was one of the major exporters of white-collar 
employees to the Gulf area. The situation worsened after the return of 
Jordanians from Kuwait and Iraq, a situation, which continued until 
Jordan created more Jobs and found vacancies abroad for the large 
number of unemployed. Returnees increased the pressure on the 
limited natural resources (e.g., education facilities, housing, and health 
care units). The return of the large number of Jordanians in a short 
period increased the number of Jordanians who lived under the poverty 
level up to one-third of the population. Before the Gulf crisis the total 
number of Jordanians who were living under poverty was 600,000-
almost 20 percent of the population. A study of 500 Jordanian families 
revealed that Jordan stepped down from a middle-income country to a 
low-income country. '^*^^ Salamah Hammad, writing in Sawt al-Sha'b, 
reported that over 1,6 25000 persons had entered Jordan between 
August and December 1990, out of whom 885,000 continued their trip 
to their home countries (e.g., India, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, 
and Egypt). This number equals 23 percent of Jordan's population and 
would be equivalent to 13 million people passing through England. In 
order to help these refugees.the Jordanian Government spent over $ 
60 million of its budget, though the UN eventually reimbursed only $ 12 
million of that amount. Thousands of Palestinians also stayed in Jordan 
because the other Arab countries that issued their papers refused to 
receive them. Additionally, many other nationalities like Somalis, 
Liberians and Eritreans stayed in Jordan for longer periods until they 
could find another country that would accept them. '^*^^ Jordanian 
authorities did not charge the refugees or international airlines taking 
the refugees home any of the fees normally paid by travelers. It also 
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gave up the privileges of the national Jordanian Airline Company 
(Royal Jordanian) and cancelled many of its flights to allow other airline 
companies to carry the refugees. 
Jordan and the United States during the Crisis 
The Jordanian King v\/as criticized sharply by a range of US 
observers for his pro-Iraqi tilt during the Gulf War, and initially even 
administration officials joined the chorus. There was, admittedly, much 
to be annoyed about. 
At the least, Washington accepted some Jordanian equivocation 
under the circumstances but did not really get it. Indeed, the president 
was so annoyed with the extent of King Hussein's early support for Iraq 
that he lost his temper, at a televised August 5 news conference, when 
ABC's Ann Compton began describing a Pro-Iraqi interview given that 
day by the King. "I can read, "Bush shot back, clearly more annoyed 
with the King than with Compton. It was the only time Bush lost his 
temper publicly throughout the crisis. 
As the days passed, Jordanian behavior worsened from the US 
point of view. In particular, the endlessly repeated Hashemite refrain 
that had it not been for the hasty introduction of US forces an Arab 
solution could have been found annoyed officials in Washington, who 
knew it was just not true and found it difficult to believe that even the 
King himself took the argument seriously. And days after the invasion, 
as Bush was characterizing Saddam Hussein as a Hitler, King Hussein 
told NBC news that Saddam was "a person to be trusted and dealt 
y j^^ l^ " (46) Thereafter, despite King Hussein visit to Kennebunk port on 
August 16, Jordan's seemingly two-faced behavior with respect to 
sanctions, its complaints about the US embassy monitoring the 
Jordanian-Iraqi border as the refugee problem grew in scope, its 
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colorful, conspiracy-bedecked anti-US rhetoric, and the King's gambit 
to bring the Europeans to undermine US strategy, all of this annoyed 
Washington further through out the nearly six months before the 
beginning of the air war on January 16,1991. 
In response to this, the US Navy blockaded Aqaba and the 
administration urged Jordanian neutrality at the least.^ ''^ ^ After the air war 
began, it also sent Ambassador Richard L Armitage to Jordan on January 
23 to calm nerves and, with Lawrence Eagleburger in Israel, to try to 
prevent a second Middle East war from breaking out between Israel and 
Jordan.^ '*^ ^ This genuinely worried Jordan as well as the United States and 
Israel. King Hussein was not exaggerating when he said on November 17 
that Jordan was at a cross roads and that the Middle East was on the 
"verge of a catastrophe which would destroy our existence", nor was 
Crown Prince Hassan just mouthing words when he said, "plainly put, our 
small country of 3.5 million people is on the brink of destruction".^^^^ He 
went on to describe Jordan as "hell's firewood". 
In addition to what Jordan was saying about the crisis, other 
irritations surfaced as well. There were unconfirmed claims that Jordan 
was training Iraqis on captured Hav/k missiles, that Jordanian 
intelligence was aiding lraq;^^°' that Jordanian weapons had been sent 
to Iraq before and during the fighting;^^^^ that Jordan was laundering 
money for Iraq;^"^ and that some Iraqi mobile SCUD launchers were 
hiding in Jordan despite the best efforts of coalition air forces to find 
them.^ ^^^ Meanwhile, Jordanian truck drivers were still plying the Iraqi-
Jordanian desert highway in violation of the UN embargo, and, in early 
February, they too felt the brunt of coalition air attacks. 
King Hussein delivered harsh anti-US Speech on February 6, 
seemingly triggered by the deaths of Jordanian truck drivers on that 
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road/^'*' The administration, in response, expressed its bitter 
disappointment with Hussein, suspended aid to Jordan, and 
commenced to review next year's aid allotment as well. An unnamed 
senior administration spokesman, possibly Secretary Baker himself, 
told the New York Time, " There is a war going on now. Americans are 
at risk, and what the King is doing is putting them more at risk. That is 
not the way friends behave-even friends under pressure. We cannot be 
the ones always doing what we can to help him and then he goes and 
pockets that and doesn't care if he says things that make life more 
difficult for us. There are limits to our patience, and he needs to know 
that more clearly".<^^> 
The Jordanians, in turn, professed outrage, anger, and dismay at 
US actions, and it appeared that US Jordanian relations had plummeted 
to their lowest point ever.^ ^^ ^ 
However bad this looked, some of the anger and dismay was 
probably staged. The experts on the US side new how sharply Hussein's 
domestic situation limited his options. More important, the Sheer horror of 
contemplating a Hussein-less Jordan in the midst of the Kuwait crisis 
Indeed, the day after the King's speech, secretary Baker told the senate 
foreign Relations Committee that lines of communication with Jordan had 
to remain open because " when we look at alternative we don't see what 
we perceive to be a particularly pretty picture".^^ '^ And, while public 
evidence is locking, it may be that a certain level of anti-Jordanian 
remarks by US officials was expected to aid King Hussein in the court 
of Jordanian public opinion, where to be an enemy of the United States 
was to be a friend "of the people". 
In this regard, US Jordanian discussions at Kennebunk port on 
August 16 and in the months there after may have led to more than just 
_. . _ , „ First Gulf War and Its Aftermath: 
Chapter - 5 191 j he Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty 
an exchange of sensitivities. Details are not public knowledge, but 
Thomas Friedman remarked in the New York Time on February 9, 
administration officials say they are ready to accept a certain amount of 
posturing by the King, who has provided some useful intelligence on 
Iraq, and tacit military cooperation since the Gulf War began/^^' 
Not withstanding this diplomatic subtext to US Jordanian relation 
during the crisis, the US cold shoulder persisted for a time after the war 
ended/^^^ Secretary Baker snubbed Hussein on his first two-post war 
trips to the region, and policy Planning Director Dennis Ross dubbed 
the King "a master of strategic misjudgment"/^°' At the same time, 
however, both the King and the administration were commencing 
efforts to patch up their spat. As early as his news conference on 
March 1, President Bush acknowledged difficulties with Jordan, but he 
cited extenuating circumstances and added, "clearly we do not want to 
see a destabilized Jordan. I have no personal animosity towards His 
Majesty the King".^^^' Later, on March 26, State Department spokesman 
Margaret Tutweiler said on the occasion of Adnan Abu-Odeh's trip to 
Washington that despite US disappointment with Jordan during the 
Kuwait crisis, Jordan still had a very important role to play in the search 
for peace and security in the region. This statement was duly broadcast 
by Jordanian media.^^^' 
Luckly for Jordan, disappointment or not, the administration had 
even less interest in the PLO. It was clear by early autumn that there 
would be no renewed US-'PLO dialogue after the war. The president 
himself said on March 9 that he was not in any rush to restart direct 
talks with the PLO which, he said, had lost much credibility in the war 
by siding with Iraq.^"^ 
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Even more important, the administration's approach to the peace 
process was first to concentrate on getting the Arab states engaged 
with Israel, then to address the Palestinian aspect of the process, 
which was when Jordan's role would become paramount-hence Baker's 
avoidance of Amman during his first two trips to the region after the 
Gulf War. The president said on March 9 that "it is high time that the 
combatants of the Arab-Israeli conflict recognized Israel's right to exist 
and we can then turn our attention to the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict". So the administration had not forgotten Jordan, and it knew it 
did not have the luxury of remaining angry at the King. Instead, though 
perhaps regretting the lack of alternatives, Washington waited for the 
right moment to recast US-Jordanian ties and involve the King in the 
peace process.^^^^ 
Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War, Bush administration on its own 
agreed for a negotiated settlement of Arab Israeli conflict. The Bush 
administration gained a position of diplomatic dominance within the 
Middle East acting more positively as compared to its earlier 
counterparts. For that matter, the 1991 Gulf War provided the catalyst 
and induced peace efforts at much faster pace than the earlier four 
decades. The intrinsic advantage of this regime was its dependence 
upon elite less courteous and favourable to Israel. Bush emerged as 
the biggest beneficiary from the end of cold war and the Gulf war. It 
gave him domestic applause and a favourable position to initiate the 
peace process.^^^^ 
On 20-21 July 1991, US Secretary of State James Baker visited 
Jordan when King Hussein announced his intention to accept an 
invitation to Jordan to attend a Middle East peace conference 
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sponsored by the US and the USSR. It was hoped that the conference 
would be attended by delegations from Israel, Egypt. Syria and 
Lebanon, and by ajoint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; and that it 
would thus become the first occasion when Israel, the Palestinians and 
the Arab nations would participate in direct negotiations. 
The Jordanian House of Representatives opposed the plan, 
however, demanding Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories 
and East Jerusalem as a precondition for Jordan's attendance;^ ®^^ and 
rejecting Israel's insistence that neither Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem nor overt supporters of the PLO should be allowed to attend. 
James Baker visited Amman again in September and October. He had 
visited the regions eight times since the end of the Gulf War, for further 
rounds of pre-Conference diplomacy, and on 12 October King Hussein 
announced that a Jordanian delegation would attend the conference, in 
spite of intense opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood and leftist 
political groupings. He stated that he had received assurances from the 
USA that it would do its utmost to ensure that a transitional period of 
Palestinian 'autonomy' in the Occupied Territories would be negotiated 
within one year of the opening of the conference; and that he had 
considered abdicating over the Arab-Israeli confrontation, but believed 
that attending the conference would increase international pressure on 
Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories. The Central Council of 
the PLO, meeting in Tunis on 16-17 October, approved the formation of 
a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, a decision strongly criticized 
by the leader of the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 
George Habbash. 
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Jordan and the Peace Process 
Just as the Unites States had use for Jordan, Jordan had use for 
the United States and the peace Process it created and shepherded. 
King Hussein had six good, interlocking reasons for wanting to partake 
in post-Gulf War peace diplomacy. 
First and most important, while Jordan was weak, the PLO was 
even weaker. The chance to take advantage of Yasser Arafat while the 
PLO was down must have seemed irresistible to the King. King Hussein 
and Arafat had been sparring for decades, before and after the 1974 
Rabat Summit empowered the PLO, at Hashemite expense, as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. After Rabat, the King 
fought a holding action against a rising tide of Palestinian nationalism 
that threatened Jordan's position in the West Bank and, ultimately, 
Hashemite rule in the East Bank. After the Gulf War, finally, the tables 
were turned and the King, though tottering, prepared to attack. 
Second, with Syria and Israel likely to become the major focus of 
post-Gulf War diplomacy, Jordan did not want to be left out on the off 
chance that a new peace process achieved success. And even if it did 
not, Syria was Jordan's once and perhaps future adversary after 
Saddam Hussein had been reduced. As always, the King to head off 
trouble, has always preferred to deal with danger by snuggling up to it 
rather than by confronting it. Third, King Hussein had to appear active 
diplomatically in order to raise money. The country was broke; and 
Amman needed all it could get and only from Washington. It was 
through US pressure, too, that the King hoped for a renewal of Saudi 
aid to the Hashemite Kingdom. 
Fourth, the King hoped that a helpful diplomacy would buy 
protection from Washington against future Israeli predations. The 
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specter of "transfer" a euphemism for expelling Palestinians from the 
West Bank and Gaza into Jordan-was foremost among Jordanian fears, 
albeit an exaggerated one. 
Fifth, the very process of a peace diplomacy was useful to 
Hussein. It allowed Jordan to sidestep trouble with Washington over 
continuing Jordan-Iraqi ties, including Jordan's importing roughly 
55,000 barrels of Iraqi oil a day, about $ 400 million a year from Iraq. It 
helped drive Jordanian opinion toward moderation and thus helped the 
King isolate the Islamist challenge. It worked to help mend Jordanian-
Saudi ties. It worked against extremism in Israeli politics, which the 
King greatly feared, and helped isolate Syrian rejectionism. 
Last, there were the benefits of peace itself, if only peace could 
be attained. For decades King Hussein has been waiting for a 
convergence of forces that would allow him to take prudent risks for 
peace. In the denouement of the Gulf War, this convergence seemed to 
hover into view. King Hussein has always needed four keys, ready to 
be turned in sequence. The Arab key, the Palestinian key, the Israeli 
key, and the superpower key.^ ^^ ^ 
As to the Arab key. King Hussein has needed to know that no 
Arab state or group of States would veto his effort. Jordan remained 
concerned about Syria, but with Saudi Arabia and Egypt more or less in 
League, and with Arab radicals like Iraq and Libya on the sidelines, 
Hussein was buoyed. Indeed, the fact that Jordan was able to scorn 
Syria's insistence that Jordan and other Arab states stay away from 
multilateral talks after Madrid, and demur entering bilateral talks with 
Israel in the absence of US and Soviet diplomats, proved that the 
tables have turned. 
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King Hussein has also needed Palestinians to share the risk of 
compromise, lest he meet the fate of his grandfather, King Abdullah. 
After the Gulf War, the PLC's weakness and the Intifade-induced shift 
of the center of gravity of Palestinian nationalism toward the more 
moderate Palestinians under occupation appeared to place this key in 
readiness. Arafat, in particular, was sidelined by the entire process, 
and West Bank Palestinians inherently more amenable to Jordanian 
interests were raised up in his stead. The King knew Arafat was not 
about to go quietly into the Arab night as chairman-emeritus, but never 
had the Palestinian national movement as a whole looked better from 
the Hashemite point of view.^ '^*^ 
The Israeli key appeared not to be in readiness at Madrid, but 
the King had reason to be patient. King Hussein knew that Israeli 
opinion-which favors land for peace by more than half and which 
opposes the frenzied settlement policy of the Likud government might, 
under the right circumstances, bring to power in Israel a government 
with that key in hand. 
Last, while Jordan disparaged both the skill and the seriousness 
of the Carter and Reagan administrations, it had infinitely more faith in 
the Bush administration's professionalism and determination. 
The opening session of the historic Middle East peace 
conference, convened within the framework of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338, and chaired by President Bush of the USA 
and the Soviet President, Mikhail Gorbachev, was held in Madrid, 
Spain, during 30 October-1 November 1991. The Joint Jordanian 
Palestinian delegation was led by Kamel Abu Jaber, who had been 
appointed Jordan's Minister of Foreign Affairs following the resignation, 
on 3 October, of Dr Abdullah an-Nusur. The delegation included 
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diplomats, civil servants and academics. In his speech, calling for the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Occupied lands, Abu Jaber stated 
that King Hussein would have preferred a separate Palestinian 
delegation but 'we have no objection to providing an umbrella for our 
Palestinian brethren, the Palestinian people must be allowed to 
excercise their right of self-determination in their ancestral homeland. 
He added, Jordan has never been Palestine and will not be so. In 
Washington and Moscow, subsequent negotiations between the Israeli 
and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations remained deadlocked. 
However, secret talks between the PLO and the Israeli Government in 
Norway, which had begun early in 1993, led to an agreement on a 
Declaration of Principles on 19 August 1993 which involved a degree 
of Palestinian self-government in the occupied Territories. The 
Declaration of Principles was signed in Washington on 13 September 
1993. This agreement came as a surprise to King Hussein who had not 
been informed that negotiations were taking place in Oslo, and the 
agreement is reported to have caused grave embarrassment to the 
Palestinian negotiators in Washington. Despite the King's initial 
irritation at the Israeli-PLO accord, which presented a socio-economic 
as well as a political challenge for Jordan, the King quickly accepted 
the Declaration of Principles. On 14 September, the day after the 
Washington signature of the accord, Jordan and Israel concluded a 
'common agenda' for subsequent negotiations between the two 
countries. The agenda aimed to achieve a just lasting and 
comprehensive peace' between the Arab States, the Palestinians and 
Israel. Jordan and Israel agreed to respect each other's security and to 
discuss future co-operation on territorial and economic issues. The 
signing of the agenda was publicized as being the first agreement 
between an Arab State and Israel since the peace agreement between 
^. . _ FirstGulf War and Its Aftermath: 
Chapter - 5 198 The Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty 
Egypt and Israel in 1979. King Hussein, however, stressed that the 
agenda was not a peace agreement but an outline of topics to be 
discussed at future talks. Much of the agenda had already been agreed 
in 1992 but an official signing was delayed because of objections by 
the Palestinians.^^°^ 
Within Jordan, news of the Israeli-PLO accord was greeted with 
considerable cynicism. Opposition to the accord appeared to be 
strongest in the vast Palestinian refugee Camp at Baqaa. Most Islamist 
and leftist politicians condemned the accord. The agreement between 
the PLO and Israel in September 1993 initiated a sometimes 
acrimonious debate on the vexed question of Palestinian identity and 
the future of Palestinians in Jordan. Since October 1993 Jordan had 
become increasingly frustrated with the PLO over its failure to 
implement agreements on closer co-operation. In particular Jordan was 
concerned that the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, appeared to be 
unwilling to sign a draft economic agreement that had been drawn up 
earlier in the year. At the beginning of 1994 King Hussein publicly 
criticized Arafat because Jordan had not been continuously advised 
about the progress of talks between the PLO and Israel concerning the 
implementation of Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho and 
economic co-operation. He requested that Arafat stop making 
references to a future Jordanian-Palestinian confederation because this 
was an issue on which no decision had yet been made. In the past King 
Hussein had appeared to favour such an arrangement, but more 
recently Jordan had decided not to discuss the final relationship with 
the Occupied Territories. Following the King's criticisms, a PLO 
delegation led by Farouk Kaddoumi, the head of the PLO's political 
department visited Amman and an agreement on economic 
co-operation, covering tourism, agriculture, infrastructure, investment 
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promotion, and private sector co-operation, was signed on 7 January 
1994. Just over a week later, Jordan and the PLO drew up a draft 
accord on security and the exchange of intelligence information. Jordan 
was particularly concerned about who would control the bridges across 
the Jordan River after the establishment of Palestinian autonomy. 
Jordanian experts were reported to be present as observers at talks 
between the PLO and Israel in Paris on economic and monetary 
questions. Yet in spite of a personal visit to Amman by Arafat to brief 
King Hussein on the Cairo talks with Israel, relation between Jordan 
and the PLO remained strained. At the end of March King Hussein 
blamed the PLO for mishandling the negotiations leading up to Security 
Council Resolution 904, which had allowed the USA to abstain on the 
paragraph in the preamble concerning Jerusalem. The King argued that 
the American vote could have been avoided if the PLO had consulted 
Jordan. There was a relatively low-key reaction from the Jordanian 
Government to the Cairo accord between Israel and the PLO signed on 
4 May. Arafat visited Amman on 5 May to brief King Hussein on the 
Cairo agreement but the King remained disillusioned by Arafat's failure 
to liaise with Jordan in the peace process.^^^^ 
Following a secret meeting in November 1993 between King 
Hussein and Shimon Peres, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, there 
was optimism in Israeli government circles that Jordan would soon sign 
a formal peace agreement with Israel. These hopes were dashed in late 
January 1994 when King Hussein insisted that the key issues which lay 
behind the Arab-Israeli conflict must be discussed before any accord 
could be signed and that it was unacceptable to leave negotiations until 
after the signing. Jordan, together with Syria and Lebanon, withdrew 
temporarily from the rounds of bilateral talks with Israel in Washington 
Immediately after the Hebron massacre in February, although the 
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gesture appeared to be largely symbolic and aimed at appeasing public 
anger at the incident. The King firmly rejected calls made by Islamist 
deputies for Jordan to withdraw permanently from the peace talks. 
The National Assembly requested that the Government link 
Jordan's resumption of peace negotiations with new arrangements for 
inspecting ships with cargo bound for Iraq through Aqaba port. There 
had been growing criticism of the policy of intercepting and searching 
ships bound for Aqaba in the Tiran Straits by a multinational inspection 
force led by the US navy. The system of inspection, introduced in 
August 1991 in order to verify compliance with international sanctions 
against Iraq, resulted in long delays and loss of revenue to the 
Jordanian authorities. When the USA failed to respond to Jordanian 
requests for new arrangements, this was interpreted in Amman as a 
means of putting pressure on Jordan to finalize a peace agreement 
with Israel. In Late March 1994 King Hussein announced that Jordan 
would not resume peace negotiations with Israel unless the naval 
blockade of Aqaba was lifted. However, it was not until the end of April 
that the USA accepted a Jordanian proposal for a new land-based 
system of inspection.^^^^ Prime Minister Majali told the press on 25 April 
that his government was now willing to sign agreements on all 
individual items on the Jordan- Israel agenda and to participate in all 
multilateral talks in the hope that the negotiations would lead eventually 
to a peace treaty. He emphasized that a peace treaty could only be 
achieved in this way. 
Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty 
In May-June 1994 the peace process received a new impetus, 
after King Hussein unexpectedly decided to proceed unilaterally with 
talks with Israel. After talks between the King and Israeli Prime 
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Minister, Itzhak Rabin, in London, United Kingdom, at the end of IVIay, 
negotiations resumed at a meeting of the Jordanian-lsraeii-US 
Trilateral Commission, held on 6-7 June in Washington, DC. At the 
meeting Jordan and Israel agreed to hold future bilateral talks in Israel 
and Jordan, and to establish joint sub-commissions on boundary 
demarcation, security, and water and environmental issues. These sub-
commissions began work on 18-19 July, at a meeting on the Jordanian-
Israeli border. 
On 25 July 1994 at a ceremony at the White House, King 
Hussein and the Prime Minister of Israel, Itzahk Rabin, signed the 
'Washington Declaration' ending the state of war which had existed 
between the two countries since 1948. The declaration stopped short of 
a full peace treaty, but US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
state that he expected it to speed the process for formal peace 
agreement 'within a matter of months/^^^ 
In Jordan opposition to the Declaration was limited, and there 
were no large-scale protests. Islamists declared 'a day of Sadness and 
Mourning' and at a modest protest meeting at the central mosque in 
Amman, Bahjat Abu-Gharbiah, head of the Arab-Jordanian popular 
committee Against Normalization, told the demonstrations that the 
peace was 'an attempt to consolidate the hegemony of the Zionist 
entity through normalization that allows its cancerous spread until the 
shores of the Arabian Gulf. The PLO Chairman Arafat sent his 
congratulations to the Israeli and Jordanian leaders on the declaration 
and expressed the hope that Syria and Lebanon would also make 
peace with Israel. However, Palestinian leaders were angered by a 
statement in the Declaration endorsing the special role of King Hussein 
as guardian of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. They argued that it 
undermined the Palestinian claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem, and 
_. , _ ^ „ ^ First Gulf War and Its Aftermath: 
Chapter - 5 202 The Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty 
that it contradicted the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles, which 
stated that the final status of Jerusalem would be determined by 
negotiation between Israel and the FLO. The Syrian press criticized the 
Washington Declaration, arguing that separate peace deals weakened 
the Arab cause. Nevertheless, President Assad appeared to be 
privately reconciled to the negotiations. 
Bilateral talks between Jordanian and Israeli delegations 
continued in August and September 1994. In mid-October, despite 
reports that problems remained over border demarcation and water 
resource allocation, the Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, visited 
Amman, and agreement was reached on a final peace treaty between 
the two countries. On 26 October the Treaty was formally signed at a 
ceremony held on the Jordanian-Israeli border, Jordan thus becoming 
only the second Arab state (After Egypt) to conclude a peace treaty 
with Israel. The Peace Treaty included agreement on border 
demarcation security, water allocation and the restoration of economic 
relations between the two states. King Hussein role as guardian of the 
Muslim Shrines in Jerusalem was also reaffirmed. The Treaty was 
adopted by both houses of the Jordanian National Assembly, and 
ratified by King Hussein on 9 November. As agreed in the Treaty, full 
diplomatic relations between Jordan and Israel were established in 
Late November. Also in November the Jordanian-Israeli border was 
opened to citizens of the two countries, and Israeli troops began 
withdrawing from some 340 sq km of land occupied since the 1967 war. 
Within Jordan little effort had been made to prepare public opinion for 
the peace agreement. Following a demonstration against the treaty in 
Amman by some 5,000 people, organized by Islamic groups, the 
Government banned all public meetings.^''^^ 
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The Islamic Action Front (lAF) and its allies continued to oppose 
the treaty and began a campaign in the National Assembly against the 
normalization of relations with Israel. They attempted to prevent the 
repeal of legislation limiting relations with Israel, including a law (adopted 
in 1973) prohibiting land sales to Israelis, a 1958 law imposing a total 
economic boycott of Israel, and legislation from 1953 outlawing trade 
between the two states. The Peace Treaty did little to improve relations 
with the Palestinian leadership. The reaffirmation of King Hussein special 
role as guardian of the Muslim holy places East Jerusalem was critized by 
the PLO leadership. In September 1994 the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) had claimed responsibility for all Islamic institutions in East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. In response, Jordan had agreed to 
relinquish its rights over sites in the West Bank and Gaza, but it refused 
to renounce its guardianship over the holy Shrines of East Jerusalem. A 
compromise war reached on the issue in late January 1995, When accord 
was signed by the two sides. The Palestinians agreed to recognize the 
Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, thus implying de facto recognition of 
Jordanian rights over the Jerusalem Shrines, at least until the city came 
under Palestinian sovereignty. In return, Jordan reaffirmed its support for 
Palestinian autonomy and for the future creation of a Palestinian state 
with East Jerusalem as its capital. The accord also covered economic, 
cultural and administrative affairs, and included an agreement to use the 
Jordanian currency in Palestinian territories. The timing of the agreement 
prompted observers to argue that Arafat was seeKing better relations with 
Jordan, because of Israel's increasingly unco-operative approach on the 
Palestinian question, and as a response to growing pressure from Islamic 
groups violently opposed to the PLO-lsrael accords.^^ '^ 
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Main Points of Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
The Jordan Peace Treaty with Israel comprises 30 articles, five 
annexes which address boundary demarcation, water issues, police 
cooperation, environmental issues and mutual border crossings, and 
six maps/^^' 
• The main provisions of the treaty are as follows: 
< International boundary 
The agreement delimits the agreed international boundary 
between Jordan and Israel including territorial waters and airspace. 
This boundary is delimited with reference to the Mandate boundary and 
is shown on the maps attached to the agreement. The Agreement 
provides for some minor mutual border modifications which will enable 
Israeli farmers in the Arava to continue to cultivate their land. 
The Baqura Area and Zofar Area will fall under Jordanian 
sovereignty with Israeli private land use rights. These rights include 
unimpeded freedom of entry to, exit from and movement within the area. 
These areas are not subject to customs or immigration legislation. These 
rights will remain in force for 25 years and will be renewed automatically 
for the same period unless either country wishes to terminate the 
arrangement, in which case consultations will be taken. 
< Security 
The two parties will refrain from any acts of belligerency or 
hostility, will ensure that no threats of violence against the other party 
originate from within their territory, and undertake to take necessary 
and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism. They will also 
refrain from joining a coalition whose objectives includes military 
aggression against the other party. Israel and Jordan will abstain from 
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hostile propaganda and will repeal all discriminatory references and 
expressions of hostility in their respective legislation. The two countries 
will establish a Conference on security and Cooperation in the Middle 
East (CSCME) which will be modeled after the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This is an ambitious attempt to 
replace the more classical view of security by substituting the old 
nations of deterrence and military preparedness with confidence 
building measures. In due time, confidence will lead to the 
establishment mutual trust and institutions aimed at preventing war 
and enhancing cooperation. 
< Water 
Israel and Jordan have agreed on allocations of water from the 
Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers and from Araba ground water. Israel has 
agreed to transfer to Jordan 50 million cubic meters of water annually 
from the northern part of the country. In addition the two countries have 
agreed to cooperate to alleviate the water shortage by developing 
existing and new water resources, by preventing contamination of 
water resources and by minimizing water wastage. ^^ ^^  
< Freedom of Passage 
Nationals from both countries and their vehicles will be permitted 
freedom of movement through open roads and border-crossings. 
Vessels from either country will have the right to passage through 
territorial waters, and will be granted access to ports. Negotiations are 
underway towards a Civil Aviation Agreement. The Strait of Tiran and 
the Gulf of Aqaba are considered international waterways, open to all 
nations for freedom of navigation and over flight. 
< Places of Historical and Religious Significance 
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There will be freedom of access to the places of religious and 
historical significance. In accordance with the Washington Declaration, 
Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan in Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the 
permanent status, as detailed in the Declaration of Principles, will take 
place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these 
Shrines. 
< Refugees and Displaced Persons 
The parties recognize the human problems caused by the conflict 
in the Middle East, and agree to alleviate them on a bilateral level and 
to try to resolve them through three channels. 
• The quadripartite committee with Egypt and the Palestinians with 
regard to displaced persons. 
• The Multilateral Working Group on Refugees. 
• Negotiations in a framework to be agreed upon-bilateral or 
otherwise in conjunction with permanent status negotiation 
detailed in the Declaration of Principles. 
< Normalization of Relations between Jordan and Israel. 
The peace treaty deals not only with an end to war, but also 
normalization. Various articles of the treaty deal with practical issues of 
normalization in such matters as culture and science, the war against 
crime and drugs, transportation and roads, postal services and 
telecommunication, tourism the environment, energy, health, 
agriculture, and the development of the Jordan Rift valley and the 
Aqaba /Eliat area. 
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Economic cooperation is seen as one of the pillars of peace, vital 
to the promotion of secure and harmonious relations between the two 
peoples. Diplomatic relations between Jordan an Israel were 
established on November 27, 1994, including the appointment of 
ambassadors and the opening of embassies. 
Jordan and Israel will maintain good neighborly relations by 
cooperating in many spheres on joint projects. Among the projects are: 
Development of energy and water sources, protecting the natural 
environment, joint tourism development and the development of the 
Jordan Rift valley. 
As a result of continuing negotiations over the last year, bilateral 
agreements have been signed between Jordan and Israel in the areas 
of tourism, environmental cooperation, trade, police cooperation and 
agriculture.^^°^ 
Relations with the USA 
In October 1991, following Jordan's acceptance of an invitation 
to attend the opening session of the Middle East peace conference in 
Madrid, President Bush announced the USA's intention to resume 
military aid to Jordan. In June 1992 the USA postponed a joint military 
exercise with Jordan in order to express its disapproval of the 
assistance that Jordan was allegedly providing to Iraq to enable it to 
circumvent the UN trade embargo and the USA proposed that UN 
observers should be dispatched to Jordan in order to suppress the 
smuggling of goods to Iraq. Jordan rejected the proposal outright as an 
infringement of its sovereignty. In August both the Jordanian 
Government and the House of Representatives condemned Western 
plans to establish an air exclusion zone in southern Iraq. In January 
1993, King Hussein strongly criticized renewed air attacks on targets in 
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Iraq by Western air forces, but did not express support for the Iraqi 
President, Saddam Hussein. King Hussein emphasized that Jordan 
would remain on friendly terms with the USA under the newly-elected 
Clinton administration. In June King Hussein visited the USA, where he 
held talks, for the first time with president Clinton. In late 1994, King 
Hussein visited the USA where he met President Clinton and the 
secretary of state, warren Christopher. Their talks included discussions 
about the Arab-Israeli peace process and future USA arms sales to 
Jordan. In March, new tensions emerged with the USA over Jerusalem 
and over the U.S-led naval blockade of Jordan's only port at Aqaba. 
After the adoption of Resolution 904 by the UN Security Council on 18 
March 1994, Jordan protested strongly about the U.S position on the 
status of Jerusalem.^^°' The USA abstained on two paragraphs in the 
preamble, in which East Jerusalem was referred to as part of the 
Occupied Territories. However, most King Hussein's fury over this 
reversal was directed towards PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat who was 
accused of mishandling the negotiations which preceded the adoption 
of the Resolution by failing to consult with Jordan on its wording. As 
part of King Hussein's improve relations with the USA, the King in 
March 1995 visited the USA and an agreement was signed by both 
countries for canceling $ 420 million of Jordan's outstanding debt. The 
USA mad efforts to persuade Jordan to sever all of its economic links 
with Iraq, but these efforts were rejected. In January 1996, the US 
Secretary of Defense announced that the USA would supply Jordan 
with 12 F-16A and four F-16B fighter aircraft, and in late February 
President Clanton authorized the supply of military equipment worth $ 
100 million as a grant to Jordan. After King Hussein visited Washington, 
DC, in March, the USA announced that military co-operation between the 
two countries would be expanded and in April, 34 US F-15 and F-16 
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fighter aircraft were stationed in Jordan for an indefinite period in order 
to undertake flights over southern Iraq. In June 1996 King Hussein was 
the first Arab leader to visit Washington, DC, after the right-wing Likud 
victory in the Israeli elections. Discussions focused on the Middle East 
peace process and on Jordan's strategic relationship with the USA. 
Soon after the King's visit another series of joint military manoeuvres 
were carried out in southern Jordan, and at the end of the month the 
Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, visited 
Jordan to strengthen the military relationship between the two 
countries.^^^^ In October, after violent clashes between Israelis and 
Palestinians following Israel's decisions to open a tunnel in Jerusalem 
close to Muslim holy places, President Clinton invited King Hussein, 
the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, and the new Israeli Prime Minister 
Binyamin Netanyahu, to Washington in order to reduce tensions and it 
was agreed that direct talks would be resumed between Israel and the 
Palestinian National Authority on the redeployment of Israeli troops in 
Hebron. In November President Clinton announced that Jordan was 
being granted special military status, thus making the Kingdom eligible 
for increases in US military aid. In December Jordan received the first 
US $ 100 million installment of a $ 300 million package of military 
equipment as part as of a US commitment to help modernize the 
Jordanian armed forces. Joint exercises between Jordanian and US 
forces continued, and the first group of F-16 fighter aircraft, pledged 
under the rearmament agreement that had been signed with the USA at 
the end of 1996, arrived in December 1997;^^^^ with the rest of the 
aircraft scheduled for delivery in early 1998. In October 1997 the US 
Government accorded Irbid in northern Jordan, where there were a 
number of Jordanian-Israeli joint ventures, the status of 'qualifying 
industrial Zon', there by allowing all goods exported from it duty-free 
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access to the US market. In November Jordan dispatched a high-level 
delegation, headed by Jawad al-Anani, to the US sponsored Middle 
East and North Africa economic conference in Doha, Qatar, while both 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia decided to boycott the meeting, owing to Israeli 
participation. Despite the close alliance with the US Government and 
the suppression of pro-Iraqi demonstrations during the increased 
tension between the USA and Iraq in early 1998, Jordan indicated that 
it would not allow its territory or airspace to be used for an attack on 
Iraq. In July 1998 King Hussein arrived in the USA for further cancer 
treatment and remained there for almost six months. The King's 
mediation at the US-brokered peace Summit, which took place between 
Israel and the Palestinians at the Wye Plantation, Maryland, in 
October, was crucial to the signing of the Wye River Memorandum. In 
December, after renewed US and British air strikes against, Iraq the 
Jordanian authorities allowed pro-Iraqi demonstrations by the public, 
but ensured that they were contained and policed. 
Relations with Arab States 
Jordan since the end of the Gulf War has continued to distance 
itself from Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and has tried to improve 
relations with the Gulf States. In November 1994, Jordan welcomed the 
decision of Iraq to recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Kuwait. Jordan continued to favor the international rehabilitation of 
Iraq, including the relaxation of UN sanctions. In June 1995 King 
Hussein was openly critical of US policy towards Iraq. After a visit to 
Amman later that month by Viktor Possovalyuk, the Russian Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, both Jordan and Russia agreed to co-
operate to end UN sanctions against Iraq. 
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At the end of November 1993 King Hussein made has first official 
visit to Egypt since the Gulf crisis. Relations with Egypt had slowly 
improved after diplomatic efforts by the King who made an unofficial 
visit to Cairo in October 1992 to offer condolences just after the 
Egyptian capital suffered a serious earthquake. During a visit to 
Amman by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in October 1993 it 
was agreed to reconvene the Higher Jordanian-Egyptian Joint' 
Committee which had not met since the Gulf crisis. In January 1995 
President Mubarak of Egypt made his first official visit to Jordan since 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and in February Jordan, together a summit 
meeting in Cairo, in an attempt to avert a breakdown in the peace 
process. In March the Higher Jordanian-Egyptian Joint Committee 
convened in Cairo, where it was agreed to co-ordinate the activities of 
the two countries. 
Following visits by Crown Prince Hassan to Doha in late 1993 
and by Sheikh Hamad bin Jaber ath-Thani, the Qatari Minister of 
foreign Affairs, to Amman at the beginning of 1994, normal relations 
betvt/een Jordan and Qatar were restored after being strained by 
Jordan's support for Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. In March 1994 
King Hussein made his first visit to Doha since the Gulf crisis. 
However, the normalization of relations with Qatar did not include the 
resumption of financial aid to Jordan from the Emirate. King Hussein 
also visited Oman, where discussions included the efforts by both 
countries to mediate between the two factions in Yemen, but visits to 
Bahrain and the UAE were cancelled.^°^^ 
In November 1994 a three-year programme of bilateral co-
operation in educations, science and culture was agreed with Qatar, 
and in January 1995 King Hussein made a visit to Oman for talks with 
Sultan Qaboos. There were also signs of some improvement in 
First Gulf War and Its Aftermath: 
Chapter - 5 212 The Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty 
relations with Bahrain and the UAE. After the coup in Qatar in June 
1995 in which Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa ath-Thani deposed his father, 
King Hussein offered his congratulations to the new Amir, who had 
been largely responsible for the policy of improving relations with 
Jordan. During the second half of 1995 relations with Yemen were also 
strengthened. 
In 1994-1995 there was some improvement in relations with 
Kuwait, which had been severely strained since the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. A senior Jordanian diplomat visited Kuwait in 
September 1994, and it was later announced that the Jordanian 
embassy in Kuwait would reopen and that Kuwait had agreed to allow 
several thousand Jordanians who had been expelled in 1991 to return. 
In late 1994 and 1995 relations with Saudi Arabia began to 
improve, tentative signs of rapprochement were evident in late 1994. In 
September co-operation on border issues resumed. A ban on granting 
residence permits to the dependants of all Jordanians and Palestinians 
working in Saudi Arabia, which had been imposed since the Gulf crisis, 
was partly revoked in March 1995, when residence permits were 
granted to the families of those Jordanians employed in 'vital position'. 
After a visit to Riyadh by the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
July there were signs that Saudi Arabia was ready to restore diplomatic 
representation with Jordan to ambassadorial level. 
During the second half of 1997 there were indications that King 
Hussein wished to achieve an improvement in relations with Syria. 
Speaking at Irbid, a city in the north part of Jordan near the border of 
Syria, the King praised President Assad, but also urged the Syrian 
Government to reciprocate by ceasing to support some Jordanian 
opposition parties. For their part, the Jordanian authorities ordered the 
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head of the Syrian branch of the MB's information office in Amman to 
leave the country/^"' 
Although relation with Syria appeared to improve during the early 
part of 1998, by the end of the year they had deteriorated again. In 
October Mustafa TIass, the Syrian Minister of Defence, claimed that 
Jordan was 'Judaizing' its people, and accused the authorities there of 
having refused to allow army units from Saudi Arabia to assist Syria 
during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. On the Death of King Hussein in 
early February 1999, the Syrian Government immediately announced 
three days of official mourning and President Assad attended the 
King's funeral at the head of a high-level Syrian delegation. 
Further evidence of an improvement in bilateral relations emerged 
when, in early May 1999, it was announced that Syria would supply 
Jordan with water, in order to ease Jordan's drought over the summer 
months. Syria began to supply the water in mid-May and was to continue 
for four months. Jordan and Syria also agreed to proceed with the long-
standing Yarmouk dam project, and to seek financing jointly. 
Breakdown in Relations with Iraq 
In early August 1995 King Hussein granted political asylum to 
Hussain Kamel al-Majid, his brother Saddam Kamel and their wives 
after they fled from Baghdad to Amman. Hussein and Saddam Kamel 
had been senior figures in the Iraqi regime and were married to 
daughters of Saddam Hussain, the Iraqi leader. Their defection marked 
a sharp deterioration in relations between Jordan and Iraq. Hussain 
Kamel appealed for the removal of Saddam Hussain and spoke of his 
hopes of leading an Iraqi opposition movement to rescue Iraqis from 
their worsening plight. King Hussein delivered a speech in which he 
praised Hussain Kamel as a great patriot and strongly criticized the 
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Iraqi leader. In response, Iraq denounced Hussain Kamel as a traitor 
and a US agent, but carefully avoided attacks on King Hussein. Despite 
the political rupture, economic co-operation continued, with Iraq 
remaining Jordan's main source of oil supplies. Jordan continued to 
provide Iraq with a vitally important link with the outside world. In 
October King Hussein renewed his attack on the Iraqi regime, 
denouncing the presidential elections in Iraq as a farce. He also 
established contact with Iraqi opposition groups in London United 
Kingdom, and promoted the idea of holding congress in Amman to 
bring the different factions together in order to discuss political change 
in Iraq. However, the proposed congress drew criticism, especially from 
Syria, and the idea was abandoned. His support for Hussain Kamel 
was short-lived. It quickly became clear that Kamel had few supporters 
in Iraq, while his appeals to the Iraqi opposition -in-exile were firmly 
rejected. By the end of 1995 his presence in Jordan had become 
something of an embarrassment. When Hussain Kamel and his brother 
decided to return to Iraq in February 1996, after Iraq announced that 
they had been pardoned. Nevertheless, the brutal murder of the two 
men by order of Saddam Hussain only days after their return was 
strongly condemned by Jordan. 
In April 1996, after US aircraft were stationed at Azraq to enforce 
the air exclusion zone in southern Iraq, the Jordanian Government 
insisted that it would not permit the country to be used as a base for 
attacks against Iraq. King Hussein met with Iraqi opposition leaders in 
London, United Kingdom, in March 1996 and gave permission for the 
Iraqi National Accord (INA) to open an office in Amman. In March there 
was another high-level defection from Iraq when Gen. Nizar Kazraji, a 
former Chief of staff of the Iraqi army, arrived in Jordan and associated 
himself with the INA. In late March, amid speculation that Iraqi agents 
^ ^ , ^ ^ , , First Gulf War and Its Aftermath: 
Chapter - 5 215 The Jordan - Israel Peace Treaty 
operating in Jordan might be seeking to target Jordanians, the first 
explosion of an Iraqi diplomat from Jordan occurred. In retaliation, Iraq 
expelled a Jordanian diplomat. 
Jordan's new policy towards Iraq caused disquiet in Egypt and 
Syria, which feared that It could lead to a new, US-backed strategic 
reorientation in the region. The Egyptian and Syrian press accused 
King Hussein of pursing has own ambitions in Iraq. The King had talks 
with president Mubarak of Egypt in Washington, DC, at the and of 
September 1995 during the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and in late December 
President Mubarak visited Amman. At the end of his visit to Jordan the 
two leaders issued a joint statement in which they emphasized the 
need to ensure the unity of Iraq and to allow the Iraqi people to decide 
their own future.^®^' 
The tense relations that had existed with Iraq since August 1995, 
improved slightly in December 1996, when the Iraqi Ministers of Trade 
and Foreign Affairs held talks in Amman with senior Jordanian officials, 
marking a resumption in high-level contacts between the two countries. 
The invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan by Saddam Hussain forces in August 
1996, and the destruction of the Iraqi opposition based there, may have 
convinced the King that an early removal of the Iraqi leader was 
extremely unlikely. The Jordanian Government deliberately refrained 
from commenting on the Iraqi invasion, but voiced concern over the US 
missile attack against Iraq. The Jordanian National Assembly, in 
contrast, strongly condemned the American action. The Iraqi National 
Accord (INA) was allowed to keep its office in Amman, despite reports 
that the group had been infiltrated by Iraqi agent, but the Jordanian 
Government repeatedly asserted that Jordan would not be used as 
abase for operations against the Iraqi regime( °^ ^ 
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In December 1997 relations between the two countries once 
again became strained, after the Iraqi authorities executed four 
Jordanian nationals who had been convicted of smuggling offences. 
King Hussein condemned the executions, expelled a number of Iraqi 
diplomats from Amman, and recalled the Jordanian charge affaires 
from Baghdad. In an attempt to improve relations, Iraq announced that 
it would commute the death sentence of a fifth Jordanian convicted of 
smuggling and release a number of Jordanian held in Iraqi prisons. The 
Killing of Iraq's charge affaires in Amman in January 1998 prompted 
rumours that Iraqi government agents may have been responsible. In 
May, however, the Jordanian Minister of the Interior announced that a 
number of Jordanian nationals had been arrested in connection with 
the Killing, which, had not been politically motivated and did not involve 
'neighboring countries'. Despite Jordan's close alliance with the US 
Government, the authorities indicated that they would not allow 
Jordanian territory or airspace to be used for air strikes against Iraq, 
but they urged the Iraqi Government to comply with all UN resolutions 
and allow UN weapons inspectors access to all suspect sites. 
Jordanian support for the Arab League's efforts to resolve the crisis by 
diplomatic means contributed to an improvement in relations with some 
other Arab states, notably Egypt. Although relations with Iraq remained 
uneasy, economic co-operation continued, and in February 1998 the 
two countries renewed the 1991 oil agreement. In December 1998, 
public demonstrations were allowed in protest at US and British air 
strikes against Iraq. The Jordanian Government also strongly 
condemned the attacks. In December 1998, an emergency meeting of 
the Arab Parliamentary Union was held in Amman at which Crown 
Prince Hassan, called for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. However, 
comments made by Crown Prince Hassan regarding the need for 
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greater democracy in Iraq, and his demands for the release of all 
Kuwaiti prisoners of war held there angered the Iraqi delegation. 
Jordan River Dispute 
The struggle for fresh water in the Middle East was a primary 
cause of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and has contributed to other military 
disputes in the region. Like other conflicts that revolve around scarce 
environmental resources, there are ways to determine the likehood of 
water issues escalating into a large-scale multi-national conflict. The 
probability that the degree of scarcity of water to a region, the need of 
several nations to share one fresh water source, the military or 
economic power of the state that controls the water, and existence of 
other fresh water sources aids the ability to predict the causes and 
possible solutions for these conflicts. Perhaps the clearest example of 
a region where fresh water supplies have had strategic implications is 
the Middle East.<^^^ 
The Jordan River originates in the mountains of eastern 
Lebanon. As the Jordan River flows south through the enterance to the 
Great Syrian Rift Valley, it is fed from underground sources and small 
streams at various points in Jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. The 
Jordan's main sources are the Hasbani River, which flows from 
Lebanon to Israel, the Banyas River, which flows from Syria to Israel, 
the Dan River, which begins and flows inside Israel, and the Yarmouk 
River, which begins near the Golan Heights and flows to the Jordan 
River. Following its flow into 'Lake of Galilee' the Jordan River 
continues southward into the center of the Jordan Valley, forming the 
border between the western edge of Jordan and eastern side of Israel 
including part of the Palestinian Autonomy. The Jordan continues 
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flowing into the Dead Sea, and tlien through a smaller stream it flows 
eventually into the Red Sea.^^^' 
It is important to emphasize that the Jordan River, inspite of its 
relative large size in Israel, is actually a small river in international 
terms. The Jordan flows in a narrow valley. Its average width is a bout 
1200 meters, and sometimes it limit itself into 500 meters only.^ ^®' The 
lower part of the river between Like of Galilee and the Dead Sea is very 
curved. While the air distance between Lake of Galilee and the Dead 
Sea is 105 km, the flow distance is 220 km.^^°^ 
The Middle East region is known for the fact that it is extremely 
arid. The scarcity of water is connected to meteorologic, geographic 
and demographic factors. Throughout most of the Middle East region 
rainfall is irregular. The rainy season is short, between 6-8 months a 
year, and rainfall varies between 250-400 mm annually, which is 
insufficient for basic agriculture which requires at least 400 mm of 
regular rainfall. Irrigated agriculture is further restricted because there 
are only few major rivers in the Middle East- the Jordan River and the 
Nile among further more, there is the issue of the vastly expanding 
population in the Middle East. This population growth stems from two 
sources, in Jordan the population increase is due to the birthrate and in 
Israel the large waves of immigrants in recent year have increased the 
population.^^^^ According to recent statistics, the population of Jordan is 
predicted to be 6.5 (millions) in 2010. The population of Israel 
(including the West Bank and Gaza) suppose to grow into 10.9 
(millions) in the year of 2010.^^^^ 
The Jordan River supplies Israel and Jordan with the vast 
majority of their water. Some hydrologists have identified 1000 cubic 
meters per person per year as a minimum water requirement for an 
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efficient moderately industrialized nation. Inside Israel's border, the 
availability of water per-capita in 1990 was 740 cubic meters.^^^' It is 
estimated that by the year 2025 this availability will be reduced to 310 
cubic meters. As such, over 50 percent of Israel's water sources rely 
on rain which falls outside of the Israeli border. Israel depends on 
water supply which either comes from rivers that originates outside the 
border, or from disputed lands. 
For the Kingdom of Jordan, the Jordan River supplies a bout 75 
percent of its need.^ '^'^  In contrast to Israel, only 36 percent of the river 
flow originates outside the Jordanian border. However, in terms of water 
availability for the year of 1990, Jordan had only 260 cubic meters per 
capita, which is almost % less than the minimum water requirement for an 
industrial nation. Moreover, by the year 2025 it is estimated that Jordan 
will only have 80 cubic meters per capita per year. ^^ ^^  
Jordan and Israel are highly dependent upon the Jordan River. 
Jordan, however, is facing another environmental problem which 
increases the state's dependency on the water of the Jordan River. The 
main rivers in Jordan are the Jordan, the Yarmouk, and the Zarqa. While 
the water quality of the Jordan and the Yarmouk River considered to be 
good, the Zarqa River, flowing entirely within Jordan's borders, faces a 
pollution crisis that prohibit both access and the use of its water. 
The need for water and the continuing hostility between Israel 
and the surrounding Arab States has placed the Jordan River as a 
central bargaining chip since Israel's establishment in 1948. The Israeli 
War of Independence was rooted in the fact that the Arab countries 
considered the state of Israel to be illegitimate. Connected to these 
declarations, the Arab states have persistently denounced the unilateral 
diversion of the Jordan River as completely illegal. The Israeli response 
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has been that the surrounding Arab nations were never willing to let Israel 
exist in peace. These historical disagreements interwine with the dispute 
between Israel and Jordan in which the Jordan River plays a main role. 
In order to understand the core of the conflict between Israel and 
Jordan around the Jordan River, it is important to note the different 
perceptions of water between the two countries. Jordan, as part of the 
Arab world, perceived the water problem as part of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Therefore, for Jordanian, water was always a matter of an 
Arab national pride.^^^^ For Israel, water seemed to be an integral part 
of territory and a necessary resource for development.^^^' 
As the population of Israel grew, the reliance on the Jordan River 
grew to over 50 percent of their water wage. In the early 50's Israel 
created a National Water Carrier to transport water from the Jordan River 
and the Sea of Galilee to the Negev desert. These new waterways 
permitted cultivation of additional desert land. However, in the eyes of 
Arab nations in the 1950's, the National Water Carrier became a symbol 
of Israel's aggressive expansionism. In reaction, in 1955 Syrian artillery 
units opened fire on the Israeli construction team. In an attempt to settle 
the water dispute, American President Eisenhower appointed Eric 
Johnston as mediator.^^^^ Negotiations between Arab States and Israel on 
regional water-sharing agreement continued for more than two years with 
no actual success beyond a cease-fire. 
Following more than 10 year of silent tensions, the conflict flared 
again. The Syrian government, inside its borders, attempted to divert 
the Banyas River which is one of the Jordan River's tributaries. This 
was following by three Israeli army and air force attacks on the site of 
the diversion. These incidents regarding water issues led up to the 
outbreak of the Six-Day war in June 1967 between Israel against Syria, 
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Jordan, and Egypt. During the war, Israel captured the Golan Heights 
and the site of the Banyas headwaters, which enabled Israel to prevent 
the diversion of the Banyas by the Syrians. Israel also gained control of 
the West Bank, the Jordan River as well as the northern bank of the 
Yarmouk.^^^^ 
In the year following the Six-Day War, Israel increased its water 
use from the Jordan River by 33 percent.^^°°' Jordan, on the other 
hand, lost to significant access water from the Jordan River. The 
Jordanian's plans to expand usage of the river and its cannel system 
had to be terminated by the out come of the war. Following the war, a 
large percentage of the sources of the Jordan River were controlled by 
Israel. In addition, Palestinians also took control over large sectors of 
the Jordan valley that held this source water.^^°^^ 
For Israel, the West Bank valley became a key water source 
because of its underground flow of water and wells. In order to provide 
water to north and central parts of the country, Israel depends on the 
water that comes from the Golan Heights as well as this area. These 
water sources are key elements in Israel's strategy to hold onto the 
West Bank and the Golan Heights.<^°^' 
In the past twenty-five years, Israel and Jordan have searched for 
alternatives to maximize the use of water. For Jordan, the main projects 
were the rehabilitation of the East Gohr Canal, the repair of the Yarmouk 
main canal tunnel, and the constructions of the rockfill dam on the Zarqa 
River-the King Talal dam. The economic benefits of these projects are 
enormous in terms of agricultural production and water supply to the 
region. A bout 36 new town and villages have been built in the area and 
the agricultural productivity has greatly increased. It is important to note 
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that the Yarmouk Project required a mutual understanding with Israel, 
which has rights to the Jordan-Yarmouk waters.^"""^^ 
Israel, has recently sought solutions to its water problems by 
applying advanced technology and environmental research to its efforts 
by bring water to the entire country. Large amounts of financial 
resources have been dedicated to find ways to increase efficiency of 
water usage. One remarkable breakthrough was the Israeli refined drip 
irrigation system, which delivers water directly to the root of the plant. 
The use of cloud seeding has also aided conservation efforts. Another 
plan was to use mediterranean water, which required a process of 
desalination. Desalination involves removing the impurities from 
seawater by using either heat or pressure.^^°*^ 
Each country developed independent alternatives in order to 
provide fresh water to their people, but this very expensive. It became 
clear to Israel and to Jordan that any solution they developed would be 
only a temporary answer to the water problems. In the beginning of the 
1990s, water for both countries became an object for cooperation.^^°^^ 
In addition to the need for cooperation around water, both Israel 
and Jordan have come to realize that water is an object that needs 
protection.^^°^^ However, this time it was not a protection from the 
enemy, but from pollution and other environmental disasters. 
Nevertheless, the two countries posses a different standard of living, 
which allows a different approach to the problem, Israel as a first world 
country, may concern itself with environmental issues and seek 
solution, while Jordan, as a developing country, does not have the 
ability to deal with such problem.^^°^^ As part of their new approach 
towards cooperation, Israel and Jordan to seek a peace settlement. 
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which would include water agreements and would take in to 
consideration the relative economic ability of each country. 
On October 26,1994, the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Israel 
signed a peace treaty. This peace agreement put an end to the state of 
war which had lasted for almost 50 years between the two countries. 
Some specific articles of the agreement deal with the Jordan River. 
Israel and Jordan agreed to share the river. Both countries will create 
storage facilities to hold excess water from rain floods as well as build 
dams for river flow management. The parties agreed to provide water 
to one another. In terms of environmental conservation, Jordan and 
Israel are obligated to protect the river from pollution, contamination, or 
industrial disposal. Furthermore, according to the treaty, the countries 
will establish a joint water committee to oversee issues regarding the 
quality of the water. ^^ °^ ^ 
In these ways the 1994 agreement is doubly powerful in terms of 
water saving and environment protection as it ensures the supply of 
quality fresh water to both parties. According to Israeli news in 1997, 
Israel is ready to transfer 75 million cubic meters of high quality water 
to Jordan within the next three years. However, this treaty is only the 
beginning of a wider regional agreement which will need to include 
Syria and Lebanon. These countries, which are still in a state of war 
with Israel, struggle for the control over the Hasbani River and the 
Golan Heights rivers that are part of the tributaries to the Jordan River. 
Death of King Hussein 
In July 1998 King Hussein began to undergo treatment in the 
USA for lymphatic cancer. In August the King issued a royal decree, 
which transferred responsibility for certain executive duties, including 
the appointment of ministers, to his brother. Crown Prince Hassan. On 
King Hussein's return to Jordan on 19 January 1999, amid considerable 
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public celebration and government assurances that his death had been 
restored, the King prompted renewed speculation about the royal 
succession by appointing Crown Prince Hassan as his 'deputy'. On 24 
January King Hussein issued a royal decree naming his eldest son, 
Abdullah, as Crown Prince of Jordan. Some sections of the US press 
suggested that the Clinton administration had encouraged the 
replacement of Hassan as Crown Prince, owing to his perceived 
hostility towards the Palestinian negotiators and willingness to ally 
himself to the extremist Muslim Brotherhood. 
On 26 January 1999 King Hussein left Jordan for emergency 
treatment in the USA, following a rapid deterioration in his health. 
However, King Hussein returned to Amman on 5 February, and was 
pronounced dead on 7 February. The Jordanian public had been given 
little accurate information about the King's condition by the official 
media, and were genuinely shocked by the news of his death. King 
Hussein had been the Middle East's longest-serving ruler, controlling 
the fortunes of Jordan for the greater part of its modern history. The 
funeral of King Hussein, held in Amman on 8 February, was attended 
by more than 50 heads of state or government, including US President 
Clinton (accompanied by three former US Presidents), the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Syria's President Hafez Assad.^^°^' 
King Abdullah takes Control 
A few hours after King Hussein's death, on 7 February 1999 the 
Newly-appointed Crown Prince was sworn in as King Abdullah Ibn al-
Hussein of Jordan. After formal education in the United Kingdom and 
the USA, Abdullah had embarked on a distinguished military career, 
becoming Commander of Special Forces with the rank of major 
general. Abdullah is reported to have good relations with younger 
members of the ruling families of the Gulf States, as well as useful 
contacts within the US political establishment. Soon after his father's 
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death, the new King made a televised address to the nation, appealing 
for Jordanian unity and pledging to continue his father's policies. He 
subsequently named his brother, and the youngest son of King 
Hussein, Prince Hamzeh Ibn al-Hussein, as the new Crown Prince of 
Jordan in accordance with the wishes of the Late King Hussein. 
Before the official 40-day period of mourning for King Hussein 
had ended, the new King made a number of Key changes at the Royal 
Palace and in the military high command and also appointed a new 
Government. On 21 March King Abdullah issued a royal decree naming 
his wife, Rania, the Queen of Jordan.^^^°^ 
On 4 March 1999 King Abdullah appointed a new 24-member 
Cabinet, with Abd ar- Rouf ar-Rawabdeh replacing Fayez at-Tarawneh 
as Prime Minister. Ar-Rawabdeh's Cabinet contained eight Minister 
from the outgoing administration, including the three Key portfolios of 
the interior, finance and foreign affairs. In his letter of appointment to 
the new Prime Minister, King Abdullah prescribed 'fundamental 
reforms', including the strengthening of the rule of law and further 
democratization; he also called on ar-Rawabdeh to address the serious 
problems of poverty and unemployment in Jordan, and to encourage 
investment. In his policy statement to the National Assembly, ar-
Rawabdeh acknowledged that Jordan had entered a period of 
recession, and stated that his aim was to accelerate the 
implementation of economic reforms and to eradicate corrupt practices. 
After his accession, King Abdullah immediately made efforts to 
strengthen relations with the Arab world as well as relations with the 
USA and Western Countries. King Abdullah also assured Israel that he 
was committed his father's support for the Middle East peace process. 
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Chapter- 6 
CONCLUSION 
Jordan is an ancient land which happens to be the home to some of the earliest human settlements and farming villages. It stands at the juncture of Asia, Africa and 
Europe and as such forms the hub of near east; the cross worlds of the 
ancient world, where human beings first organised themselves into 
communities, cities and eventually civilization. The Hashemite of 
Jordan (a/ Mamlakah al Urduniyah al Hashimiyah), is the official name 
which was adopted after 1950 annexation of Arab Palestine, west of 
the Jordan River to the Kingdom of Transjordan. The term 'Jordan' is 
derived from the Arabic world Ardan, Urduun or Al Urdun which means 
descender. The State of Transjordan was created in 1921 which was 
also addressed, as Outer Jordan, Urdon or Sharq al Urdun. This area 
was never an independent and separate entity historically, therefore a 
variety of names exist as a matter of political and diplomatic 
convenience. 
The area provided safe trade routes and therefore had strategic 
importance for invaders. Its long chequered history bears testimony to 
it being occupied by the Hebrews, Assyrians, Chalderns, Persians, 
Nabateans, Arabs, Greeks, Romans, Muslim Arabs and Ottoman Turks. 
On the west, Jordan is bordered by Israel, the north by Syria, the east 
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by Iraq and the south east by Saudi Arabia. It is almost a land locked 
country except for a 16 mile coastline on the Red Sea the focus of 
which is the Port of Aqaba. As to size, the East Bank is 35,000 square 
miles. 
Topographically nearly 7/8 of total area is desert, located east of 
Hejaz Railway. Deep north south geological rift forms Jordan River 
valley, Dead Sea and Wadi Arbah depression divides the country into 
two regions-West Bank with fertile hills and valleys in Samaria and 
Western Jordan, East Bank with dry rocky desert. 
The principal official language is Arabic. English is the most 
popular foreign language. A sizeable minority speaks Armaic, Cherkess 
and Armenian. Arabic is both popular and cementing languages of 
Jordan, for a country with domestic policy goals of social integration 
and development of a national consciousness. This unifying factor of 
common language has a far reaching significance. 
Islam is the official religion of the state. It is based on the 
monotheistic dogma as per the teachings of Mohammad (PBUH) who 
lived in Hejaz in western Arabia. Islam has worked as the thread that 
binds all parts of Jordan together. 
Transjordan's creation reflected in large measure a compromise 
settlement by the Allied Powers after World War I that attempted to 
reconcile Zionist and Arab aspirations in the area. Britain assumed a 
mandate over Palestine and Iraq, while France became the mandatory 
power for Syria and Lebanon. In a British government memorandum of 
1922, approved by the League of Nations Council, Jewish settlement in 
Transjordan was specifically excluded. 
As Transjordan moved toward nationhood, Britain gradually 
relinquished control, limiting its oversight to financial and foreign policy 
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matters. In March 1946, under the Treaty of London, Transjordan 
became a kingdom and a new constitution replaced the 1928 Organic 
Law. Britain continued to subsidize the Arab Legion, a military force 
established in 1923. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Arab Legion 
gained control for Transjordan of the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem. The war added about 450,000 Palestinian Arab refugees as 
well as approximately 450,000 West Bank Arabs to the roughly 340,000 
East Bank. Arabs in Jordan. In December 1948, Abdullah took the title 
King of Jordan, and he officially changed the country's name to the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949. The following year he 
annexed the West Bank. 
Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem in July 1951. Abdullah's 
son, Talal, who was in ill health, briefly succeeded to the throne before 
being obliged to abdicate in favor of his son, Hussein, in 1952. 
Hussein, who had been studying in Britain, could not legally be 
crowned until he was eighteen; in the interim he attended the British 
Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and returned to Jordan in 1953 to 
become king. 
The survival of Hussein as King of Jordan represents one of the 
longest rules in the Arab world, thirty-seven years. King Hussein's 
survival has entailed a keen sense of what is politically possible; 
moving cautiously and seeking to build consensus, he has exercised 
skillful diplomacy, both domestically and regionally. For King Hussein 
survival has involved achieving a balance between more liberal 
Palestinians and more traditionally oriented Transjordanians, 
particularly the loyal beduin tribes of the East Bank, 
The creation of Israel has affected Jordan most because Jordan 
shares longest borders with it. Like other Arab countries, Jordan rated 
the emergence of Israel a dominant power determental to its peace and 
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security and as a loss of its prestige and glory. This has been the 
single core factor to plunge the Arab politics into disarray and 
quandary. During the cold war phenomena, Jordan remained a pushpin 
game in the hands of the East and the West, who did not fight direct 
war in the West Asian region but maintained status quo. The interests 
remained confined to the supply of arms, military training and economic 
aid so that the countries of the region remained dependent upon them 
to a greater or lesser extent. Jordan was a beneficiary of western aid, 
overtly or covertly and since 1967, offers of active military support got 
accelerated. One aspect of containment policy was also to maintain a 
chain of pro-western governments including that of Jordan also. King 
Hussein deliberately perpetuated Jordan's alignment with the United 
States due to imperative factors of its internal instability as well as 
harsh acrimony and criticisms led by the anti-Western Arab countries. 
The advantage that Jordan gained out of this tilt was marginal because 
US policy grew increasingly weighted in favour of Israel. Jordan more 
or less kept on adjusting to new developments and US policies in 
response to meet new challenges and development. 
There is a close association between Palestine and Jordan. They 
are linked with historical, cultural and economic bonds. The partnership 
with the Palestinians desired by King Hussein fell apart in September, 
1970. The pervasive and chaotic presence of armed Palestinian 
Fedayeen groups who expected immunity from Jordan's laws was 
leading to a state of virtual anarchy throughout the Kingdom. Moderate 
Palestinian leaders were unable to reign in extremist elements, who 
ambushed the King's motorcade twice and perpetrated a series of 
spectacular hijackings. The situation prompted different reactions 
throughout the Arab world. While most leaders privately expressed 
sympathy with the position of King Hussein many took a public stance 
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in favor of the Fedayeen in order to embellish their credentials as "Arab 
Nationalists". 
Following the events of 1970-71, domestic policy aimed 
principally at promoting national unity among the Jordanian population. 
This desired unity was considered the ultimate guarantee for the 
survival and security of Jordan. Once achieved, Jordan could be trans 
formed into a model Arab State by opening the way for a full return to 
democracy. For the moment, however, matter of security and order 
remained the immediate concern of the regime. 
Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at an Arab Summit 
conference held in Rabat, Morocco in 1974, King Hussein agreed, 
along with all the other Arab leaders to a summit declaration 
recognizing the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole. 
Legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Consequently, 
responsibility for negotiating the return of the occupied Palestinian 
lands was transferred from Jordan to the PLO. 
Following the Rabat Summit the PLO scored an impressive 
political victory in the international arena. In late November 1974, the 
UN recognized PLO representation of the Palestinian people, and PLO 
Chairman Yasir Arafat addressed the General Assemble in Arabic, his 
pistol at his side. In addition, in a joint communique issued the same 
month. President Gerald R. Ford of the United states and General 
Secretary of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhev 
acknowledged the "legitimate interests" of the Palestinians in 
accordance with the UN resolutions. Nonetheless, a UN draft resolution 
in 1976 Proposing to reaffirm the right of the Palestinians to self-
determination and including the right to establish an independent state 
was acceptable definition of Palestinian interests." 
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After the Rabat Summit, King Hussein stressed the need for 
Jordanian political self-sufficiency. He told his subjects that a new 
reality exists and Jordan must adjust to it. The West Bank in no longer 
Jordanian. "But having surrendered title to half his kingdom at the 
behest of the Arab states, Hussein confessed that the East bank might 
become a substitute Palestine swallowed up as the balance of 
Palestinians in the East Bank changed markedly following the Rabat 
Summit. He advised that the resident Palestinians must choose 
between Jordanian citizenship or Palestine identity. No attempt would 
be made to oust those who chose the latter, he said the they would be 
permitted to remain in Jordan as " guests." He also insisted that any 
Palestinian choosing to Keep his Jordanian citizenship must be allowed 
to do so without endangering his rights in the West Bank; he further 
promised that any Palestinian living in the East Bank who chose to 
identify his interests with those of the Palestinian people could do so 
without jeopardizing his rights as a Jordanian citizen. 
In response to the new political situation following the Rabat 
summit Hussein reorganized Jordan's political and administrative 
institutions. On November 9, he amended the Constitution to give the 
King authority to dissolve the House of Representatives (also called the 
Chamber of Deputies) and to delay elections as he saw fit. Using this 
constitutional prerogative, Hussein dissolved the lower house of the 
National Assembly- the elected House of Representatives when it had 
completed its work on November 23. The House of Representatives, 
half of whose sixty members represented West Bank constituencies 
could no longer function without undermining the newly recognized 
representative status of the PLO. The Constitution was amended to 
provide for the indefinite postponement of election s for new House of 
Representatives so as to avoid elections on the East Bank alone, which 
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if held would have symbolized the final separation of the West Bank 
from Jordan. In addition to dissolving the House of Representatives, 
Hussein directed Prime Minister Zaid ar Rifai to form a new government 
that did not include Palestinians from the West Bank. No Move was 
made however, to relieve Palestinians in the Jordanian army, where 
they composed one- third of the officer corps, albeit mostly in 
noncombatant functions the government also continued to pay the 
salaries of 6,000 civil servants and teachers in the west Bank, which 
amounted to about US $40 million a year. 
The October 1973 War, in which Jordan was not a direct 
participant brought Jordan and the United States much closer in the 
peace process that began after the conflict. Jordan Joined with the 
United States in support of UN Security Council Resolution 338. This 
resolution called on the parties involved in the October 1973 War to 
cease their hostilities and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 
242 of 1967 providing for a peace based on Israeli withdrawal from 
occupied territories. His expectations were buoyed by Washington's 
success in negotiating disengagement and limited withdrawal of forces 
agreement between Egypt and Israel and Syria and Israel. 
The failure of the United States during 1974 to persuade Israel to 
pull back its forces from part of the West Bank as an initial step 
towards a peace agreement with Jordan disillusioned King Hussein with 
respect to the ability of the Americans to pressure Israel on the issue of 
withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territories. Although he 
continued to value Washington reaffirmations of support for Jordan 
security and economic progress, King Hussein became increasingly 
skeptical of American assurances that the West Bank would return to 
Arab hands. Consequently, he refrained from participation in the Camp 
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David process, which he was convinced would used by Israel to 
Perpetuate its control of the West Bank. 
Jordan's commitment to the realization of Palestinian aspirations 
was further exemplified in its reaction to the Camp David Accords of 
1978. The Treaty between Egypt and Israel shattered the chances for a 
just and comprehensive settlement of the conflict, as it neighter required 
the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories (excluding the Sinai) nor 
asserted Arab sovereignty over them. Along with most Arab leaders, King 
Hussein rejected the treaty as destabilizing to the region. 
Through out the 1980's the Jordanian monarch worked tireless to 
end the Israeli occupation of West Bank and Gaza Strip. King Hussein 
accepted that political developments since 1974 made it impossible to 
ignore the PLO in any peace negotiation. Thus, one of his policy aims vis-
a-vis the United States became to convince Washington to deal-at least 
unofficially-with the PLO. From the end of 1982 until the end of 1988, King 
Hussein served as an intermediary between the United States and the 
PLO, attempting to get both parties to make the kind of political 
concessions that were necessary before a dialogue could be initiated. 
Jordan has stressed its support of the Arab cause in general, 
and its relations with most of the Arab states have been cordial, 
particularly relations with Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 
Hussein had advocated Egypt's reintegration into the Arab family of 
nations as early as 1981 and was one of the first Arab states to 
reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt, doing so in 1984; Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, also having hereditary royal families, were the 
major contributors of financial aid to Jordan, in accordance with 
resolutions reached at Arab summit conferences. 
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In July 1988, King Hussein announced the cessation of a $1.3 
billion development program for the West Bank, explaining that the 
measure was designed to allow the PLO more responsibility for the 
area. Following this decision, the King formally dissolved Parliament, 
ending West Bank representation in the legislature. And severed all 
administrative and legal ties with the occupied West Bank. Accordingly, 
electoral districts were redrawn to represent East Bank constituencies 
only. This disengagement decision marks the turning point that 
launched the current democratic process, and began a new stage in 
Jordan's relationship with West Bank Palestinians. 
Following Jordan's complete disengagement from the West Bank, 
the country could now fully concentrate on the need to develop viable 
and democratic political institutions in line with the aspirations of the 
Jordanian populace. Thus from the late eighties Jordan withnessed an 
effervescence of democratic political activity, the likes of which has not 
been seen in the past three decades. 
In 1989, political reform began with parliamentary elections that 
were hailed internationally as among the freest ever held in the Middle 
East. A caretaker government headed by Sharif (Now his late Highness 
Prince) Zeid bin Shaker was entrusted to supervise democratic 
elections for Jordan's House of Deputies, thereby strengthening the 
process of political reform. Censorship was duly lifted and candidates 
for the lower house began to campaign independently albeit under the 
banners of different ideological persuasions. Jordanian went to the 
polls on November 8, 1989, in the first general elections in twenty-two 
years. The fairness of the elections was acknowledged internationally 
and domestically by both winners and losers alike, and King Hussein 
was given credit for the measures he had taken to secure the return of 
democracy to Jordan. The electoral guidelines allowed all citizens over 
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age nineteen the right to vote. Jordanian women were allowed to vote, 
having first gained the franchise in 1974, and were also entitled to seek 
office. Although the ban on political parties effected in 1957, remained 
on the books, candidates ranged ideologically from the extreme left to 
the extreme right. Most of these independent candidates formed 
loosely organized blocs according to political inclinations. 
More than 640 candidates, including 12 women, competed for 
seats in the lower house, which was expanded, form 60 to 80 
members. For the first time in the country's history, the entire spectrum 
of Jordanian society participated in the legislative branch of 
government At the election, in which 63% of the total electorate 
(including, for the first time, women) of 877.475 voted the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) won 20 seats, while independent Islamic candidates 
who supported the Muslim Brotherhood, won a further 14 seats. It was 
estimated that Palestinian or Arab nationalist candidates won seven 
seats and that candidates who were supporters of 'leftist' political 
groupings won four seats. The remaining seats were won by 
candidates who were broadly considered to be supporters of the 
Government, In order to place Jordan's progress to democracy on a 
stable foundation, a 60-member royal commission was appointed by 
King Hussein in April 1990 with the aim of drafting guidelines for the 
conduct of party activity in Jordan. The commission comprised 
members representing all the political groups in the country, and it 
produced a written consensus in the form of the National Charter. The 
Charter was adopted in June 1991 at a national conference of two 
thousands leading Jordanians. 
The National Charter outlines general guidelines for constructive 
dialogue between the executive and legislative organs, as well as 
between decision-makers and political and intellectual elites 
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concerning questions of authority, rights and responsibility. It 
enunciates the terms under which political parties can operate namely, 
within the framework of the Constitution and free of foreign funding and 
also emphasizes broad agreement on the need for political reflection 
on Jordan's cultural pluralism. Perhaps most importantly, the Charter 
has given Jordanian leaders a sense of direction, an insurance policy 
against outbidding by unrestrained groups, and a degree of 
predictability in political affairs. It has also eased concerns about the 
consequences of unbridled freedom of expression. The National 
Charter, along with the Jordanian Constitution, provides a compass for 
the national debate on fundamental issues. 
It also guarantee the protection of human rights and offered an 
indigenous model of democratic pluralism based on the only true 
guarantors of stability: public participation and collective responsibility. 
Freedom of the press, one of the cornerstones of democracy, was 
enhanced with the enactment of new legislation on press and 
publications. In the area of human rights, the government repealed 
martial law, which had been enforced in the aftermath of the 1967 war. 
The government also encouraged the stationing of several international 
and regional human rights organizations in Jordan, and ratified a 
number of treaties on human rights 
In June 1992 an extraordinary session of the House of 
Representatives was convened ia order to debate new laws regarding 
political parties and the press. In early July the House adopted new 
legislation whereby, subject to certain conditions, political parties were 
formally legalized, in preparation for the country's first multi-party 
election since 1956, which were to be held before November 1993. The 
new legislation was approved by royal decree at the end of August and 
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by March 1993 nine political parties had received the Government's 
formal approval of their activities. 
At the beginning of August 1993 King Hussein unexpectedly 
dissolved the House of Representatives, provoking criticism from some 
politicians who had expected the House to debate proposed changes to 
the country's electoral law and changes in voting procedures at the 
general election, which was subsequently announced by the King in 
mid-August. Voters were to be allowed to cast one vote only, rather 
than a number equal to that of the number of candidates contesting a 
given constituency, as before. After the announcement of the Israeli-
PLO accord in September 1993 King Hussein appeared to be unsure 
whether or not to proceed with the elections, fearing that they might be 
dominated by the debate about the peace process. Eventually the King 
decided to hold the elections as planned in November 1993. The 
election campaign went smoothly and peacefully. Some 820,000 
Jordanians (52% of eligible voters and 68% of registered voters) cast 
their ballots in the 20 electoral districts. However, the independent New 
Jordan Research Centre estimated that 70% of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin abstained. This low level of participation was 
attributed to the fact that Jordanians of Palestinian origin did not feel 
part of the Jordanian political system and also that the prevailing 
system of electoral districts favoured areas dominated by East 
Bankers. 
In all, some 534 candidates contested the election and one-half 
of the 20 registered political parties fielded candidates. The majority of 
candidates, however, stood as independents. The political parties, 
which had been legal for less than a year, had little time to organize 
mass public support. Domestic issues, such as unemployment, were 
the main issues in the electoral campaign, with traditionalist candidates 
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focusing on local Issues and promising to improve the provision of 
public services in their constituencies. Of the 80 deputies returned, 45 
were independents. With the traditions of tribalism deeply rooted in the 
customs of the country, they won largely because of their tribal 
affiliations and personal influence. 
The Islamic Action Front (lAF), an alliance between the MB and 
other Islamist groups, won 16 seats, the largest number of any political 
party, but six fewer than in the 1989 elections. This reversal was 
largely thought to result from the new electoral law, which embodied 
the one-man one-vote principle. Indeed, the new law was widely 
interpreted as an attempt to weaken the lAF. Others felt that the 
Islamists had misjudged the mood of the country and had not devoted 
enough attention in their campaign to basic issues related to the impact 
of the economic recession on the lives of ordinary Jordanians. Of the 
other political parties, leftists and Arab nationalists won eight seats 
while five conservative and right-of-centre parties claimed a total of 14 
seats. Only 14 of the 80 new deputies were of Palestinian origin. 
Among the new deputies was the first woman to be elected to the 
Assembly, Toujan al-Faisal, who won one of the seats reserved for the 
Circassian minority. 
Soon after the election a number of political groupings were 
formed in addition to the lAF. The Progressive Democratic Coalition, 
consisting of Liberal deputies and leftist and Arab nationalists, claimed 
the support of 22 deputies; the National Action Front (NAF) and the 
Jordan Action Front (JAF), both groupings of conservative parties and 
their allies, claimed 18 and 9 seats respectively. The lAF remained the 
largest single political organization in the country. Some deputies saw 
the emergence of Parliamentary blocs as the first step in a move 
towards the formation of larger political parties. 
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In another move towards democratization, in March 1994 the 
National Assembly approved legislation to allow municipal elections in 
Greater Amman, where some two-fifths of the country's population 
were living. The Government, no doubt concerned about the strength of 
Palestinian and Islamist opposition in the capital, had originally 
proposed that only one-half of the municipal council should be elected, 
but this was increased to two-thirds by the National Assembly. The 
remaining third of he council, together with the mayor, were to continue 
to be appointed by the Government. 
In early January 1995 there was a further extensive 
reorganization of the Government, following the dismissal of al-Majali 
as Prime Minister. Two new political blocs emerged in the National 
Assembly in early 1995. The Independent National Action Front (INAF), 
with 17 deputies, was formed by a merger of the NAF and the bloc of 
independent deputies in the Assembly. The former Speaker of the 
National Assembly, Taher al-Masri, formed a second new grouping of 
some 15 liberal and independent Islamist deputies. 
In municipal elections held nationwide for the first time in July 
1995 Islamic and left-wing groups failed to gain significant popular 
support, most elected candidates being largely pro-government or 
independent. 
At the beginning of February 1996 King Hussein appointed the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd al-Karim Kabariti as Prime Minister. 
King Hussein was believed to have clashed with his predecessor, 
Sharif Zaid Ibn Shaker, on the pace of normalization with Israel and the 
severing of ties with Iraq. Kabariti's appointment was followed by the 
most radical reshuffle of the Government for many years. He appointed 
a new Cabinet in which the majority of ministers took office for the first 
time. Twenty-two of the 31 members, including the Minister of the 
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Interior, were deputies in the House of Representatives, strengthening 
the new administration's democratic credentials. 
In May 1997, following increasing media criticism of a number of 
government policies, a number of amendments were made to 
legislation governing the press prompting strong protests from editors, 
journalists, professional associations and opposition groups. The 
amendments include a considerable increase in the minimum capital 
that weekly journals were required to raise as a precondition for 
publishing, an extension of the range of prohibited subjects to include 
the armed forces and the security services, and a substantial rise in the 
fines that could be levied for contravening the press legislation. 
Opposition activists feared that these measure represented the return 
of closer state control over the press. Also in May 1997 nine centrist 
parties, announced that they had united to form the National 
Constitutional Party (NCP), which became the country's largest political 
grouping. The formation of the NCP together with the establishment in 
1996 of the Unionist Arab Democratic Party (a coalition of three leftist 
parties), reduced the total number of political parties from 24 to 14. 
In July 1997 the MB declared that it would boycott the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections, which, King Hussein had 
announced, were to proceed in November, as scheduled. This decision, 
which was opposed by some prominent members of the movement, 
appeared to reflect growing disillusionment with the role of the National 
Assembly, which was perceived to have little or no influence over 
important political and economic decisions in the country. After 
intensive discussions, the lAF endorsed the MB's decision by a large 
majority. In the two months prior to the elections, discussions between 
the Government and the opposition parties failed to achieve any 
significant progress. The lAF, together with nine smaller leftist and 
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nationalist parties, had in particular, demanded changes in the electoral 
legislation, arguing that the existing one man, one vote system 
favoured candidates with strong tribal affiliations over those 
representing 'ideological' parties; However, King Hussein and al-Majali 
refused to make any concessions. In September the Government 
suspended some 13 weekly newspapers for three months (effectively 
during the electoral period) for failing to comply with the amendments 
to the press regulations that had been introduced in May. 
The elections on 4 November 1997, which were boycotted by 
many parties, professional associations and respected political figures, 
attracted little popular enthusiasm. It was estimated that a mere 55% of 
the registered electorate participated, with a voter turn-out of only 26% 
in parts of Amman. There were widespread allegations of electoral 
malpractice, and in a number of regions the security forces were 
obliged to intervene to suppress clashes between rival candidates and 
their supporters Deputies with tribal affiliations dominated the new 
parliament. 
In January 1998 the High Court ruled that the amendments to the 
press regulations introduced in May 1997 were unconstitutional and 
that actions taken by the Government under the amendments 
consequently had no validity. The authorities reluctantly agreed to 
accept the ruling, and a number of newspapers that had been banned 
resumed publishing in March. 
The inception of modernization and spread by modern education 
have played Key role in modifying women's role and changing their 
status in Jordan. Throughout the nineteenth century and in the early 
decades of twentieth century individual and collective efforts were 
being made to universalize female education and to make women 
conscious of their rights. It is worthy to be noted that in every epoch 
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the freedom of women had remained a subject of heated discussion 
between the conservative and liberal circles, thus hampering considerably 
any attempt to achieve the desired goal of equality of status speedily. The 
effect of education and employment gave Jordanian women a wider 
perspective and created desires which traditional seclusion could not 
satisfy. Emancipation has led to the organization of hundreds of women's 
clubs and societies. Some of these seek to expand women's rights and 
to promote their welfare in modern times. Others have charitable, 
philanthropic, and educational functions. Many are affiliated with 
international women's groups. Gradually, women have also acquired 
political rights (i.e. right to vote and be elected). The first women 
minister was appointed in Jordan in 1984. 
Jordan's democratic renaissance has had a deep impact in so far 
as empowerment of women is concerned. In Jordan, number of women 
work in government offices, schools, medical clinics, hospitals and 
even in business enterprises. As area where women have made strong 
headway has been in the professions. There are substantial number of 
professional women in Jordan, and they are able to achieve top 
positions remarkably quickly. There are women pilots, women Judges, 
women Deans, women T.V. producers, radio announcers, computer 
scientists, journalists and economists throughout the Kingdom. There is 
no doubt that women's aspirations, demands, and success will 
transform Jordan profoundly and permanently. 
According to the Jordanian Constitution, all Jordanians are equal 
before the law, have the right to assume public office and the right to 
work. Women were also given the right to vote and the right to run for 
general elections since 1974. In addition, the government of Jordan 
signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
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Women (CEDAW) in December 1980, which was ratified by parliament 
in 1992. 
The economy of Jordan since past three decades has been 
dominated by dislocations and uncertainties stemming from the Arab 
conflict with Israel. It created demographic problems as the new 
settlers were from totally different backgrounds and there was different 
outlook from the traditional semi nomadic East Bankers. On account of 
the 1967 Arab Israel war, the society was strained by a further 3.5 
percent increase in population, rapid urbanization, scarce water 
resources and the frustration of the unemployed. Agriculture production 
Is insufficient to feed the population and large quantities of food stuffs 
have to be imported. Between 1968 and 1970, Palestinian guerilla 
forays against Israel and the latter's military action caused the 
developing agriculture of Jordan valley to decrease for a while. The 
1970-71 civil war added to the economic woes. Since 1975, phosphate 
export rose dramatically and new irrigation projects were launched. The 
major theme during this period has been free enterprise, commerce 
and industry thereby necessitating infrastructure, growth of roads, 
ports, telephone and telex and other communication facilities as well as 
protection legislation promoting industry and direct investment. 
The state has played an important role in industrial financing 
since the mid 50's though the economy is essentially based on free 
enterprise. The state is a partner of a private enterprise in the 
operation of a number of the country's leading industries. Its role is 
regulatory and promotional. It provides institutional structure and 
financial support necessary to stimulate economic and social 
development. The Government adopted a Five Year Plan for Economic 
Development, 1962-67. Industrial development is limited by a lack of 
commercial deposits of metallic minerals, insufficient skilled labour, a 
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restricted labour market and a deficient hydro electric power and fuels 
such as coal and petroleum. The Government did encourage industry 
with tax exemption and financial aid. It also instituted programmes 
favoring industrialization and showed its concern for the promotion of 
private industrial investment. 
Jordan's relatively small population of fewer than 3 million 
persons in 1987 resulted in a limited domestic market unable to 
achieve economies of scale; thus, Jordan needed to develop export 
markets. Apart from its labor force, which the government actively 
encouraged to seek work abroad in view of scanty domestic 
employment opportunities, Jordan's principal natural resource 
consisted of phosphates--it was the world's third largest phosphates 
producer-and potash. It also was actively engaged in a search for oil 
and gas; small amounts of both had been discovered. These extractive 
industries, however, required large capital investments beyond the 
capability of Jordan's private sector. In consequence, the government 
not only played the key role in development planning but also became 
a major economic participant, ultimately sharing in forty semipublic 
companies, contrary to its avowed advocacy of free enterprise. In 
addition, Jordan benefited from the Civil War in Lebanon that began in 
1975 and the war's troubled aftermath, which heightened Jordan's role 
as a provider of banking, insurance, and professional services formerly 
supplied by Lebanon. 
Jordan's long-term plans called for economic self-sufficiency, 
and the king's brother, Crown Prince Hasan, and the Jordan 
Technology Group that he founded in 1988 were key elements in 
Jordan's economic endeavors. The surface prosperity of the early 
1980s, however, was ended by the downturn of oil prices in the late 
1980s, the resulting return home from the Persian Gulf of thousands of 
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Jordanian workers, the decrease in Arab subsidies to Jordan (from 
more than US$1 billion in 1981 to about US$400 million in 1990), and 
Jordan's increasing debt (estimated in early 1990 at between US$6 and 
US$8 billion). Austerity was reflected in the 1988-89 devaluation of the 
dinar, the freezing of the exchange rate, and increased import duties 
on luxury goods. These measures, combined with the reduction of 
subsidies on many basic commodities to comply with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements led to riots by East Bankers and 
Bedouins in several towns in late 1989. Jordan had been obliged to 
reduce subsidies as part of an economic stabilization program so as to 
qualify for a US$79.3 million IMF credit. IMF loan endorsement was a 
precondition for Jordan's rescheduling payment on many of its 
outstanding loans and obtaining new loans of more than US$300 
million from the World Bank, Japan, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (West Germany). Furthermore, Jordan was sharply affected 
by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988; during the war, because of its 
good transportation facilities, especially between the port of Al Aqabah 
and Amman, Jordan served as the primary transshipment point for 
goods destined for Iraq. 
The development of service industries, of industries involving 
import substitution, and of export industries, such as industrial 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals that required technical expertise, was 
an economic necessity for Jordan because its agricultural potential was 
very limited-the greater part of the country is desert. Moreover, Jordan 
was facing a water shortage in the near future. With a population 
estimated to be growing by at least 3.6 percent per year, plus 
expanded industrial use of water, some experts estimated that the 
demand for water could outstrip supply by the early 1990s. Jordan's 
attempt to stimulate exports was a major factor in its formation in early 
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1989 of the Arab Cooperation Council, consisting of Jordan, Egypt, 
Iraq, and the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen), with headquarters 
in Amman. This regional arrangement, however, promised relatively 
little economic advantage because the participants tended to produce 
similar goods. In spite of all of its efforts, Jordan continued to rely 
heavily on foreign aid, which in the 1980s constituted between 30 and 
40 percent annually of government revenue before borrowing. 
Economic reasons thus shaped not only Jordan's domestic 
development and employment policies--the government was the largest 
single employer, accounting for more than 40 percent of the work force-
but also its foreign policy because of Jordan's dependence on foreign aid. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 found Jordan 
itself in a difficult situation, hard pressed both economically and 
politically. The enforcement of austerity measures in accordance with 
IMF loan requirements had improved Jordan's balance of payments 
position, but because of the decrease in the transit trade across Jordan 
to Iraq after the Iran-Iraq War ended and the return of Jordanian 
workers from the Persian Gulf states resulting from the downturn of oil 
prices, Jordanian unemployment had increased to between 15 and 20 
percent. Economic austerity measures had widened the gap between 
the "haves" and the "have no" and had caused discontent among 
elements of the population traditionally loyal to the monarchy: the 
Bedouins and the East Bankers. 
Regionally, Jordan found itself between Scylla and Charybdis. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United States 
response in sending forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf and 
encouraging UN economic sanctions against Iraq put Jordan in a 
quandary. In accordance with the UN resolution, it closed the port of Al 
Aqaba to Iraq, and Hussein announced that Jordan refused to 
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recognize Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. But Jordan expressed 
reservations concerning the Arab League resolution to endorse the 
sending of an Arab force to Saudi Arabia. 
King Hussein saw his role as that of an active mediator between 
Saddam Husayn and both the other Arab states and the West. Between 
August 1990 and late January 1991, the King held countless meetings 
with Western and Arab world leaders, including President Bush in mid-
August. Initially, Hussein sought to promote an "Arab solution" to the 
Gulf crisis. Disappointed at the failure of this effort, he pursued an 
"Islamic solution" involving Islamic states outside the Arab world, and 
after the war began on January 16 he strove to end the conflict. This 
policy resulted from a number of factors. The King shared the view of 
the majority Palestinian element of Jordan's population that the West, 
led by the United States, was using a double standard in denouncing 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to the point that it was willing to go to war, 
while ignoring Palestinian grievances over Israel's occupation policies 
in the West Bank. This stance made the King popular with Palestinians, 
as did permission for the September holding of a pro-Iraqi conference 
by Jordanians and representatives of several major PLO groups, 
Yasser Arafat's August endorsement of Saddam Husayn had, however, 
created a rift in the PLO as well as cut off Saudi financial assistance to 
the PLO. Hussein also had a longstanding fear that Israel planned to 
make Jordan the substitute Palestinian state-this aim had been stated 
on numerous occasions by prominent members of Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Bloc- -thus leading to the downfall of the 
Hashimite monarchy. The Gulf crisis was seen as a focus that would 
divert attention from the Israeli-Palestinian question and allow Israel 
greater latitude to pursue such a course of action. Both of these 
elements were reflected in the king's request to Jordanian 
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parliamentarians in August to refer to him as "Sharif" Hussein, 
demonstrating the king's view that the Gulf crisis represented a conflict 
between the Arab sovereignty and foreign domination similar to the 
situation that his great grandfather, Sharif Hussein of Mecca, faced at 
British hands in 1925. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the king's seeking to 
reconcile the conflict was the economic consequence to Jordan of the 
crisis and the subsequent war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait created a 
stream of refugees, primarily Arab and Asian expatriate workers and 
their dependents, who had been living in Iraq and Kuwait. These 
persons entered Jordan at the rate of more than 10,000 per day, a total 
of more than 500,000 as of late September 1990. They required food 
and shelter before most could be repatriated. This influx further 
strained Jordan's economy, in part because promised Western financial 
contributions to help defer costs of the humanitarian enterprise were 
slow in arriving. For example, Jordan was obliged to ration subsidized 
foods such as rice, sugar, and powdered milk at the beginning of 
September. Meanwhile, the boycott of Iraq had a major impact on 
Jordan because Iraq had been Jordan's principal export market and its 
major source of cheap oil (providing almost 90 percent of Jordan's oil), 
whereas Kuwait had been Jordan's second largest market. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, which had provided substantial 
economic support to Jordan in the past, was so angered over Jordan's 
failure to back it in its dispute with Iraq that it cut off oil exports to 
Jordan and shortly afterward expelled twenty Jordanian diplomats. In 
turn, in early October Jordan closed its borders to trucks bound for 
Saudi Arabia and instituted fuel austerity conservation measures. The 
crisis also resulted in a dramatic drop in tourism income, a major 
component of Jordan's GDP. The situation caused Minister of Finance 
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Basil Jardanah in the latter half of September to estimate that Jordan 
would lose US$2.1 billion the first year of the boycott and would need 
US$1.5 billion (by January this figure had been revised to US$2 billion) 
in aid to avoid economic collapse. He made a strong plea for financial 
aid to the UN and the West in general; various Western nations and 
Japan promised loans. 
In early January, reflecting Jordan's concern over being caught 
between Iraq and Israel and the tension prevailing, Jordan mobilized its 
armed forces and transferred a number of troops from the east to the 
Jordan Valley, indicating that it considered the threat from Israel to be 
the more serious. As the deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait 
came on January 15, Jordan announced that it would protect its land 
and air borders against external aggression. 
Following the liberation of Kuwait by us forces. Middle East 
alignments have changed appreciably, and the fiction of Arab unity was 
destroyed. Jordan's position in the midst of this regional dilemma was 
rendered more precarious than it had been for many years. 
Sensing a "window of opportunity" following the liberation of 
Kuwait, the United States and the Russian Federation co-sponsored 
the Madrid Peace Conference in October, 1991. During the Madrid 
negotiations, Jordan extended an "umbrella to the Palestinian 
delegation, allowing them to negotiate with the Israelis directly for the 
first time. 
Almost two years later, on September 13, 1993, the PLO and 
Israel signed their Declaration of Principles (Oslo I), outlining a 
negotiating framework to be followed leading to a final status treaty 
between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. This opened the road for 
Jordan to proceed on its own negotiating track with Israel, and the 
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Jordan-Israel Common Agenda of negotiations was initialed one day 
after the PLO-lsrael Declaration of Principles. On July 25, 1994, King 
Hussein met with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin in the Rose Garden of 
the White House, where they signed the Washington Declaration, 
formally ending the 46-year state of war between Jordan and Israel. 
The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty was signed on October 26, 1994, 
at the southern border crossing of Wadi 'Araba. The treaty guaranteed 
Jordan the restoration of its occupied land (approximately 380 square 
kilometers), and guaranteed the Kingdom an equitable share of water 
from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Moreover, the treaty defined 
Jordan's western borders clearly and conclusively for the first time, 
putting an end to the dangerous Zionist suggestion that "Jordan is 
Palestine." 
Seeking to lay a firm foundation for a just, comprehensive and 
lasting peace, the treaty also outlined a number of areas in which 
negotiations would continue. To this end, Jordanian and Israeli 
negotiators have signed a series of protocols establishing a mutually 
beneficial framework of relations in fields such as trade, transportation, 
tourism, communications, energy, culture, science, navigation, the 
environment, health and agriculture, as well as cooperatory 
agreements for the Jordan Valley and the Aqaba-Eilat region. 
A comprehensive and just peace will allow the states of the 
Middle East to cooperate in confronting what may be the greatest 
regional challenge, the lack of water. In the sphere of economics, 
regional peace will help to boost investment, and greater trust and 
openness between states should allow for freer trade and more joint 
economic programs. Indeed, the world is moving towards free trade 
and Jordan's restructuring program is designed to take advantage of 
the country's geographic location by strengthening its export potential. 
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Although Jordan seeks to expand trade to areas outside the Middle 
East—namely the Far East, Europe and the United States—comprehensive 
peace is essential to its efforts to substantially increase its exports 
within the region. 
Jordan's support for peace is thus designed to bring about 
immediate and tangible dividends in the short term, while removing 
obstacles and "Ploughing the Field" for future regional development. 
Jordan's support for the peace process is thus a mixture of the two 
tracks of its foreign policy--maximizing the immediate interests of the 
state and promoting the long-term rejuvenation of the Arab World and 
the Middle East. 
Jordan has consistently followed a pro-Western foreign policy 
and traditionally has had close relations with the United States and the 
United Kingdom. These relations were damaged by support in Jordan 
for Iraq during the Gulf war. Although the Government of Jordan stated 
its opposition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, popular support for Iraq 
was driven by Jordan's Palestinian community, which favored Saddam 
as a champion against Western supporters of Israel. Publicly, Jordan 
continues to call for the lifting of UN sanctions against Iraq within the 
context of implementing UNSC resolutions. 
Since the end of the war, Jordan has largely restored its relations 
with Western countries through its participation in the Middle East 
peace process and enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq. 
No body in Jordan can deny the progress and prosperity that has 
taken place during the late King Hussein's reign. Throughout his long 
and eventual reign. King Hussein worked hard at building his country 
and raising the living standard of each and every Jordanian. Early on, 
King Hussein concentrated on building an economic and industrial 
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infrastructure that would compliment and enhance the advances he 
wanted to achieve in the quality of life of his people. 
On the human level, the number speak for King Hussein's 
achievements. While in 1950, water sanitation and electricity were 
available to only 10% of Jordanians, today these reach 99% of the 
population. In 1960 only 33% of Jordanians were literate, while by 
1996, this number had climbed to 90%. In 1961, the average Jordanian 
received a daily intake of 21 98 calories, and by 1992, this figure had 
increased by 37.5% to reach 3022 calories. UNICEF Statistics show 
that between 1981 and 1991, Jordan achieved the world's fastest 
annual rate of decline in infant mortality-from 70 deaths per 1000 births 
in 1981 to 37 per 1000 in 1991, a fall of over 47%. King Hussein always 
believed that Jordan's people are its biggest asset, and throughout his 
reign he encouraged all-including the less fortunate, the disabled and 
the orphaned-to achieve more for them selves and their country. King 
Hussein also struggled throughout his 47-year reign to promote peace 
in the Middle East. 
King Hussein died on February 7,1999 and was succeeded by 
King Abdullah. After his accession, King Abdullah immediately made 
efforts to strengthen relations with the Arab world as well as relations 
with the USA and Western countries. King Abdullah also assured that 
he was committed to continue his father's support for the Middle East 
peace process. The death of Hussein Bin Talal, the estimable King of 
Hashemite Jordan, is a deeply saddening event. He was a rare man in 
political life in that he was both rich in deeds and even richer in 
decency. King Hussein is no more, but the challenging legacy is an 
ideal vision for young King Abdullah. 
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GLOSSARY 
> Arab League 
Organization of Arab states, founded in 1945, works for common 
political and economic goals. 
> Arab Revolt 
The Arab uprising from 1916-1920 against the Ottoman Empire. 
> Cam David Accords 
Peace agreement reached between Israel and Egypt, the first 
between Israel and an Arab neighbor, signed March, 1979. Called 
for normalization of relations and return of the Sinai to Egypt. 
> Declaration Of Principles (DOP) 
Agreement signed September 13, 1993, between Israel and the 
P.L.O., affirming mutual recognition and legitimacy. The P.LO. 
agreed to end the intifada and terrorist activity and to amend its 
charter calling for the destruction of Israel. Israel agreed to grant 
the P.L.O. civil autonomy over the majority of Gaza and the West 
Bank. 
> Deportation 
The forced transport of people outside of the area where they live. 
> Diaspora 
Greek "scattering". Often used to refer to the Jewish communities 
living among the gentiles outside the "Holy Land" of 
Canaan/Palestine. 
> Dinar 
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Basic currency unit consisting of 1,000 fils; created in 1950 as 
replacement for the Palestinian pound. Dinar's value was 
established at parity with the British pound sterling, or a value of 
US$2.80 equal to JDI. Jordan, as a member of the sterling area, 
maintained parity with the British pound until 1967 when the 
British devalued their currency. Jordan did not follow the pound, 
retaining the dinar at US$2.80 equal to JD through 1972. when 
United States currency was devalued in 1973, the dinar was 
unlinked from the dollar, since which time the rate has fluctuated. 
Beginning in February 1975, the dinar was pegged to the special 
drawing right (SDR-q.v.). 
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF-q.v.) data, the 
average conversion rate of the dinar for trade and other purposes 
was US$3.04 In 1987, US$2.1 in 1988, and US$1.54 in 1989. 
> Disengagement 
Refers to Jordan's legal disengagement from the West Bank on 
July 31, 1988. 
> East Bank 
The area east of the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and the series 
of wadis from the Dead sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. Roughly the 
former Amirate of Transjordan. 
> Eisenhower, Dwight D. 
American general and 34**^  president of the United States 
between 1953-61. In 1942 he named U.S. Commander of the 
European theater of Operations. He commanded the American 
landings in North Africa and in February 1943 became chief of 
all Allied forces in North Africa. After successfully directing the 
invasions of Sicily and Italy, he was called to England to become 
chief commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. He was 
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largely responsible for the cooperation of the Allied armies in the 
battle for the liberation of the European continent. 
> Fatah 
The largest and most important of the organizations that make up 
the PLO. Fatah, which means "conquest" in Arabic, was founded 
in secret in the late 1950s and appeared publicly on the scene in 
1965. in 1968 it took over the PLO, and its leader, Yasir Arafat 
became the organization's chairman. 
> Fedayeen 
In 1955, Egyptian President Nasser introduced a new from of 
warfare to the Arab-Israeli conflict, terrorists called fedayeen 
("One who sacrifices himself"). Nasser trained and equipped the 
fedayeen to engage in hostile action on the border and infiltrate 
Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The fedayeen 
operated mainly from bases in Jordan so that country would bear 
the brunt of Israel's retaliation, which inevitably followed. The 
terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that 
prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces. 
> Gaza - Jericho (Cairo Agreement) 
In May 4, 1994, agreement implementing Israel's withdrawal of 
forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The agreement detailed 
various aspects of Palestinian self-rule, including the respective 
roles of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian police force, as 
well as border arrangements. The Cairo Agreement was superseded 
by the Interim Agreement ("Oslo 11") of September 28, 1995. 
> Gaza Strip 
Narrow, 25-mile long strip of land along the Mediterranean Sea 
that Israel captured from Egypt in the 1967 War. A hotbed of 
anti-Israeli terrorism for many years, the region is home to 
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750,000-800,000 Palestinian Arabs, in addition to about 4,000 
Jews. The Cairo Agreement of May 4, 1994, has led to autonomy 
for the Gaza Strip's Palestinian residents within the framework of 
an Israeli military withdrawal from the region. 
> GDP (gross domestic product) 
A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services 
produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. 
Only output values of goods for final consumption and for 
intermediate production are assumed to be included in final 
prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market 
prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; 
when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor 
cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of 
physical assets have not been made. 
> GNP (gross national product) 
GDP (q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from 
transactions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest 
measurement of the output of goods and services by an 
economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include 
indirect taxes and subsides. Because indirect taxes and 
subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at 
factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsides. 
> Golan Heights 
Militarily and strategically important region that Israel captured 
from Syria in the Six-Day War. 
> Haganah 
Clandestine Jewish organization for armed self-defence in 
Palestine under the British Mandate, that eventually became the 
nucleus of the Israel Defense Forces. 
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> Hamas 
Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a 
fundamentalist group that rejects all discussion of peace with 
Israel, including the current Israeli-PLO negotiations. 
> International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Established along with the world Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a 
specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is 
responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and 
payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans 
to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) 
when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These 
loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal 
economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are 
developing countries. 
> Intifada 
(Arabic, lit. "shaking off."). Palestinian civil uprising in Gaza and 
the West Bank December 1987-September 1993, to protest 
Israeli occupation 
> Israel 
A name given to the Jewish patriarch Jacob according to the 
etiology of Genesis 32.38. in Jewish biblical times, this name refers 
to the northern tribes, but also to the entire nation. Historically, 
Jews have continued to regard themselves as the true continuation 
of the ancient Israelite national-religious community. In modern 
times, it also refers to the political state of Israel. 
> Jihad 
Centuries-old Arabic term translated literally as "holy war" or 
"endeavor." In recent years, Muslim fighters, especially in the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict, have used the term almost solely to mean 
"holy war 
> Karameh 
PLO base in Jordan in the 1960s and located in Jordan Valley 
near the Dead Sea 
> Kibbutz 
(pi. Kibbutzim). A communal settlement in Israel. 
> Knesset 
The parliament of the State of Israel. Its name and the number of 
its members are based on the "Knesset Hagdola" of the early 
Second Temple period. It is composed of 120 representatives of 
different political parties, elected for a four-year term 
> Lebanon War 
June 1982 conflict in which the Israel Defense Forces conducted 
a military operation in Lebanon to drive out the PLO, which had 
been shelling northern Israeli towns. The majority of Israel's 
forces withdrew in 1985. 
> Likud 
Israeli political alignment, including the nationalist populist Herut 
party and the centrist Liberal party, plus several smaller parties 
> Madrid Peace Conference 
Conference sponsored and organized in 1991 by the U.S. and 
Russian in the aftermath of the Gulf War, in which Israel and its 
Arab neighbors commenced bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations on a wide variety from peace to economic issues to 
water. This was the first that Arab countries other than Egypt met 
Israel before the world. Today's ongoing peace process between 
Israel and the PLO, Jordan, and Syria has origins in the Madrid 
Peace conference. 
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> Muslim Brothers (Al-lkhwan Ai-Muslimun) 
An organization started in 1929 by Hassan Al-Banna to 
overthrow the secular government in Egypt and return to a 
fundamentalist Islamic government. The organization grew and 
spread to other Arab countries and is responsible for other 
Islamic organizations that have emerged since then. 
> Nabateans 
Arab tribes inhabited southern part of Transjordan from the third 
century BCE to the seventh century CE. The Nabateans were 
nomads at first, then became travelers and led caravans along 
the Spice Route. 
> Negev 
The southern, mostly arid region of Israel. 
> Palestinian 
Narrowly, a citizen of the British mandated territory of Palestine 
(1922-48). Generally, a Muslim or Christian native or descendant 
of a native of the region between the Egyptian Sinai and 
Lebanon and west of the Jordan river-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba 
line who identifies himself primarily as a Palestinian. 
> Oslo 
Capital of Norway, site of secret talks in 1993 between Israel and 
the PLO that led to mutual recognition and the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles. Refers generally to the multistage 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. 
> Palestine National Council (PNC) 
The PLCs highest decision-making body. Composed of nearly 
600 members from all PLO factions, it meets once every few 
years to set the organization's long-term goals and policies. 
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> Palestine National Front (PNF) 
Formed in January 1973 to coordinate nationalist resistance. The 
group was outlawed by Israel in 1978. 
> Palestinian Authority (PA) 
The Palestinian autonomous government in the West Bank and 
Gaza areas from which the Israeli Defense Forces have 
redeployed since the 1994 Gaza-Jericho agreement and the 
1995 Interim Agreement ("Oslo II"). 
> Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) 
Formed in 1964 as the PLO's military branch led by Yasser 
Arafat. After Oslo this group was observed by the PA security 
units. 
> Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) 
Founded in 1964 after an Arab League decision. In 1969 Yasser 
Arafat took the organization over and became the chairman. 
> Pluralism 
A general term for situations in which a variety of perspectives 
are accommodated, or at least tolerated, within the recognized 
system; e.g., America as a pluralistic society. 
> Sanctions 
Penalties levied by an authority for not complying with an order 
or law. 
> Sharif (Arabic pi., Ashraf) 
An individual who claims to be and is accepted as a descendant 
of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. 
> Shaykh 
Leader or chief. Word used to mean either a political leader or a 
learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific. Frequently 
spelled sheikh or sheik. 
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> Sinai Peninsula 
Desert region located to Israel's southwest. Israel captured the 
Sinai in the Six-Day War but returned it to Egypt as part of the 
1979 peace treaty between the two countries. 
> Sykes-Pico Agreement 
Secret agreement named after Britain's Sir mark Sykes and 
France's Charles Geogres PIcot. Signed by Britain and France in 
May 1916, the agreement divided the Ottoman Empire among 
them. Lebanon and Syria were to be French spheres of influence 
while Jordan and Iraq were to be controlled by Britain. Palestine 
was supposed to be internationalized but wound up coming 
under British rule. 
> Tel Aviv 
Israel's largest and most cosmopolitan city, located along the 
Mediterranean coast. 
> Transjordanian 
Narrowly, a citizen of the Amirate of Transjordan (1921-46). 
Generally, a Muslim or Christian native of the region east of the 
Jordan River-Dead Sea-Gulf of Aqaba line and within the 
approximate boundaries of the contemporary state of Jordan, 
that is, of the East Bank (q.v.). 
> United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 
Resolution adopted in 1967 that established the principle of land 
for peace. The resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, as well as 
calling for the Arab states to recognize that every State in the 
area has the right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force. UNSC Resolution 
242 also stresses the importance of freedom of navigation 
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through Middle East water ways and a just settlement of the 
refugee problem. 
> United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 
Resolution adopted in 1973 calling for a cease-fire in the Yom Kippur 
War, the implementation of UNSC Resolution 242 and negotiations 
between the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
> UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency) 
Founded in 1949 as a Palestinian emergency assistance 
organization. Its mandate is to provide education, health and 
relief services. Its headquarters are in Gaza. 
> West Bank 
The area west of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea, which was 
annexed by Jordan in 1950. Area has been under Israeli 
occupation since the June 1967 War. In July 1988, King Hussein 
renounced Jordan's claim to the West Bank. 
> World Bank 
Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated 
international institutions: The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD), the International Development 
Association (IDA), and the International finance Corporation (IFC). 
> Wye River Memorandum 
Agreement signed on October 23, 1998 for the implementation of 
Oslo II agreement and to resume final status talks. The 
memorandum included giving the PA control over 13% of the 
West bank, changing the PLO Charter, opening of the Gaza 
airport, reduction of the number of Palestinian Police and the 
release of Palestinian prisoners. The full extent of agreements 
were not carried out. 
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